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Leasing Consumer Goods: The Spotlight ShiftS to
the Uniform Consumer Leases Act
RALPH J. ROHNER*
"lA]n important challenge for consumer financial services
law and lawyers in the twenty-first century is to rationalize
that area of law by creating a clearer and more simple and
uniform system of rules to govern everyday consumer finan-
cial transactions. In other words, to do for consumer finan-
cial services law what the Uniform Commercial Code
(U, C. C.) did for commercial transactions. Last year [2001],
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws (NCCUSL) took a step in that direction by promulgat-
ing the Uniform Consumer Leases Act (UCLA) for possible
enactment by the states. That enactment would make the law
in this area uniform on both the federal and state levels, and
do much to smoothly coordinate the two. '
As a participant throughout the drafting process for the Uniform Con-
sumer Leases Act ("U.C.L.A." or "the Act"),2 I believe that the Act de-
serves serious consideration in the state legislatures to fill gaps in existing
Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America School of Law. The author was the
N.C.C.U.S.L. Reporter for the Uniform Consumer Leases Act drafting project. The views expressed
here are the author's own, and are not attributable to the Drafting Committee or N.C.C.U.S.L. The
author is grateful for the research assistance of Michael M. Gordon, Catholic University Law School
Class of 2003, and for access to the electronic databases of the law firm of Hudson Cook LLP and the
Consumer Credit Compliance Company, LLC, both of Linthicum, MD.
I Lynne B. Barr et al., Introduction to the 2002 Annual Survey of Consumer Finance Services
Law, 57 BuS. LAW. 1157, 1157 (2002) (internal citations omitted).
2 The Uniform Consumer Leases Act ("U.C.L.A.") and its Official Comments are published in
UNIF. CONSUMER LEASES ACT, 7A U.L.A. 3 (2002). They are also available through the web site of
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, available at http://www.nccusl.org
(last visited Nov. 9, 2002) (on file with Connecticut Law Review).
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consumer protections for consumer lessees.3 The Act complements the
Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C.") Article 2A (Leases), which creates
a basic legal framework for all leases of goods, commercial and consumer
alike, and the federal Consumer Leasing Act,4 which prescribes advertising
and disclosure rules for consumer leases. The U.C.L.A. is also intended to
reinforce, or be reinforced by, certain existing state laws, such as those
prohibiting unfair or deceptive acts or practices ("U.D.A.P.") laws and
"lemon laws," which provide remedies for defective goods. There are scat-
tered existing state laws specifically dealing with consumer leases, some of
which are limited to motor vehicle leases. These laws would, for the most
part, be repealed if the U.C.L.A. is enacted. The U.C.L.A. can be com-
pared generally to the various state "retail installment sales acts" applicable
to credit sales of motor vehicles and other consumer goods. It provides for
disclosure of lease terms, restricts (or in some cases requires) certain lease
provisions and practices, regulates the process of terminating a consumer
lease, and provides an enforcement structure that includes private and pub-
lic remedies.
I. SETTING THE STAGE: LEASING VS. BUYING
A. Emergence of Lease Products for Marketing Consumer Goods
Sedans, coupes, SUVs, pick-up trucks, muscle cars-motor vehicles of
every sort; computers, sofas, refrigerators, A/V entertainment systems,
pianos, piccolos--even perhaps a tuba for an aspiring high school band
member: These are typical of the "goods" American consumers crave to
own and use. Consumer access to these and similar goods has been a
benchmark of the quality of life in our times. Producers and distributors of
these consumer goods compete vigorously in their marketing, seeking cus-
tomers willing to pay cash or to finance the acquisition through a credit
sale or purchase money loan.5 That marketing competition now includes
3 Connecticut is the first state to enact the U.C.L.A. Uniform Consumer Leases Act, 2002 Conn.
Pub. Acts 02-81 (Reg. Sess.). References to the Connecticut U.C.L.A. hereinafter are to "CONN.
U.C.L.A."
4 15 U.S.C. §§ 1667-1667f(2000). The Act is implemented through the Federal Reserve Board's
Regulation M, 12 C.F.R. § 213 (2002).
5 "Credit sale" generally refers to a transaction in which the seller extends credit by deferring
payment of the purchase price over time. See Truth in Lending (Regulation Z), 12 C.F.R. §
226.2(a)(16). The Uniform Consumer Credit Code similarly defines "consumer credit sale," UNIF.
CONSUMER CREDIT CODE (U.C.C.C.) § 1.301(12) (1974). The U.C.C.C. is published in 7 U.L.A.
(2002). In addition, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") uses the comparable phrase "financed
sale." FTC Trade Regulation Rule on Preservation of Consumers' Claims and Defenses, 16 C.F.R. §
433.1(e) (2002). A "purchase money loan" generally means a transaction in which a lender advances
funds to a buyer to enable the buyer to purchase goods from a seller. See id. § 433.1(d). Both transac-
tion forms--credit sale and purchase money loan-usually include a security interest covering "pur-
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offering consumers the option to lease the item of choice on a relatively
long-term basis,6 rather than buy it outright. Consumers shop with their
feet, and with their hearts, and sometimes with their brains, and often find
the lease option to be an attractive one.7
The great bulk of goods leased to consumers are motor vehicles. By
the mid-1990s, more than one-third of all new cars delivered at retail were
leased rather than sold.' That proportion has flattened or even shrunk in
recent years,9 but remains a significant portion of the new car market.
Leases of other forms of goods tend to cluster in niche markets, such as
furniture for transient consumers, computers and other electronics systems,
and musical instruments for family or household use. In the auto markets,
most dealers offer lease and sale options side by side, or car by car: The
customer may select the vehicle first, and the financing method later. Fur-
niture and musical instrument lessors tend to specialize in lease arrange-
ments. Overall, a significant, but certainly not dominant, portion of the
marketing of consumer goods is in lease format.
B. Why Lease, Not Buy?
What makes the lease option attractive? For the merchant dealer or
leasing company, it is a financing alternative they can offer at attractive
rates of return, to induce consumers to acquire goods they might not wish,
or be able, to purchase for cash or finance on a conventional credit basis.
chase money collateral" and securing a "purchase money obligation" as those terms are used in the
U.C.C. U.C.C. § 9-103(a) (2002).
6 Consumers may have short-term lease or rental options as well, such as for a vacation car rental
or the weekend rental of garden tools, but these are not really options to purchasing those goods.
"Rent-to-own" or "rental-purchase" transactions are something of a hybrid; they are typically written as
short-term obligations (weekly or monthly), but are automatically renewable for an extended period,
and the consumer becomes the owner on completion of payments over that span. Susan Lorde Martin
& Nancy White Huckins, Consumer Advocates vs. the Rent-To-Own Industry: Reaching a Reasonable
Accommodation, 34 AM. BUS. L.J. 385, 385-86 (1997) (discussing typical rent-to-own transactions);
David L. Ramp, Renting to Own in the United States, 24 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 797 (1990) (discussing
rent-to-own contracts).
7The following quote exemplifies the reasons why leasing is so popular with consumers:
It's easy to see why consumers find leasing so seductive. After all, with little or no
money down and for a "low" monthly payment, you can drive an automobile you
never imagined you could afford to own.... With a lease, the scent of fresh leather
upholstery need never leave your nostrils.
It's the Lease You Can Do, CONSUMER REP., Jan. 2001, at 12.
8 See AFSA Spotlight on Financial Services, Auto Leasing Slows, at
http://www.spotlightonfinance.com/free/Stories/story9.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2002) (on file with the
Connecticut Law Review).
9A trade association Web page succinctly describes the shrinkage of market share:
Personal use leases accounted for 32.7 percent of new vehicle sales (autos and light
trucks) in the first nine months of 1999, down from 34.2 percent in the same period a
year earlier .... CNW Marketing/Research predicts that leasing will account for less
than 30 percent of new vehicle sales in 2000, the lowest level since 1993.
2003]
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So long as the rent charges imposed and the disposition value of the goods
at the end of the lease term hold to the lessor's projections, the lease ar-
rangement has profit opportunities (and risks) not unlike those in secured
credit sales-including the right to repossess the goods on default.'0 There
may also be tax and accounting advantages for the lessor who leases rather
than sells its inventory. From the consumer viewpoint, leasing goods over
an agreed period of time typically requires less front-end cash (small or no
down-payment), and generally smaller monthly payments for goods of
comparable quality, than a credit purchase." In the auto leasing context,
why buy a Chevrolet when you can lease a Cadillac for the same cash
flow? Of course, the consumer's "risk" is that no ownership equity ac-
crues during the lease term, and on the expiration of the lease the consumer
surrenders the goods back to the lessor and looks for a new car.
C. Contrasting Lease and Sale
The essential legal components of a lease contract covered by the
U.C.L.A. are explored more fully below. For the moment it is enough to
contrast a lease to its marketplace alternative, a sale. On delivery of the
goods to the buyer in a cash sale or an unsecured credit sale, the buyer ac-
quires "title" to the property." That is, the buyer has the right to perma-
nent possession and use of the property, and can keep, donate, or resell it at
his discretion, enjoying both the benefits and the risks of long-term durabil-
ity or depreciation of the property. Even when the buyer purchases on se-
cured credit, the buyer becomes the owner and the creditor's rights in the
property are limited to a security interest 4 that is enforceable only on the
10 See U.C.C. § 2A-525 (right to repossession in a lease); id. § 9-609 (right to repossession in a
secured credit transaction). One attraction of casting the transaction as a lease is to free the lessor from
the strictures of U.C.C. Article 9 relating to foreclosure and disposition of collateral.
II In a purchase on credit, the buyer will pay the full value of the goods over the specified pay-
ment period, e.g., thirty-six months for an auto loan. The buyer will then own the vehicle outright,
unencumbered by any continuing security interest, with (usually) a number of years of useful life or
resale/trade-in value left in it. In a thirty-six-month lease, by contrast, the lessee's rent payments only
need to cover part of the value of the goods-roughly the expected depreciation of the goods over the
three-year lease period. The goods then revert to the lessor who can sell or re-lease the goods to re-
cover their remaining value.
12 One report noted the upscale effect of auto leasing: In 1999 "59.4 percent of Mercedes cars
were leased v. 5.5 percent of Ford cars." AFSA Spotlight on Financial Services, Auto Leasing Slows,
at http://www.spotlightonfinance.com/freeStories/story9.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2002) (on file with
the Connecticut Law Review).
13 Section 2-106(1) of the U.C.C. states that "a 'sale' consists in the passing of title from the
seller to the buyer for a price." U.C.C. § 2-106(1). Generally, "title passes to the buyer at the time and
place at which the seller completes his performance with reference to the physical delivery of the
goods." Id. § 2-401(2). The legal rights, obligations, and remedies of buyers and sellers generally
operate "irrespective of title to the goods." Id. § 2-401.
Id. § 1-201(37) ("[T]he retention or reservation of title by a seller of goods ... is limited in ef-
fect to a reservation of a security interest.").
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debtor-buyer's default, subject to numerous protections for the buyer's
equity."5  When the secured party in a consumer credit sale sells-
"hypothecates"-its rights to a secondary financer, that assignee generally
acquires only the limited rights of the assignor. 6 Throughout, the buyer
remains the title holder of the goods bought. The merchant's pricing of a
credit sale requires only setting a cash price and then adding credit and
related charges 7 that will compensate for the time value of money and the
risk of default during the payment period.
A lease, by contrast, is defined in the U.C.C. as "the right to possession
and use of goods for a term in return for consideration."'" The consumer
gets to keep and drive the leased car, but only for a specified period of
time, in exchange for rent payments that are the consideration. 9 The lessee
acquires no semblance of title or ownership. Thus, on the basis of the lease
alone, the lessor may repossess the goods-the lessor's property, after
all-when the lessee does not pay or otherwise defaults, and the lessee
must return the goods at the expiration of the lease (or may buy the goods
at a "purchase option" price, if one is offered). As a general theory, unless
the parties agree otherwise, the depreciation risk, and the risk of physical
casualty to the goods, remain with the lessor.2° If the lessor wants to assign
its lease paper to secondary financers, it may do so, but typically the lessor
will assign not only the lessee's payment obligation, but also title to the
15 See id. §§ 9-611 to 9-614 (notification before disposition of collateral); id. § 9-616(b) (explana-
tion of surplus or deficiency); id. § 9-620(e) (mandatory disposition of collateral); id. § 9-623 (right to
redeem collateral). Other law may provide the buyer/debtor additional protections, such as a right to
cure a default. See, e.g., U.C.C.C. §§ 5.109-.111 (2002).
16 U.C.C. § 9-404. The FTC Rule on Preservation of Consumers' Claims and Defenses
eliminates "holder in due course" protections for assignees of most consumer credit sale or purchase
money loan obligations. 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (2002). The U.C.C. reinforces this in secured transactions
by nullifying waiver of defense clauses in consumer contracts. U.C.C. § 9-403(d).
For disclosure purposes under the Truth in Lending Act, the basic cost of credit is the "Finance
Charge," defined in great detail in Regulation Z. 12 C.F.R. § 226.4 (2002). However, that definition
excludes from the Finance Charge numerous known or contingent charges that the borrower will or
may pay, such as security interest filing fees, insurance premiums, late fees, delinquency and default
charges, and certain mortgage settlement costs. See id.
t8 U.C.C. § 2A-103(1)(j).
t9 By long-standing convention in both real and personal property leasing, rent payments are con-
sidered earned and are usually payable at the beginning of each rental period. Thus in a contemporary
auto lease, the customer typically pays the first month's rent at closing, i.e., before delivery of the car,
and makes the final rent payment a month before the lease expires. By contrast, credit obligations are
conventionally due at the end of each payment period. The automobile buyer usually makes her first
payment a month after closing and delivery of the car, and the final payment at the end of the last
month of the payment schedule.
20 See U.C.C. § 2A-219. Under the U.C.C. the parties to a lease are free to allocate depreciation,
casualty, and other leasehold risks by contract, and in fact it is mainstream practice to allocate some or
all of those risks to the lessee. Id. §§ 1-102(3), 2A-102 & official cmt. This is true unless non-U.C.C.
statutory law prohibits the risk allocation. See id. § 2A-104(1)(c). A lease under Article 2A is also




Leases have become a common and accepted alternative means for
consumers to acquire the use of goods they desire for transportation,
household use, or other purposes. Leases are offered in the same general
markets as cash and credit sales. Leases involve, by and large, the same
consumers, the same merchants and financers, and the same marketing
ingenuity and dynamics that have prompted a half century of federal and
state consumer protection laws for cash and credit customers.2 So what
does a newly-arrived, twenty-first century, Uniform Consumer Leases Act
bring to the consumer protection table? How does it relate to, and fit into,
the existing legal environment for consumer transactions? Before dissect-
ing the U.C.L.A. itself, it is necessary to appreciate the legal environment
for consumer leases before the U.C.L.A.'s arrival. Some, but not all, of
existing law affecting leases of goods will continue to apply even after the
U.C.L.A. is enacted.
II. THE EXISTING LEGAL ENVIRONMENT FOR CONSUMER LEASES
The law of leasing has developed through a predictable path, from
common law roots to an array of federal and state statutory enactments.
While some of this existing law may be displaced by the U.C.L.A., much
of it will continue in place.
A. Pre-Statutory Rules
The acquisition of capital assets (in our case, consumer goods) through
leases is hardly brand new. 3 The contemporary short-term rent-a-car in-
dustry has been around for decades, as have short-term rentals of lawn
tools, furniture, party equipment, and the like.24 Even earlier, leases of
personal property were long recognized as distinctive, legitimate market
21 In a typical motor vehicle lease, the original "lessor" is the retail car dealer, who has pre-
arranged to assign the customer contract to a financial institution or finance company. The registration
and certificate of title for the car will usually be in the name of that assignee. But if the assignee further
transfers its leases, such as for securitization, title to the goods may be left with the first assignee who
will continue to handle collections and other servicing of those transactions.
22 See generally DEE PRIDOEN, CONSUMER CREDIT AND THE LAW (West 2000) (tracking con-
sumer credit protection laws); DEE PRIDGEN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE LAW (West 2002)
(charting modem consumer protection laws).
23 Transactions equivalent to leases "have roots that date back thousands of years." Edwin E.
Huddleson, Ill, Old Wine in New Bottles: U.C.C. Article 2A-Leases, 39 ALA. L. REv. 615, 616 n.I
(1988) (citation omitted). Justice Story, in the middle of the nineteenth century, wrote of the law of
"bailments for hire." JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS § 368 (Fred B.
Rothman & Co., 8th ed. 1986) (1870).
24 See generally RAY ANDREWS BROWN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY Ch;
X (Calloghan & Co. 1936) (providing an early twentieth century perspective on "bailments" of goods).
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transactions." Long-term motor vehicle leases at the retail level trace per-
haps to Henry Ford. Variants such as hire-purchase contracts in Great
Britain,26 and rent-to-own contracts in the United States" also have long
and distinctive roots. The law originally governing all of these arrange-
ments was the common law of property and contracts, until such time as
state legislation began to address consumer leases specifically. z8 The
courts fashioned a not very uniform body of case law guidance, borrowing
from real property law, common law, or statutory law dealing with sales of
goods.29 This common law of leases continued to be the dominant source
of substantive lease-law authority, especially in the burgeoning field of
commercial equipment leasing, until the promulgation of U.C.C. Article
2A in 1988.30
In light of other federal and state statutory developments, discussed be-
low3 and now including the U.C.L.A., common law lease precedents
probably have little role in the matrix of statutory consumer protection
rules for leases. Occasionally, these common law precedents will serve as
"supplementary general principles of law"32 when not displaced by U.C.C.
Article 2A or other statutory directives.
B. The Federal Consumer Leasing Act
Although the U.C.C.C., first promulgated in 1968 and revised in 1974,
dealt with some aspects of consumer leases, that act was not widely en-
acted.33 The first nationwide legislation dealing with consumer leases of
personal property came from Congress. It was the federal Consumer Leas-
25 Id.
26 See A. D. Hughes, Hire-Purchase in Modern Britain, J. BUS. L. 307 (1967); R. G. Lawson, The
Future of the Hire-Purchase Contract, 126 NEw L.J. 1060 (1976).
27 See sources cited supra note 6. In 2002, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a bill that
would add the "Rent-To-Own Protection Act" as a new Title X to the Consumer Credit Protection Act,
establishing federal disclosure rules for rent-to-own transactions. H.R. 2498, 107th Cong. (1st Sess.
2001). There was no action by the U.S. Senate. This industry-supported bill is a response to aggressive
legislation and litigation in some states to treat rent-to-own transactions more like credit sales. If en-
acted by Congress, this bill would reinforce the distinctiveness of rent-to-own transactions, compared
to credit sales (with disclosures under the Truth in Lending Act) and longer-term leases (with disclo-
sure under the federal Consumer Leasing Act). Section 1011 of the proposed act specifies that the
federal Consumer Leasing Act does not apply to a rent-to-own transaction. See id.
28 See infra note 112.
29 It was tempting, probably irresistible, for courts facing lease issues to look to U.C.C. Article 2
for guidance, since that Article states its own scope as "transactions in goods," not literally limited to
sales. An early leading case is Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Service, 212 A.2d 769, 775-
76 (N.J. 1965) (adopting U.C.C. Article 2 warranty rules for a lease transaction).
30 U.C.C. art. 2A (2002).
31 See infra Part II.B-D.
32 U.C.C. § 1-103; see also U.C.L.A. § 106 (2002).
33 William J. Woodward, Private Legislation in the United States-How the Uniform Commercial
Code Becomes Law, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 451,466 (1999).
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ing Act of 197614 ("C.L.A."), enacted in the heyday of federal intervention
in the consumer financial services markets.a5 The C.L.A. was formally
proposed and initially drafted by the Federal Reserve Board 6 as part of its
monitoring function under the Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968
("C.C.P.A."),3 7 and was a natural extension of the transactional disclosure
philosophy embodied in the Truth in Lending Act a few years earlier.
The C.L.A. was not considered radical at the time.3' The act was
signed into law in 1976, as Chapter 5 of the Truth in Lending Act
('T.I.L.A.") (and by virtue of that location it shares the T.I.L.A. enforce-
ment structure)., 9 The C.L.A. laid out a disclosure framework for con-
sumer leases, including lease advertising and transactional disclosures,
with the details to be refined in regulations of the Federal Reserve Board.
These regulations, known as Regulation M, 4' remained virtually untouched
34 15 U.S.C. §§ 1667-1667f(2000).
35 In the decade beginning in 1968 Congress enacted:
- The Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1692), containing
the Truth in Lending Act and restrictions on wage garnishments and "extortionate" credit, and creating
the National Commission on Consumer Finance;
- The Unsolicited Credit Card and Truth in Lending Amendments of 1970 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 1601);
" The Fair Credit Reporting Act (1970) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681);
" The Fair Credit Billing Act (1974) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1601);
" The Equal Credit Opportunity Act (1974) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1691);
" The Consumer Leasing Act (1976) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1667);
" Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments (1976) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1691);
" Magnuson-Moss Warranty & Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act (1974) (codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. § 2301);
- The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (1974), and Real Estate Settlement Procedures
Act Amendments (1975) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 2607 (2000));
-The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (1977) (codified at IS U.S.C. § 1692); and
3 The Electronic Fund Transfer Act (1978) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1693).
36 BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. REs. SYS., 61st ANNUAL REPORT 268 (1974).
Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968). This was the umbrella legislation that included the
Truth in Lending Act as Title I. Over the years the C.C.P.A. has become the host for a number of
additional titles including the Credit Repair Organizations Act (Title IV), the Fair Credit Reporting Act
(Title VI), the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (Title VII), the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (Title
VIll), the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (Title IX), and others.
38 This author was staff counsel to the Senate Banking Committee at the time, and participated
extensively in the legislative processing of the C.L.A. "[T]he consumer leasing bills in both houses of
Congress were almost completely noncontroversial." Ralph J. Rohner, Consumer Credit Legislation in
the Ninety-Fourth Congress-and a Look Ahead, 9 U.C.C. L.J. 307, 330 (1977). The major consumer
finance bill in that congressional session was the Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments, Pub. L.
No. 94-329, 90 Stat. 251 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f).
39 15 U.S.C. § 1667d; 15 U.S.C. §§ 1607, 1640. T.I.L.A., and thus the C.L.A., authorize en-
forcement by federal agencies and through private civil actions for actual and statutory damages (plus
costs and attorney's fees).
40 12 C.F.R. § 213 (2002). The Federal Reserve Board staff has also issued an extensive Com-
mentary on Regulation M. Id.
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for almost twenty years, but by the early 1990s it was apparent that Regula-
tion M needed an overhaul to reflect contemporary leasing practices. After
an extended drafting and consultation period, and with a push from Con-
gress,4' the Federal Reserve issued a new version of Regulation M in
1996,42 with an effective date of January 1, 1998. The revised Regulation
M has been generally well-received.43
The federal C.L.A. is not of universal application to all leases to con-
sumers. The lease must involve an individual (a "natural person") leasing
personal property" for personal, family or household purposes.45 The lease
obligation must extend beyond four months,' which excludes short-term
rentals and most rent-to-own leases,47 and the contract obligation must be
$25,000 or less.48 The C.L.A. also does not apply to a "dirty lease," i.e., a
transaction that is in fact a credit sale with a security interest.49 Such a
transaction is treated as a credit transaction subject to T.I.L.A. and Regula-
tion Z °
41 In an otherwise unrelated law, the Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act
of 1996, Congress amended the C.L.A. somewhat to expand and focus the Federal Reserve Board's
regulatory responsibilities under that act. 15 U.S.C. § 1667f.
42 Regulation M, 61 Fed. Reg. 52,246 (Oct. 7, 1996) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 213).
43 See Jacqueline S. Akins, Regulation M-"New and Improved. " 52 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP.
413, 423 (1998); Elizabeth A. Huber & Thomas B. Hudson, Road Testing the New Regulation M, 53
Bus. LAW. 1011 (1998).
44 Both the C.L.A. and Regulation M state coverage in terms of leases of "personal property,"
rather than "goods" as in U.C.C. Article 2A and in the U.C.L.A. See U.C.C. § 2A-103(h) (2002).
There is a potential divergence of coverage here. The C.L.A. defines "personal property" as "any
property that is not real property." 12 C.F.R. § 213.2(l). "Goods," in the uniform state acts, are said to
mean "all things that are movable ... but the term does not include money, documents, instruments,
accounts, chattel paper, general intangibles, or minerals or the like .... " U.C.C. § 2A-103(lXh).
Section 102(aX5) of the U.C.L.A. is virtually identical. Thus, the federal C.L.A. would literally apply
to a lease of intangibles or choses in action that are excluded from U.C.C. Article 2A and the U.C.L.A.
While consumers do not often rent intangible personal property, C.L.A. coverage could extend to a
"lease" of computer software, a "general intangible" in U.C.C. terms. See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(44) & cmt.
4.a (stating that 'goods' and 'software' ... are mutually exclusive").
15 U.S.C. § 1667(l); 12 C.F.R. § 213.2(e).
46 15 U.S.C. § 1667(l).
47 Rent-to-own contracts typically obligate the lessee only one rental period (a week or a month)
at a time. The lessee can terminate the arrangement at the end of any period by returning the goods to
the lessor.
48 This means the total the consumer lessee will pay in front-end charges and monthly rent, but
not including the residual value of the goods. 12 C.F.R. § 213 cmt. 2(e)-3. This $25,000 figure has not
been changed since 1976, and obviously an upscale auto lease could easily fall outside of coverage.
For example, a thirty-six month lease with payments of $800 per month would equal $28,800.
49 Id. § 213(e)(2). This is essentially the same issue that recurs under U.C.C. section 1-201(37):
Whether the nominal "lease" transaction is really one in which the "lessee" will likely acquire the
whole useful life of the goods, as where the lessee may become the owner of the goods at the end of the
lease for no or nominal additional consideration. U.C.C. § 1-201(37).
50 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(16).
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Most of the 1996 revisions of the Regulation M disclosure rules were
common-sensical, to correct ambiguities and to reflect lease costs more
intelligibly,"' but several items were problematic and divisive. One such
item related to the disclosure of early termination charges-usually a quite
intricate formula for determining the lessee's pay-off responsibilities if the
lease is terminated ahead of schedule." Consumerists argued that lessors
should be required to disclose at the outset of the lease specific dollar pay-
off figures, at the very least an example of the early termination charge at
some point during the lease term." The industry contended that any such
Paraphrased for brevity, the current Regulation M requires these disclosures to be made, "as
applicable," before consummation of a consumer lease:
a. A description of the leased property;
b. Amount due at lease signing, itemized by type and amount;
c. Payment schedule and total amount of periodic payments;
d. Other charges, itemized by type and amount;
e. Total of payments;
f. In a vehicle lease, the payment calculation, including:
* Gross capitalized cost;
* Capitalized cost reduction;
* Adjusted capitalized cost;
* Residual value;
* Depreciation and any amortized amounts;
* Rent charge;
* Total of base periodic payments;
* The lease term;
* Amount of each base periodic payment;
* Itemization of other charges;
* Total periodic payment.
g: Early termination: conditions, charges, & notice;
h. Maintenance responsibilities;
i. Purchase option and price;
j. Statement referencing other information in the lease;
k. Liability for difference between residual and realized value;
I. Right of appraisal;
m. End-of-term liability (open-end leases);
n. Fees and taxes;
o. Insurance: coverage and cost;
p. Warranties or guarantees;
q. Penalties and delinquency charges;
r. Security interest;
s. Limitations on rate information.
12 C.F.R. § 213.4.
52 Id. § 213.4(g). This is roughly comparable to determining the unpaid principal balance when a
credit obligation is prepaid, except that the terminology here is the "unamortized adjusted capitalized
cost," or in the vernacular the "adjusted lease balance." It is complicated further by the fact that the
goods are being returned to the lessor and their realized value must usually be factored into the calcula-
tion.
Federal Reserve Board, Regulation M, Supplementary Information, 61 Fed. Reg. 52,246,
52,252-53 (Oct. 7 1996) (stating "other commenters [on the proposed revision of Regulation M] includ-
ing some lessors and many consumer representatives, favored a full description of all aspects of a
lessor's early termination method, along with an example of how that method would work").
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figures would be inherently misleading because lessors could not, at lease
signing, project the actual resale value of the car months or years in the
future. Case law had clouded the picture further by suggesting that com-
plex mathematical formulas were not "clear and conspicuous" as required
by law, when a typical consumer would not likely understand them.54 The
regulatory result was to prescribe a disclosure of "the conditions" for early
termination "and the amount or a description of the method for determin-
ing the amount of any penalty or other charge for early termination."" By
Commentary authorization, a lessor can satisfy this requirement by a short-
hand identification of the method-for example "the constant yield
method" 56-but must furnish the lessee a more detailed explanation on
request. In addition, in vehicle leases, there must be a warning as follows:
Early Termination. You may have to pay a substantial charge
if you end this lease early. The charge may be up to several
thousand dollars. The actual charge will depend on when the
lease is terminated. The earlier you end the lease, the greater
this charge is likely to be.57
A solomonic solution, perhaps. We can not explain the early-
termination formula to you, but you should know that it will cost you big
bucks! While this compromise may resolve the disclosure aspects of early
termination charges for the time being, the amounts of those charges are
still open for debate."
The other disclosure issue addressed by the Federal Reserve Board in
1996 was whether to require or permit disclosure of a "lease rate." As a
frame of reference, the linchpin disclosure for credit transactions under
T.I.L.A. is the Annual Percentage Rate ("APR")--a defined, standardized
54In the watershed case of Lundquist v. Security Pacific Auto Financial Services Corp., 993 F.2d
11 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 959 (1993), the court found that the early-termination provi-
sion in the lease was "not reasonably understandable," because it contained a "byzantine formula,
beyond the understanding of the average consumer." Lundquist, 993 F.2d at 15. This set off a round of
not-quite reconcilable holdings in other federal circuits, several taking a more tolerant view of the early
termination formula disclosure. See, e.g., Applebaum v. Nissan Motor Acceptance Corp., 226 F.3d
214, 221-23 (3d Cir. 2000); Channell v. Citicorp Nat'l Servs., Inc., 89 F.3d 379, 382-83 (7th Cir.
1996); Highsmith v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 18 F.3d 434,438-39 (7th Cir. 1994). The issue continues to
be litigated (under the old Regulation M). Clement v. Am. Honda Fin. Corp., 145 F. Supp. 2d 206,
211-15 (D. Conn. 2001).
55 12 C.F.R. § 213.4(gX) (emphasis added).
56 Id. § 213.4(g)(2) & cmt. 4.
57 Id. at § 213.4(g)(2) (emphasis omitted).
58 There has been a smattering of litigation on what is a "reasonable" formula or amount for early
termination charges. See, e.g., Miller v. Nissan Motor Acceptance Corp., No. CIV.A.99-4953, 2000
WL 1599244, at *31-'32 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 27, 2000).
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measure of the unit cost of credit stated as an annualized rate. 9 Most con-
sumers are familiar with advertised or quoted APRs, and may even have
shopped for credit on that basis. Theoretically it should be possible to cal-
culate a comparable rate in a lease setting; indeed lessors know to the
penny what their expected rate of return will be. A "lease rate" disclosure,
then, would permit consumers to compare the relative costliness of one
lease to another, and even to compare lease costs to credit costs. Congress
considered but declined to include a "lease rate" disclosure in the original
C.L.A. in 1976, feeling it was premature, or inappropriate, to impose that
disclosure (and computational) regimen on leases.' In the 1996 revision of
Regulation M, however, the issue surfaced again.61 But the Board declined
to impose a lease rate disclosure,62 persuaded by commenters and its own
in-house economic analysis63 that it was impossible to prescribe a "rate"
computation formula that could not be manipulated, or that would not be
subject to widely divergent rate numbers for what were otherwise almost
identical transactions." Instead, the revised Regulation M nominally per-
mits a lessor to advertise or provide a "rate" figure, but it must be accom-
panied by a notice stating that "this percentage may not measure the overall
cost of financing this lease," and the lessor cannot use "annual percentage
rate," "annual lease rate," or any equivalent terms.65 The issue of a "lease
rate" disclosure continued into the U.C.L.A. drafting process.'
59 15 U.S.C. § 1606 (2000); Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.14, 226.22; see also RALPH J.
ROHNER & FRED H. MILLER, TRUTH IN LENDING 179 (Am. Bar Ass'n 2000) (explaining the signifi-
cance of APRs in truth in lending).
60 S. REP. No. 94-590, at 5 (1976).
61 The Board requested comment on possible disclosure of a lease rate, both in its original Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking for Regulation M and in its Proposed Rule revising Regulation M. 60 Fed.
Reg. 48,757-58 (Sept. 20, 1995) (revision); 58 Fed. Reg. 61,035 (Nov. 19, 1993) (original).
62 Federal Reserve Board, Final Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. 52,246, 52,254-55 (Oct. 7, 1996).
63 Appendix I to the Preamble-Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, 61 Fed. Reg. 52, 269-81 (Oct. 7,
1996)outlining difficulties of lease rate disclosure).
Without getting too technical, the core problem is this: In a credit transaction, when the stream
of payments is completed, the "ending balance" [or the future value ["FV"] function on your calculator]
is virtually always $0-the loan will be paid off-and one can confidently calculate the APR that will
reflect the reduction of the original balance according to the schedule of payments. In a lease, however,
the ending balance is the projected value of the goods at the end of the lease term (technically, the
"residual value"): A figure that, at the time it is set and disclosed at lease signing, is an estimate. One
lessor's estimate of residual value may differ dramatically from another lessor's for the identical auto-
mobile, for a variety of reasons: Regional differences in expected wear and tear, use of a different
"guide book" on auto values, whether it is late or early in the model year, strategic marketing consid-
erations, factory subvention of prices, etc. The Federal Reserve staff study provides examples of eco-
nomically indistinguishable leases with different variables that would produce a range of supposed
"lease rates." Id. at 52,270.
65 12 C.F.R. § 213.4(s) (2002).
See infra Part V.D for a discussion of lease rates.
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Hardly any reported litigation has yet emerged under the revised Regu-
lation M. Case law under the older version of the regulation never ap-
proached the volume or intensity of litigation under Regulation Z,67 the
companion Federal Reserve Board regulation for credit transactions. The
major issue in the cases was the proper disclosure of early termination
charges, referred to above.6"
The original C.L.A. includes two substantive provisions, beyond the
pure disclosures just discussed. One addressed a then-hot button issue that
has faded in significance. The other remains a latent battleground for dis-
putes under the U.C.L.A. as well as under the C.L.A. Both involve limita-
tions on the lessee's liability at lease end.
The first is the matter of open-end leases.69 In the commercial context,
these are often referred to as "terminal rental adjustment clause" ("TRAC")
leases.7" These are leases in which the lessee bears the ultimate deprecia-
tion risk; i.e., at the end of the lease the goods are sold and the lessee is
responsible for any shortfall below the projected residual value of the
goods." In a simple example, if the lease projected that after thirty-six
months the leased car would be worth $15,000, and in fact it sells for only
$10,000, the lessee would be contractually obligated to pay the lessor the
$5,000 difference. This structure set off alarms for Congress, which per-
ceived that lessors might set artificially high residual values (with resulting
lower monthly payments), only to have the lessee confront a substantial
balloon obligation at lease end.72 The upshot is a provision in the C.L.A.
that effectively limits a lessee's liability in an open-end lease to three
monthly payments." The hot-button issue lurking in the background of
67 12 C.F.R. § 226.4.
68 See cases cited supra note 54.
69 Regulation M defines an "open-end lease" as a consumer lease in which the lessee's liability at
the end of the lease term is based on the difference between the residual value of the leased property
and its realized value. 12 C.F.R. § 213.2(i).
70 Huddleson, supra note 23, at 638-42. The hallmark of a closed-end lease, by contrast, is that at
lease end the lessee may return the goods (intact and with no more than normal wear and tear) and walk
away without further liability. 12 C.F.R. § 213.
71 12 C.F.R. § 714.2(d).
72 Some states had dealt with this problem by imposing statutory caps on the lessee's end-of-term
liability. See, e.g., U.C.C.C. § 3.401 (2002) ("The obligation of a lessee upon expiration of a consumer
lease.. . may not exceed twice the average payment allocable to a monthly period under the lease.").
Congress might have written a simple provision that put a precise limit on open-end lease li-
ability, like the U.C.C.C. provision in the preceding footnote. Instead, it wrote one of the most convo-
luted paragraphs imaginable. Section 183 unfolds as follows:
Estimates of residual value in open-end leases must be reasonable and in good faith;
There is a rebuttable presumption that the estimated residual value is not reasonable or
in good faith if it exceeds the actual residual value by more than three monthly pay-
ments;
* The lessor may not collect the excess amount unless it successfully sues the lessee (by
rebutting the presumption) and pays the lessee's attorney's fees;
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Section 183 had nothing to do with consumer protection, but rather with
the authority of national banks to engage in open-end leasing. Case law
had suggested that it was impermissible for a national bank to assume the
depreciation risk on property it financed.74 The "presumption" approach
was thought to solve this problem by leaving intact (ostensibly) the lessee's
obligation to pay the full depreciated value of the goods. 5 The U.C.L.A.
essentially replicates that provision.7 1 Open-end consumer leases are rare
these days, and there is not a single reported court decision applying the
open-end limitation in C.L.A. § 183(a).
The other substantive piece of the federal C.L.A. is its "reasonable-
ness" restraint on default and early termination charges in consumer
leases-a standard that also carries over into the U.C.L.A.7  Most lease
contracts specify the amounts, or formulas for fixing the amounts, of vari-
ous charges that may be imposed on the lessee for delinquency, default, or
early termination. These are in the nature of liquidated damages provi-
sions, traditionally tested by whether they provide a reasonable contract
remedy in lieu of calculating actual damages on a case by case basis. The
C.L.A. borrowed language from the liquidated damages provision in
U.C.C. Article 2,78 permitting such lease provisions,"but only at an amount
which is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual harm caused by
the delinquency, default, or early termination, the difficulties of proof of
loss, and the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an
adequate remedy."79
Litigation testing what is a "reasonable" early-termination liability
formula under this federal-law provision has not yet gotten to the appellate
courts.80 The U.C.L.A. attempts to refine the test somewhat, but the issue
remains an open one as discussed in more detail (in connection with sec-
tion 405 of the U.C.L.A.) in Part VII.D.
The presumption of unreasonableness and bad faith does not apply to excess wear and
tear; and
* The parties may agree, post-termination, on the amount of any excess residual liability.
15 U.S.C. § 1667b(a) (2000).
74 Rohner, supra note 38, at 334.
7 5 
ld.
76 U.C.L.A. § 307 (2002).
77 Id. § 106 official cmt.
78 U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (2002). Because, at the time, there was no Article 2A to state a liquidated
damages standard for leases, looking to Article 2 made sense.
15 U.S.C. § 1667c. Comparable language appears in both the U.C.C. and the U.C.L.A. See
U.C.C. § 2A-504; U.C.L.A. §§ 304,405; see also discussion infra Parts VIII.A.2, VIII.D.
80 The leading, or at least lengthiest, trial court decision to date is Miller v. Nissan Motor Accep-
tance Corp., No. CIV.A.99-4953, 2000 WL 1599244 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 27, 2000). See NAT'L CONSUMER
L. CTR., TRUTH IN LENDING § 9.5 (4th ed. 1999 & Supp. 2001) (outlining regulation of early termina-
tion charges and relevant case law).
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Thus federal law has for a quarter century specified the content and
format of transactional disclosures and advertising for most consumer
leases. It also sets baseline limitations on default and early termination
charges. This federal law preempts any state disclosure rules that are "in-
consistent,"'" but does not preclude additional state law disclosures or other
provisions that give "greater protection and benefit to the consumer."" Of
necessity, then, the state-law U.C.L.A. must co-exist with the federal
C.L.A.
C. Uniform Commercial Code Article 2A
By the 1980s leasing of goods for commercial and consumer purposes
had grown to the point that the sponsors of the Uniform Commercial Code
determined the need for a statutory framework for lease transactions. In-
stead of the parties, and courts, having to rely on elusive common law
precedents, or adapting rules from U.C.C. Article 2 (Sales) by analogy, a
codification of the law pertaining to. the leasing of goods would provide
rules that were responsive to contemporary practices while preserving
freedom of contract for the parties. The result was the promulgation in
1988 of U.C.C. Article 2A (Leases),83 which by 2002 had been adopted in
forty-nine states and the District of Columbia."'
Article 2A consciously tracks Article 2 in many respects, while also
acknowledging that U.C.C. Article 9 controls "lease" transactions that, in
economic fact, are security interests, not true leases. 5 Article 2A provides
rules for contract formation, delivery and performance obligations (includ-
ing warranties), repudiation and excuse, priority relationships with third
parties, and remedies on default by the lessor or lessee. It provides a statu-
tory backbone for the core contractual relationships in leases. But, like the
rest of the U.C.C., the primary subject matter for Article 2A is commercial
transactions, not consumer ones. While U.C.C. Article 2A provides useful
generic rules for leases of goods, it is not a consumer protection statute. In
fact, Article 2A expressly provides that a lease, though subject to Article
2A, is also subject to any applicable "consumer protection statute of this
State, or final consumer protection decision of a court of this State .... 8
81 15 U.S.C. § 1667e(a); Regulation M, 12 C.F.R. § 213.9 (2002).
82 15 U.S.C. § 1667e(a); Regulation M, 12 C.F.R. § 213.9.
83 The best general background on Article 2A is in Symposium, Article 2A of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 39 ALA. L. REV. 558 (1988).
84 The hold-out jurisdictions are Louisiana and Puerto Rico. Uniform State Laws Scorecard,
COM. L. NEWSL., July 2002, at 12-13 (ABA Sec. Bus. L.). Connecticut enacted U.C.C. Article 2A in
2002. 2002 Conn. Pub. Acts 02-131.
85 The definition of "lease" in section § 2A-103(1)(j) of the U.C.C. excludes "retention or crea-
tion of a security interest," which must be assessed under the U.C.C. definition of security interest. See
U.C.C. § 1-201(37).
86 Id. § 2A- 104(c).
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Article 2A is therefore foundational for consumer leases; it validates
the lease contract and provides default rules on performance responsibili-
ties and remedies. To the extent lessees in general benefit from the default
rules in Article 2A, consumer lessees benefit. And to the extent Article 2A
hedges the parties' freedom of contract with universal boundaries of un-
conscionability87 and good faith,88 it discourages the worst kind of con-
sumer oppression. It does not purport to be comprehensive with respect to
consumer leases. According to the drafters: "Consumer protection in lease
transactions is primarily left to other law.
89
This is not to say there is nothing in Article 2A that recognizes special
concerns in consumer leases. In a statute like Article 2A that sanctifies
freedom of contract, there inevitably must be some constraints on that prin-
ciple, and the most likely context is leases involving consumers. One sub-
tle aspect of this involves the "merchant" rules that impose additional ex-
pectations on lessors that are leasing professionals (as opposed to amateur
consumers)-a heightened standard of good faith,"' and the warranty of
merchantability. 9 Another aspect is the extended protection for "natural
persons" as third-party beneficiaries of warranties. 92
There are a number of places where Article 2A provides explicit spe-
cial rules or limitations for consumer leases.93
1. Definition of "Finance Lease"
Section 2A-103(1)(g)(iii)(D) of the U.C.C. generally permits a lease to
qualify as a "finance lease" if the lessor tells the lessee to communicate
with the supplier to learn of the lessee's warranty rights; but this method of
creating a finance lease does not apply to a consumer lease.94
Formal recognition of "finance leases" is a centerpiece of Article 2A.
87 Id. § 2A-108.
89 Id. § 1-203.
89 Id. § 2A-104 cmt. 4.
90 See id. § 2A-103(3) (adopts the Article 2 definition of "good faith," which appears in U.C.C.
section 2-103(l)(b): "'Good faith' in the case of a merchant means honesty in fact and the observance
of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade"). Note that Revised Article I now
defines "good faith" to include the "fair dealing" component for all parties, not just merchants. Id. § 1-
201(a)(20). Section 2A-103(3) also borrows the Article 2 definition of "merchant" from section 2-
104(1).
91 See id. § 2A-212 (explaining the implied warranty that exists with regard to goods leased by a
merchant).
92 See id. § 2A-216 (describing in Alternatives A and B that warranties extend to any natural per-
son).
93 See Fred H. Miller, Consumer Leases Under Uniform Commercial Code Article 2A, 39 ALA. L.
REv. 957, 959-60 (1988) (explaining the relationship between Articles 2 and 2A and consumer law).
Several of the items discussed in the text were added to Article 2A in 1990, after Prof. Miller's article
was published.
94See U.C.C. § 2A-103 (1995), reprinted in 1998 SELECTED COMMERCIAL STATUTES 855 (ad-
ding this provision in the 1990 amendments to Article 2A).
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This refers to a lease in which the nominal lessor is merely the financer of
a transaction, and is therefore not responsible for warranties or other assur-
ances on the goods.95 Instead, in a finance lease the warranties of the sup-
plier flow through to the finance lessee," and the "finance lease" definition
therefore provides several optional ways to assure that the lessee has access
to warranty information from the supplier. It would be burdensome for
consumers to have to pursue that information independently; thus section
2A-103(1)(g)(iii)(D) of the U.C.C. removes that option for a consumer
finance lease. Moreover, while a consumer lease may qualify as a finance
lease if the lessor gives the consumer lessee the relevant supplier's war-
ranty information,97 the Regulation M summary disclosure of warranties
will not suffice for this purpose.9"
2. Choice of Law and Forum
Section 2A-106 limits choice of law to a jurisdiction where the con-
sumer resides (or will reside within thirty days) or where the goods will be
used. It also proscribes a choice of forum clause unless the chosen forum
would otherwise have jurisdiction over the consumer lessee."
3. Unconscionability
Section 2A-108(2) and (4) expand the basic unconscionability limita-
tion to include not just contract terms, but also contract inducement or col-
lection with respect to consumer leases."° A consumer lessee who suc-
cessfully asserts unconscionability is entitled to reasonable attorney's
fees.'
0'
4. Limiting "Hell or High Water" Protections of Finance Lessor
Several provisions do this:
- Section 2A-221: Where required and identified goods are damaged





98 Id. § 2A-103 cmt.
99See infra Part IV.B.4 (discussing the limitation on choice of law and venue pursuant to the
U.C.L.A. section 108). Subject to limitations, the U.C.L.A. provision also permits choice of the law of
the jurisdiction where the goods are received by the lessee. U.C.L.A § 108 (2002).
100 U.C.C. § 2A-108(2).
101 Id. § 2A-108(4). The amount of the consumer's attorney's fee award is not controlled by the
amount of recovery on the underlying claim. Id. § 2A-1 08(4)(c). However, if the consumer's claim is
found groundless, the consumer is liable for the attorney's fees of the lessor or other holder of the lease.
Id. § 2A-108(4)(b). Despite the breadth of this provision, at least one court has held that Article 2A
unconscionability may only be asserted defensively, and may not serve as the basis for an affirmative
claim by a lessee. Mitchell v. Ford Motor Credit Corp., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1318 (N.D. Ga. 1998).
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before delivery, a consumer lessee in a finance lease may choose to go
forward with the lease with due allowance on the rent. 1
0 2
* Section 2A-406(l)(b): Where a lessor's performance is excused, a
consumer lessee in a finance lease may demand an available quota with
allowance on the rent.
0 3
a Section 2A-407: This statutory "hell or high water" clause for fi-
nance leases does not prevent a consumer lessee from asserting claims, for
example, for breach of warranty, against the finance lessor. '
- Section 2A-517(2): Preserves a consumer lessee's right to revoke ac-
ceptance for contract defaults by the finance lessor.'o5
5. Notice Concerning Subleasing
To restrict transfer of a consumer leasehold interest, or to make it an
event of default, section 2A-303(7) requires that the lease provision must
be specific, in writing, and conspicuous.'"
6. Fixture Priority
Under section 2A-309(5)(a), a lessor has priority over a real estate in-
terest in removable domestic appliances that become fixtures.
0 7
7. Liquidated Damages Cap
Section 2A-504(3)(b) caps a consumer lessee's liability for liquidated
damages when the lessor justifiably withholds delivery on the lessee's de-
fault or insolvency.'
8. Lessee's Notice of Breach
Under section 2A-516(3)(b), a consumer lessee is not barred from any
102 Miller, supra note 93, at 972. This is to preserve even a somewhat "frustrated bargain" for the
consumer lessee. Id.
103 U.C.C. § 2A-406(l)(b). This would allow a consumer lessee to salvage a portion of the lease
bargain, where a commercial finance lessee would not have that option.
104 Id. § 2A-407 cmt. 2. In particular, the U.C.C. states "[tlhat a [finance lease] consumer be ob-
ligated to pay notwithstanding defective goods or the like is a principle that is not tenable under case
law ... state statute ... or federal statute." Id.; see also Miller, supra note 93, at 970 (questioning
whether if as a matter of policy the statutory "hell or high water" provision cannot be invoked in a
consumer lease, can a contractual clause to the same effect be valid, and determining that this would
"be covered by law outside Article 2A"). See generally discussion infra Part VII.B.4 (discussing
U.C.L.A. § 305(b)).
105 U.C.C. § 2A-517(2) (noting that the consumer cannot be forced to re-accept cured goods).
See generally U.C.C. § 2A-517 (1995), reprinted in 1998 SELECTED COMMERCIAL STATUTES 885
(showing the 1990 amendment to Article 2A).
U.C.C. § 2A-303(7).
107 Id. § 2A-309(5)(a). This would seem to benefit a consumer lessee only marginally, perhaps
by encouraging dealers to furnish consumer appliances as fixtures on a lease basis.




warranty remedy by failing to give the lessor notice of claims for infringe-
ment or the like.'0 9
Frankly, these items differentiate consumer leases somewhat, but
hardly add much substantive protection against oppressive lease terms,
deceptive marketing practices, or heavy-handed lease enforcement. Even
the limitations on finance leases are largely academic, as not many con-
sumer leases are structured as finance leases. In most respects, therefore,
the U.C.L.A. will operate as a superstructure atop the groundworks of
U.C.C. Article 2A. To the extent the U.C.L.A. requires or prohibits more
than Article 2A, the U.C.L.A. prevails."'
The linkage between Article 2A and the U.C.L.A. is as much political
as legalistic. When the sponsors of the U.C.C. began overhauling that stat-
ute in the 1980s, they faced significant political tensions and struggles be-
tween those wanting to preserve the U.C.C. as a "commercial" code, and
others insisting on the need to include real consumer protections in that
code."' As we have seen, Article 2A was drafted, promulgated, and
widely enacted with only a handful of tweaks for consumer leases. The
commissioning of the U.C.L.A. drafting project was in large measure a
response to those tensions. It was also something of an experiment for the
N.C.C.U.S.L., to see if it could successfully produce a "uniform" consumer
protection statute that would be written in light of and in relation to, but
outside of the Uniform Commercial Code."2
D. State Consumer Leasing Statutes
More than twenty states have on their books some legislation dealing
with long term leases of consumer goods."3 It is an eclectic variety of leg-
109 Id. § 2A-516(3)(b). The rationale is that consumers may not appreciate the need to give notice
of infringement-type claims, and a remedy bar could "become a trap for the unwary." Miller, supra
note 88, at 974. For other lessor defaults, consumer lessees still must give notice "or be barred from
any remedy." U.C.C. § 2A-516(3)(a).
110 See discussion infra Part IV.B.5 (discussing U.C.L.A. section 106).
IIISee Marion E. Benfield, Jr., Consumer Provisions in Revised Article 9, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1255 (1999) (explaining that concern for addressing consumer transaction was substantive and politi-
cal); Jean Braucher, Deadlock: Consumer Transactions, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 83 (1999) (stating that
consumer transactions in Revised Article 9 raise political considerations); Symposium, Perspectives on
the Uniform Laws Revision Process, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 603 (2001) (exploring the revision of Article 2).
Anyone who has been conscious over the past dozen or so years must be aware of the commercial
versus consumer battles that characterized the redrafting of U.C.C. Article 9 (Secured Transactions),
and that contributed, in part, to the collapse of the "progressive" revision of U.C.C. Article 2 in 1999.
In the Article 9 setting, while the new article has been adopted nationwide, there are numerous non-
uniform amendments from state to state, mostly with respect to consumer issues.
112 See 2002 Conn. Pub. Acts 02-131 (Reg. Sess.) (adding Article 2A on leases to the U.C.C.).
Connecticut was the first test of this theory. Connecticut had for many years resisted enacting U.C.C.
Article 2A, in part because it lacked sufficient consumer protections. Connecticut is the first state to
enact the U.C.L.A., and, almost simultaneously, it enacted Article 2A (HB 5653) in 2002.
113 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2985.7-2992 (West 2002) (providing the "California Vehicle Leasing
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Act." Enacted: 1976, revised 1984. Coverage: Motor vehicle leases only. Scope: Extensive regulation
of advertising, disclosures, lease terms; prohibited lease provisions and practices; early termination;
private enforcement.); COL. REV. STAT. §§ 5-1-101 to 5-1-303 (2002) (providing the "Colorado Con-
sumer Credit Code," Enacted: 1971. Coverage: All goods. Scope: See discussion of the U.C.C.C.);
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 42-270 to 42-271a (2001) (providing the "Long Term Leasing of Motor Vehi-
cles" act. Enacted: 1995. Providing procedure for assessing excess wear and tear); CON. GEN. STAT.
§§ 42-158a to 42-158g (2001) (providing the "Noncommercial Motor Vehicle Lease Agreements,"
Enacted: 1999 (lease rate disclosure). These are now subsumed in, or repealed by, CONN. U.C.L.A.);
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 521.001-521.006 (West 2002) (providing the "Motor Vehicle Lease Disclosure
Act." Enacted: 1995. Coverage: Motor vehicle leases only. Scope: minimal disclosures concerning
capitalized cost and trade-in); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 481L-1 to 481L-4 (2001) (providing the "Motor
Vehicle Lease Disclosure Act." Enacted: 1997. Coverage: Motor vehicles only. Scope: Disclosure
(following Regulation M)); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 636/1-95 (West 2002) (providing the "Mo-
tor Vehicle Leasing Act." Enacted: 1996. Coverage: Motor vehicles only. Scope: Disclosure; limita-
tions on terms and practices; early termination; excess wear and tear; enforcement); IND. CODE ANN.
§§ 9-23-2.5-1 to 9-23-2.5-13 (Michie 2002) (providing the "Disclosures Required in Motor Vehicle
Leases." Enacted: 1996. Coverage: Motor vehicles only. Scope: minimal disclosures only); IND. CODE
ANN. §§ 24-4.5-1-101 to 24-4.5-1-303 (Michie 2002) (providing the "Indiana Consumer Credit Code."
Enacted: 1971. Coverage: All goods. Scope: Disclosures pursuant to federal law; and, see discussion
of U.C.C.C.); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 537.1101-537.7103 (West 2002). (providing the "Iowa Consumer
Credit Code." Enacted: 1974. Coverage: All goods. Scope: Disclosures parallel to federal law; and,
see discussion of U.C.C.C.); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 16a-1-101 to 16a-9-102 (2001) (providing the "Kan-
sas Consumer Credit Code." Enacted: 1974. Coverage: All goods. Scope: Disclosures parallel to
federal law; and, see discussion of U.C.C.C.); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:3301-9:3342 (West 2002)
(providing the "Lease of Movables Act." Enacted: 1985. Coverage: Commercial and consumer leases
of all movables. Scope: Authorizations and limitations for various charges and rebates; restrictions on
repossession); ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 9-A, §§ 1-101 to 11-122 (West 2001) (providing the "Maine
Consumer Credit Code." Enacted: 1973. Coverage: All goods. Scope: Disclosures parallel to federal
law; and see discussion of U.C.C.C.); MD. CODE ANN., Commercial Law, §§ 14-2001 to 14-2010
(2002) (providing for "Consumer Motor Vehicle Leasing Contracts." Enacted: 1995. Coverage: Motor
vehicles only. Scope: Disclosure; limitations on terms and practices; warranties; early termination;
excess wear and tear; enforcement.); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93, §§ 90-93 (West 2002) (providing
for "Written Leases or Rental Agreements of Personal Property Used Primarily for Household or Fam-
ily Use," Enacted: 1986. Coverage: All personal property. Scope: Disclosure, similar to federal Regu-
lation M); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.991-445.995 (2001) (providing for "Requirements of Lease
Contracts Involving Motor Vehicles." Enacted: 1990. Coverage: Motor vehicles only. Scope: Re-
quires notice to consumer concerning early termination); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 361-D:1 to 361-
D:28 (2002) (providing for "Motor Vehicle Leasing." Enacted: 1996. Coverage: Motor vehicles only.
Scope: Disclosures pursuant to federal Regulation M; selected limitations on terms and practices); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 56:12-60 to 56:12-74 (West 2002) (providing the "Consumer Protection Leasing Act."
Enacted: 1994. Coverage: Motor vehicles only. Scope: Disclosure pursuant to federal Regulation M;
limitations on excess wear and tear charges, and spot delivery practices); N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW §§
301-353 (McKinney 2002) (providing the "Motor Vehicle Retail Installment Sales Act." Enacted:
1995. Coverage: Motor vehicles only. Scope: Some disclosure; limitations on terms and practices;
early termination; excess wear and tear; enforcement); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, §§ 1-101 to 9-101
(West 2003) (providing the "Oklahoma Consumer Credit Code." Enacted: 1969. Coverage: All goods.
Scope: Disclosures parallel to federal law; and, see discussion of U.C.C.C.); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-1-
101 to 37-16-90 (Law. Co-op. 2002) (providing the "South Carolina Consumer Protection Code."
Enacted: 1976. Coverage: All goods. Scope: Disclosures parallel to federal law; and, see discussion of
U.C.C.C.); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 63.10.010 to 63.10.902 (West 2002) (providing the "Consumer
Leases Act." Enacted. 1983, revised 1996. Coverage: All personal property. Scope: Disclosure pursu-
ant to federal Regulation M); W. VA. CODE ANN. 46A-1-101 to 46A-8-102 (Michie 2002) (providing
the "West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act." Enacted: 1974. Coverage: All goods.
Scope: Disclosures pursuant to federal law; and see discussion of U.C.C.C.); WtS. STAT. ANN. §§
429.101-429.301 (West 2001) (providing the "Motor Vehicle Consumer Leases Act." Enacted: 1995.
Coverage: Motor vehicles only. Scope: Some disclosure; limitations on terms and practices; early
termination; excess wear and tear; enforcement; WIS. STAT. §§ 422-101 to 422-506 (West 2001) (pro-
viding that the "Wisconsin Consumer Act" applies to "consumer leases" similarly to the U.C.C.C.
states; WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-14-101 to 40-14-702 (Michie 2001) (providing the "Wyoming Uniform
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islation, often rather narrow in focus, and much of it addressed to motor
vehicle leases. Almost all of these state leasing acts require disclosures,
either by incorporating the federal Regulation M rules by reference, or by
requiring additional disclosures beyond the federal ones."4 Several of
these state statutes are fairly expansive in scope, addressing issues such as
early termination liability, excess wear and use, and a variety of matters
also dealt with in the U.C.L.A. ' Without attempting a comprehensive and
comparative analysis of all state statutes, it is possible to see similarities
and differences." 6
As is apparent, a number of states have enacted, or mimicked portions
of, the U.C.C.C. This was the N.C.C.U.S.L.'s major effort, first in 1968
and then through a revised version in 1974, to bring some legal order and
to remove artificial barriers to competition in the consumer finance mar-
kets. Consumer leasing was then in its infancy, and it is therefore remark-
able, with more than thirty years of hindsight, to see how conscious the
U.C.C.C. drafters were of leasing issues.
The U.C.C.C. deals with the following aspects of consumer leases of
goods:. 7
1. Disclosure and Advertising
Sections 3.202 and 3.209 set out rules for transactional disclosure and
advertising similar to the federal Consumer Leasing Act. These sections
are largely displaced by the later-enacted federal law, which preempts any
inconsistent state law rules.
Consumer Credit Code." Enacted: 1971. Coverage: All goods. Scope: Disclosures pursuant to federal
law; and, see discussion of U.C.C.C.).
114 See sources cited supra note 113; see NAT'L CONSUMER L. CTR., THE COST OF CREDIT:
REGULATION AND LEGAL CHALLENGES § 7.5.3.2 (2d ed. 2002) (explaining the type of disclosure
requirements). With the substantial overhaul of Regulation M in 1996, many of these states have had
to revise their disclosure requirements to maintain consistency with the federal law. See Kenneth J.
Rojc & Thomas K. Juffembruch, State Law Response to the New Regulation M, 53 Bus. LAW. 1027,
1027-28 (1998) (discussing the need for states to amend their laws to conform to the revised Regulation
M).
115 See sources cited supra note 113. By contrast, almost every state regulates rent-to-own, or
"rental-purchase," transactions. See NAT'L CONSUMER L. CTR., THE COST OF CREDIT: REGULATION
AND LEGAL CHALLENGES § 7.5.3.2. (2d ed. 2002) (outlining the states that have rent-to-own statutes
and providing information regarding disclosure requirements).
116 This list does not include some states where narrow lease provisions pop up in isolation within
a more generic consumer protection law. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-302 (1999) (includine refer-
ral sales and leases in a list of deceptive trade practices); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-702 (2001) (sub-
jecting a "lease of goods" to a cooling-off period when marketed door-to-door); UTAH CODE ANN. §
70C-2-203 (2001) (prohibiting a lessor from taking a security interest in a dwelling).
117 States adopting at least some of these U.C.C.C.-based protections are Colorado, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Oklahoma, South Carolina, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming, but not all
of these states have necessarily adopted all of the "lease" provisions from the uniform act. See sources
cited supra note 113. The U.C.C.C. definition of "consumer lease" refers to a "lease of goods," hence,
it is not limited to motor vehicles. U.C.C.C. § 1.301(14)(a) (2002).
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2. Co-signer Notice
Section 3.208 requires a warning notice to a co-signer on any "con-
sumer credit transaction," which includes a consumer lease."8
3. Limits on Lessor Remedies
The U.C.C.C. prohibits a lessor from taking or exercising:
" a security interest (other than a security deposit);" 9
• an assignment of earnings, 20 or pre-j udgment wage garnishment.'2
* a confession ofjudgment
22
4. Anti-holder-in-due-course (Assignee Liability) Rules
In combination, sections 3.307, 3.404, and 3.405 eliminate holder-in-
due course protections for assignees of consumer lease obligations.
23
5. Ban on Referral Inducements
Section 3.309 bans the use of "referral" inducements with consumer
lessees. This potentially deceptive technique promises rebates or discounts
to a lessee who furnishes names of other prospective customers, but the
rebates or discounts seldom materialize.
6. Limit on Lessee Liability at Lease Expiration
Section 3.401 imposes a limit of two monthly payments on the amount
a lessee must pay at lease expiration.1
24
7. Unconscionability
Section 5.108 imposes an unconscionability boundary on lease terms,
including unconscionable inducements or collection practices.
8. Restraints on Repossession
The sequence of sections 5.109 through 5.112 limit the circumstances
constituting lessee default, provide a mechanism for the consumer to cure a
payment default, and permit self-help repossession only if "possession can
118 See U.C.C. § 1.301(13) (2002) (defining "consumer credit transaction").
119 Id. § 3.301(2).
120 Id. § 3.305(1).
121 Id. § 5.104.
122 Id. § 3.306.
123 See discussion infra text accompanying note 467 (explaining that state law limitations like
these are important since the FTC Holder Rule does not appear to cover true lease transactions).
124 See discussion supra text accompanying note 72 (discussing how this limitation prevents pos-
sibly unexpected balloon obligations and also effectively takes the sting out of high residual value
liabilities in open-end leases).
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be taken without entry into a dwelling and without the use of force or other
breach of the peace." '25
9. Venue for Collection Actions
Under section 5.113, collection actions against the consumer may be
brought only in the county of the consumer's residence.
In addition, credit insurance is regulated under Article 4 of the
U.C.C.C., consumers have private remedies for violations of the U.C.C.C.
under Part 2 of Article 5, and the enforcement powers of the Administrator
under Article 6 apply across the board to all consumer credit transactions
(which include leases).
Versions of most of these U.C.C.C. provisions resurface in the new
U.C.L.A. Presumably a state enacting the U.C.L.A. would therefore want
to repeal or otherwise nullify the U.C.C.C. provisions on consumer leases
so as to avoid duplicative coverage.
E. Other Relevant Consumer Protection Law
Beyond the U.C.L.A., leases of consumer goods may also be affected
by existing consumer protection laws other than the federal Consumer
Leasing Act and explicit state leasing laws. But the question of coverage
by, or integration with, other law can be difficult when that other law does
not expressly state its applicability to consumer leases.
1. Federal Regulations
Numerous federal consumer protection laws apply unquestionably to
the overall business of leasing, such as laws affecting financial information
privacy,'26 credit reporting,'27 and debt collection.' However, there are
also a number of other federal laws and regulations applicable to credit
125 U.C.C.C. § 5.112 (2003).
126 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6827 (2000) (providing the major statutory
directive on consumer financial privacy). See generally Michael A. Benoit & Elena A. Lovoy, Recent
Federal and State Consumer Financial Privacy Developments, 57 Bus. LAW. 1209 (2002) (discussing
privacy compliance programs); Symposium on Privacy, 55 CONS. FIN. L. Q. REP. (2001) (addressing
assorted privacy considerations).
127 See Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-168lu (explaining that lessors have respon-
sibilities under this Act both as users of credit reports and as furnishers of information to consumer
reporting agencies); see also id. §§ 1681b(3)(A), 1681b(3)(F)(i) (showing that while the Fair Credit
Reporting Act does not expressly refer to determining lease eligibility as a "permissible purpose," it
does authorize reports "in connection with a credit transaction," and "in connection with a business
transaction that is initiated by the consumer").
128 See Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (F.D.C.P.A.) §§ 801-818, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692o
(providing for debt collection practices). Although this Act applies primarily to independent debt
collectors, there are obligations and responsibilities for original creditors, and "creditor" includes "any
person ... to whom a [consumer] debt is owed." Id. §§ 803(4), 1692a(4).
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transactions, where the question of their extension to leases is unclear.
a. Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("E.C.O.A.")
Are lease transactions subject to the same proscriptions against invidi-
ous discrimination that apply to credit sales and loans? Even though leases
and credit sales may be side-by-side alternatives for the same consumers,
the same dealers, and the same goods, with discriminatory practices just as
conceivable in one as in the other, the legal answer is "probably not, except
in the west."
The federal E.C.O.A 29 and its implementing Regulation BI30 broadly
prohibit discrimination in the granting or pricing of credit,"' limit the types
of information that may be requested from applicants or used in the evalua-
tive process,' and require creditors to give rejected applicants prompt
notice of and reasons for that adverse action.' It could therefore affect the
processing and underwriting of consumer leases in much the same way it
affects conventional "credit" transactions.' 4 Certainly, as a matter of pol-
icy, there is as much reason to protect from discrimination a consumer who
leases a car from a dealer as a consumer who buys one on credit from the
same dealer. Nevertheless, application of the E.C.O.A. to leases is neither
self-evident nor explicit in statutory law, and there is insufficient case law
or other guidance to provide a definite conclusion. The E.C.O.A. was first
enacted in 1974, two years before the C.L.A. The E.C.O.A. applies its
anti-discrimination mandate to "any aspect of a credit transaction,"'35 and
imposes restraints on conduct by a "creditor."' 36 When the C.L.A. was
enacted in 1976, it said nothing about its relationship to the E.C.O.A. and
was clearly treating leases as a distinctive form of financing.
The leading judicial interpretation regarding the E.C.O.A.'s applicabil-
ity to leases appears in the Ninth Circuit decision, Brothers v. First Leas-
ing.'" The court acknowledged the literal limitation on E.C.O.A. coverage
129 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691 f(setting forth the E.C.O.A.).
130 See Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. §§ 202.1-202.17 (2002) (providing the regulation for implement-
ing the Equal Credit Opportunity Act).
See 15 U.S.C. § 1691; Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. § 202.1 (explaining that the E.C.O.A. bars dis-
crimination based on race, color, religion, national origin, sex or marital status, or age, or because the
applicant's income derives from public assistance or the applicant has exercised a right under the Con-
sumer Credit Protection Act); see also 12 C.F.R. §. 202.2(z) (defining "prohibited basis").
132 See Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. § 202.5 (providing rules for gathering application information).
133 See id. § 202.9 (explaining notification requirements).
134 See generally DEE PRIDGEN, CONSUMER CREDIT AND THE LAW, ch. 3 (Clark Boardman ed.,
1998); NAT'L CONSUMER L. CTR., CREDIT DISCRIMINATION, § 2.2.1 (2d ed. 2001) (explaining the
coverage of E.C.O.A.).
1 5 See E.C.O.A., 15 U.S.C. § 1691.
136 d. § 1691a(e) (defining the term creditor).
137 See Brothers v. First Leasing, 724 F.2d 789, 790 (9th Cir. 1984) (addressing whether the
E.C.O.A. applies to consumer leases).
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to "credit" transactions. 38 Yet, since the C.L.A. was added as a new chap-
ter to the Truth in Lending Act, and since the E.C.O.A. and the T.I.L.A. are
both titles under the umbrella Consumer Credit Protection Act, the Ninth
Circuit concluded the E.C.O.A. applied to the auto lease in the case:
In view of the strong national commitment to the eradication
of discrimination in our society, we see no reason why Con-
gress would have wanted to subject the leasing of durable
consumer goods to regulation under the disclosure provisions
of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, but to exclude those
transactions from the scope of the antidiscrimination provi-
sions of that Act .... It is far more reasonable to conclude
that Congress thought that an express amendment was unnec-
essary because the E.C.O.A. on its face applies to all credit
transactions and, therefore, the language already in the Act
was broad enough to cover consumer leases.'39
The problem with Brothers is that it proves too much. If a lease is in-
herently a form of credit (at least for anti-discrimination purposes), then all
leases should be subject to the E.C.O.A.-real estate leases, commercial
equipment leases, rent-to-own transactions, and so forth. 4° The court's
formal holding applies only to the narrower class of "consumer leases" as
defined in the federal C.L.A., 4' but the court intimates quite clearly that
the E.C.O.A. is written expansively enough to apply to leases outside of the
coverage of the C.L.A.'42 Shortly thereafter, in the course of amending
Regulation B, the Federal Reserve Board criticized Brothers for interpret-
ing the E.C.O.A. term "credit" "too broadly," and declined to apply the
E.C.O.A. to leases by regulation. 43  Instead, the Federal Reserve Board
138 Id. at 794.
139 Id. There was a sympathetic but strong dissent against the majority's expansive reading of the
statutes. Id. at 796 (Canby, J., dissenting). As the Senate staff person handling the federal C.L.A. and
E.C.O.A. Amendments bills in 1975-76, I do not recall any congressional discussion about whether
E.C.O.A. applied to leases and I do not mention the issue in my contemporaneous account of that
legislation. Ralph J. Rohner, Consumer Credit Legislation in the Ninety-Fourth Congress-and A Look
Ahead, 9 U.C.C. L.J. 307 (1977) (providing an account of the legislative action taken by Congress
regarding the E.C.O.A.).
140 See Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. §§ 202.1-202.17 (2002). Although often thought of as a con-
sumer protection law, the E.C.O.A. applies to all forms of credit regardless of purpose, amount, or the
circumstances of the applicant or debtor, although differing technical compliance rules for "consumer
cfedit" transactions are introduced in Regulation B.
141 See Brothers, 724 F.2d at 792 n.7 ("[C]onsumer lease" under the C.L.A. is one to an individ-
ual, for consumer purposes, for more than four months, and for a total obligation of $25,000 or less).
142 See id. at 795 n.14 (stating that "ft]he language of the E.C.O.A. is much broader than that of
the T.I.L.A .... The language of the E.C.O.A., on its face, imposes no [T.I.L.A.- or C.L.A.-based]
limitations on 'credit transactions"').
143 Regulation B, 50 Fed. Reg. 48,018,48,020 (Nov. 20,1985).
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(the "FRB") said it would monitor the leasing markets for evidence of dis-
criminatory practices, and propose regulatory or statutory change as appro-
priate.'" No such proposals have emerged from the Board, and two federal
district courts have split on whether to follow Brothers. '41
So we can say the following: (i) the E.C.O.A. apparently applies to
"consumer leases" (within C.L.A.) in the Ninth Circuit, (ii) the E.C.O.A.
may apply to non-consumer leases in the Ninth Circuit, (iii) the Federal
Reserve Board believes the E.C.O.A. does not apply to leases at all, and
(iv) other judicial authority is inconclusive. Maybe discriminatory prac-
tices are not a problem in lease markets; maybe they are. 146 Prudence may
induce lessors and leasing companies to include E.C.O.A. compliance in
operating guidelines and checklists where they can, and there is evidence
they do so."" Perhaps some day Congress will clarify the E.C.O.A.'s
scope with respect to leases. 8
b. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act
Since 1976, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act ("M.M.W.A.") has im-
posed a layer of federal law on the disclosure and content of consumer
product warranties. "4' Basically, any supplier of a consumer product that
furnishes a written warranty on that product must explain the warranty
terms and label the warranty "full" or "limited."'' ° Where a written war-
ranty is provided, the warrantor may not disclaim the implied warranties
that arise under state law.'' Above certain amounts, actions may be
144Id. at 48,018.
145Compare Ferguson v. Park City Mobile Homes, No. 89-C1909, 1989 WL 111916, at *3 (N.D.
III. Sept. 18, 1989) (holding that the E.C.O.A. applies to lease of a mobile home site, i.e., real estate),
with Liberty Leasing v. Machamer, 6 F. Supp. 2d 714, 720 (S.D. Ohio 1998) (holding that the E.C.O.A.
does not apply to a vehicle lease).
146 As of summer 2002, there were a number of pending lawsuits against the major auto finance
companies, alleging discrimination in the pricing of their products. The theory could apply to leases as
well as credit sales. See generally Coleman v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 296 F.3d 443 (6th Cir.
2002) (wherein class certification was reversed, and the cause remanded); Jones v. Ford Motor Credit
Co., No. 00 Civ. 8330 (LMM), 2002 WL 88431, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2002) (denying defendants'
motion to dismiss); Rodriguez v. Ford Motor Credit Co., No. 01 -C8526, 2002 WL 655679, at *6 (N.D.
Ill. Apr. 19,2002) (denying motion to dismiss).
Lessors were exercising this kind of prudence even before the Brothers decision. See Broth-
ers, 724 F.2d at 791 (explaining that the defendant leasing company was giving reasons for denial-an
E.C.O.A. requirement-using forms "almost identical" to those prescribed by Regulation B). Lessors
may also be subject to state anti-discrimination laws.
148 Theoretically, the drafters of the U.C.L.A. might have included anti-discrimination provisions
in the Act expressly, or might have "borrowed" the federal standards from the E.C.O.A. (as the
U.C.L.A. borrows disclosure rules from the federal C.L.A.). To the best of my recollection, the issue of
E.C.O.A. applicability was never discussed in the U.C.L.A. drafting process.
149See Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
2301-2312 (2000) (codifying the provisions of the 1976 Act).




brought in federal courts, and a victorious consumer litigant may be
awarded costs and attorney's fees. 52  The principal impact of the
M.M.W.A. is on the manufacturer warranties that typically accompany the
goods from factory through retailer to the end-user consumer.
Thus buyers of consumer goods get the benefit of the generic warranty
rules in the U.C.C. Article 2,1' plus the overlay of disclosure and other
protections of the M.M.W.A. Consumer lessees now may also claim ge-
neric warranty protections under the U.C.C. Article 2A.', The question
then is, are consumer lessees also covered by the M.M.W.A.? As in the
prior section on the E.C.O.A., there is no inherent reason why the
M.M.W.A. should not apply to consumer leases. It is the same supplier's
warranty, on the same car on the same premises of the same dealer, being
acquired by the same consumer with the same general expectation of a
reasonable level of quality in the goods."' Mechanically, the M.M.W.A.
disclosure and other rules should operate no differently in a lease setting
than in a sale.'56  Yet the best answer to the question whether the
M.M.W.A. applies to leases is "doubtful."
The problem again is one of definitions. Nothing in the M.M.W.A., or
in the Federal Trade Commission regulations interpreting it, expressly ad-
dresses coverage of leases.'57 The key terms in the M.M.W.A. seem to
152 Id. § 23 10(d).
153 See U.C.C. § 2-313 (2002) (providing rules regarding express warranties); id. § 2-314 (provid-
ing for implied warranties of merchantability); id. § 2-3 15 (providing for implied warranty of fitness for
particular purpose); id. § 2-316 (addressing warranty disclaimers). If revised Article 2 is ever approved
and adopted it will likely include new sections 2-313A and 2-313B, which recognize quality responsi-
bilities undertaken by remote (non-privity) sellers or based on a seller's advertising. See CONTRACT
LAW: SELECTED SOURCE MATERIALS 164-66 (Steven J. Burton & Melvin A. Eisenberg eds., 2001)
(providing proposed revisions to sections 2-313A and 2-313B).
See U.C.C. § 2A-210 (providing for express warranty); id. § 2A-212 (regarding implied war-
ranty of merchantability); id. § 2A-213 (providing implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose).
Proposed revised section 2A-214(3) will impose new, clearer wording requirements for disclaimers of
implied warranties in consumer leases. Lessees will also benefit indirectly if the pending revisions to
Article 2 are adopted. New section 2-313A specifically extends the factory warranty (often the "war-
ranty in the box," or in the glove compartment) through distributors and dealers to the ultimate "buyer
or lessee." CONTRACT LAW: SELECTED SOURCE MATERIALS, supra note 153, at 164-65. New section
2-313B does the same for warranties on new goods based on a supplier's advertising. Id. at 165-66.
155 In theory, a lessee may even have a marginally greater expectation of performance qualities
than a buyer. A buyer may tolerate certain limitations in the quality of the goods in exchange for a
bargain price or where the buyer expects to resell. A lessee, on the other hand, bargains explicitly for
the right to "possession and use"-uninterrupted enjoyment--of the goods for the duration of the lease.
The warranty parallelism between the U.C.C. Articles 2 and 2A belies any official recognition of this
difference.
156 Some difference in treatment may be unavoidable, for example, if the supplier's warranty by
its terms runs only to a "buyer" or "purchaser," and not to a lessee. Nothing in the M.M.W.A. appears
to preclude a supplier from limiting the beneficiaries of its warranty.
157 See generally 16 C.F.R. §§ 700.1-700.12 (2002) (providing the FTC interpretations of the
M.M.W.A.).
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contemplate a consumer "buyer" rather than lessee.' On the other hand,
the M.M.W.A. remedies are available to any "consumer," defined to in-
clude not only a "buyer" but anyone to whom the warranted product is
transferred and anyone entitled to enforce a warranty under state law.'59
These latter phrases arguably pick up lessees. The case law is somewhat
split, and has been described as "less than lucid"' 6 on the subject. The
most recent, and perhaps most authoritative, holding is that the M.M.W.A.
does not apply to leases, primarily because of the definitional limitations
just discussed, and despite the fact that a manufacturer's warranty was
passed along to the lessee just as in a sale. 161
The U.C.L.A. Drafting Committee was aware of the role of the
M.M.W.A. for sales warranties and the uncertainty of its application to
leases, but was more interested in seeing how the U.C.C. Article 2 and 2A
revision processes would deal with consumer goods warranties. The even-
tual accommodation of the U.C.L.A. to the M.M.W.A. and the U.C.C. Ar-
ticle 2A is discussed below in connection with the U.C.L.A. section 3 10.162
c. Federal Trade Commission Act
The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") Act states the broad premise
that "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce are
hereby declared unlawful.' 163 This is a sweeping proscription of bad con-
duct that certainly can include consumer leases. Enforcement of this stan-
dard is assigned primarily to the FTC itself, which may seek cease-and-
desist orders, injunctions, and restitution through administrative proceed-
ings. The Commission could invoke this statutory mandate independently
158 The M.M.W.A. is triggered when a supplier makes a "written warranty." See M.M.W.A., 15
U.S.C. § 2301(6)(A) (2000). This critical term is defined in part as "any written affirmation of fact or
written promise made in connection with the sale of a consumer product by a supplier to a buyer..."
Id. (emphasis added). A second part of the definition of "written warranty" seemingly omits the
"buyer" requirement when it speaks of "any undertaking in writing in connection with the sale by a
supplier of a consumer product . I..." Id. § 2301(6)(B). However, the tag line of the overall definition
of "written warranty" requires that in all cases the supplier's undertaking must become "part of the
basis of the bargain between a supplier and a buyer forpurposes other than resale of such product" Id.
§ 23016) (emphasis added).
19 ld. § 2301(3).
160 See NAT'L CONSUMER L. CTR., CONSUMER WARRANTY LAW: LEMON LAW, MAGNUSON-
MOSS, UCC, MOBILE HOME, AND OTHER WARRANTY STATUTES § 19.2.3 (2d ed. 2001).
161 DiCintio v. DaimlerChrysler Corp, 768 N.E.2d 1121 (N.Y. 2002). But see Freeman v. Hubco
Leasing, Inc., 324 S.E.2d 462, 465, 468 (Ga. 1985) (holding that M.M.W.A. applied to a lease that
obligated the lessee to purchase the car at lease end); Bus. Modeling Techniques, Inc. v. General Mo-
tors Corp., 123 Misc. 2d 605, 606 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984) (holding that a lessee is a consumer under the
M.M.W.A.).
162 See infra Part VII.B.7.
163 15 U.S.C. § 45(aX1) (2000).
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to police leasing practices, but in recent years has confined itself to enforc-
ing the specific strictures of the C.L.A. and Regulation M.'
The FTC's enforcement jurisdiction does not include banks and other
depository institutions.'65 But recently several of the bank regulatory agen-
cies have asserted the authority to enforce the general FTC Act proscrip-
tion against unfair or deceptive acts or practices against banks, though none
of these instances has involved consumer leases.'"
d. FTC Trade Regulation Rules
There are several instances at the regulatory, rather than statutory, level
where existing federal law may seem to extend consumer protections to
lessees as well as buyers Most of them involve FTC "trade regulation
rules" that are specific applications of the "unfair or deceptive acts or prac-
tices" rubric just discussed.'67
One is the FTC "Holder Rule" that preserves a consumer's claims and
defenses when the consumer's contract obligation is assigned or transferred
to a secondary financer 65 The Rule's purpose is to eliminate the holder-
in-due-course doctrine that historically insulated assignees from transac-
tional disputes with their consumer obligors. This repudiation of holder-in-
due-course is accomplished by the mandatory inclusion in consumer con-
tracts of a "NOTICE" that assignees take subject to the consumer's claims
and defenses.' 69 The Holder Rule seems at first glance to be explicitly ap-
plicable to leases, as the definition of "seller" includes anyone who "sells
or leases goods... to consumers," 70 and the substantive mandate of the
Rule operates "[i]n connection with any sale or lease"'' of goods or ser-
vices. But the Notice required by the Rule must appear only in a "con-
sumer credit contract,"' 72 and the component definitions of this phrase ("fi-
164 15 U.S.C. § 1607(c). For purposes of FTC enforcement, a violation of the C.L.A. (as part of
the T.I.L.A.) is considered a violation of the FTC Act. Id.
165 15 U.S.C. § 45.
166See OCC Advisory Letter, Subject: Guidance on Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices, at 3
(March 22, 2002) (providing guidance on how the FTC Act impacts banks), available at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/advisory/2002-3.doc (last visited Nov. 9, 2002) (on file with the Con-
necticut Law Review); see also Letter from Alan Greenspan, Federal Reserve Board Chairman, to Rep.
John J. LaFalce (May 30, 2002) (addressing application of the FTC Act to the banking industry), avail-
able at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/bcreg/2002/20020530/default.htm (last visited
Nov. 9,2002) (on file with the Connecticut Law Review).
167 See supra Part II.E.l .c.
168 See FTC Trade Regulation Rule, Preservation of Consumers' Claims and Defenses, 16 C.F.R.
pt. 443 12002) (providing for the preservation of consumers' claims and defenses).
16 See id. (providing for a notice requirement).
170Id. § 433.1(j).
171 Id. § 433.2.
172 Id.; see also id. § 433.1 (i) (defining consumer credit contract).
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nanced sale""' and "purchase money loan"'74) limit it to credit transactions
covered by the T.I.L.A. and Regulation Z. The ostensible Holder Rule
coverage of leases, therefore, is necessarily limited to "dirty leases" that
are in fact credit sales under the T.I.L.A. 175 The U.C.L.A. deals with the
holder-in-due-course, or assignee-liability, issue in section 305(b), dis-
cussed below at Part VII.B.4.
One might think that the FTC Credit Practices Rule 176 would be appli-
cable or transferable to leases. It attacks a number of practices that histori-
cally have been troublesome in the consumer credit markets. The Rule:
* Prohibits or sharply curtails the inclusion of:
* cognovit or confession of judgment clauses,
* waivers of exemptions from attachment,
* assignments of earnings, or
* non-purchase money security interests in household goods;
177
" Requires an explicit notice to co-signers before they become obli-
gated; 178 and
• Bars the "pyramiding" of late charges. 179
Wishes aside, it is a virtual certainty that the FTC Credit Practices Rule
does not apply to leases. Partly this is because the FTC staff has said so. 8°
Further, the Rule's critical definitions and requirements speak solely in
terms of a "creditor," who may be either a "lender" or a "retail installment
seller,"'' leaving little literal leverage to argue for the Rule's applicability
to leases. It should not be surprising, then, to see that the U.C.L.A. in fact
addresses the matters covered by the Credit Practices Rule.1
8 2
173 Id. § 433.1(e).
174 Id. § 433.1(d).
175 See Jarvis v. S. Oak Dodge, Inc., 773 N.E.2d 641, 646 (I1. 2002) (finding that the FTC Rule
does not apply to leases); see also NAT'L CONSUMER L. CTR., UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND
PRACTICES § 6.6.2.2.1 (4th ed. 1997) (stating that i  is "[u]nclear... whether the Holder Rule applies to
leases ;)74FTC Credit Practices Rule, 16 C.F.R. pt. 444.
177 See id. §444.2.
178 Id. § 444.3.
179 Id. § 444.4. This refers to the practice of imposing a late charge on a current payment when
the only delinquency is failure to pay a late charge on a prior late payment. See U.C.L.A. § 304(b)
(2002) (prohibiting pyramiding of late charges).
180 FTC Staff Advisory Letter [1980-1989 Transfer Binder] Consumer Cred. Guide (CCH) [
96,165, at 85,632-33 (Mar. 18, 1986).
181 16 C.F.R. § 444.1(a), (b), (f). Although the definition of"retail installment seller" refers to a
"lease-purchase agreement," the FTC staff letter dismissed this as "merely denot[ing] a type of sale (not
lease)." FTC Staff Advisory Letter, supra note 180, at 85,633.
182 See U.C.L.A. § 205 (requiring notice to cosigners), § 302 (prohibiting acceleration, require-
menus to confess judgment or authorize assignment of wages, and some types of repossession), 303
(defining allowed security interests), § 304 (restricting late charges and attorney's fees).
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Another instance of existing federal regulation that may affect con-
sumer leases is the FTC Door to Door Sales Rule.' As its official name
suggests, the Rule requires that vendors give their customers a three-day
cooling off period for transactions solicited by the vendor and consum-
mated off the vendor's premises. 4 On the question whether the Rule ap-
plies to consumer leases, the devil again is in the definitions, with the clear
tilt in favor of coverage."' The baseline term "door-to-door sale" ex-
pressly includes a "sale, lease, or rental of consumer goods,"'86 and there is
a specific exclusion for "rental of real property,""'s suggesting that leases
of goods are included. Yet the substantive rule, and the mandatory Notice
of Cancellation, speak only in terms of the "buyer,"'8 8 undefined in the
Rule.
While there is little evidence of door-to-door, or off-premises, leasing
of goods, one can envision those patterns occurring at boat or computer
shows, or with respect to computers marketed in college dorms or similar
settings away from the lessor's regular place of business. The FTC Rule
was promulgated in 1972-thirty years ago--when door-to-door leasing
was probably unknown or very rare. The Rule lacks some precision as to
its application to leases, but a lessor would seem foolhardy to engage in
door-to-door or off-premises leasing without compliance with the FTC
Rule.
Beyond these examples are still other, broader federal regulatory rules
that can affect the marketing of consumer leases. For instance, rules prom-
ulgated by the Federal Trade Commission restrict telemarketing prac-
tices,"' and the FTC has issued guidelines on "bait and switch" advertis-
ing.'" Whether these restraints are applicable to lease marketing depends,
183 FTC Trade Reg. Rule, Cooling-Off Period for Sales Made at Homes or at Certain Other Loca-
tions, 16 C.F.R. § 429.
1/d. § 429.1. The Rule indicates that this includes "sales at the buyer's residence, or at facili-
ties rented on a temporary or short-term basis, such as hotel or motel rooms, convention centers, fair-
grounds and restaurants, or sales at the buyer's workplace or in dormitory lounges." Id. § 429.0(a).
But the FTC has exempted from the Rule sellers of automobiles at temporary places of business-"auto
fairs"-if they have a permanent place of business. Rule on Cooling-Off Period for Door-to-Door
Sales, 53 Fed. Reg. 45,455, 45,456 (Nov. 10, 1988) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 429).
185 The original statement of purpose for the Rule clearly indicates an intent to cover leases. 37
Fed. Reg. 22,945 (Oct. 26, 1972). When the Commission sought comments on the Rule as part of its
regulatory oversight responsibilities, it did not raise lease coverage as an issue. FTC Request for
Comments Concerning Rule on Cooling-Off Period for Door-to-Door Sales, 59 Fed. Reg. 18,007,
18,008 (Apr. 15, 1994).
186 16 C.F.R. § 429.0(a).
187 Id. § 429.0(a)(6).
1s8 For example, the seller must furnish "the buyer" a copy of the contract containing a bold-face
notice that "[y]ou, the buyer, may cancel this transaction ... " Id. § 429. 1(a) (emphasis added).
189 FTC Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. §§ 310.3-310.4.
190 FTC Guides Against Bait Advertising, 16 C.F.R. §§ 238.0-238.4.
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as usual, on how each rule describes its own coverage. 9' Does the FTC
Telemarketing Rule apply to leases? Maybe. The critical term "telemar-
keting" is defined as "a plan, program, or campaign which is conducted to
induce the purchase of goods or services by use of ... telephones....
Well, is a lessee a "purchaser"? The Rule does not elaborate. If we look to
the U.C.C. for guidance, it defines "purchase" broadly to include any "vol-
untary transaction creating an interest in property."'93 But is the lessee's
leasehold interest an "interest in property"? Maybe not, since the lessor
retains full title. Still, Article 2A of the U.C.C. defines "leasehold interest"
as "the interest of the lessor or the lessee under a lease contract."' 94 What-
ever the lessee acquires, it is an "interest" (in either the goods or the con-
tract right to possession and use of them). So by this reasoning, the lessee
may be a purchaser after all, and leasing is therefore a form of "telemarket-
ing," and the Telemarketing Rule applies. Is that right? Yes, but you must
also be willing to read "seller" to include a lessor, which is not too difficult
because "seller" is defined as "any person who, in connection with a tele-
marketing transaction, provides, offers to provide, or arranges for others to
provide goods or services to the customer in exchange for considera-
tion."'
195
2. Miscellaneous State Laws
In addition to U.C.C. Article 2A and any explicit consumer leasing leg-
islation in the state, there are likely to be other laws that will or could have
impact on the rights of consumer lessees. In most cases state laws in this
category would continue to operate in connection with consumer leases,
and would not be displaced or preempted by the U.C.L.A.
One example would be state door-to-door sales laws, comparable to the
FTC Rule on that topic. Virtually every state has cooling-off laws for
door-to-door selling.'9 While the U.C.L.A. does not include a door-to-
door cooling-off provision as such, a "Legislative Note"', 97 suggests that
enacting states consider whether to bring leases under a separate state law
for that purpose.
191 Even the generic FTC "bait and switch" guides leave uncertainty as to their applicability to
leases. "[Blait advertising" is defined as "an alluring but insincere offer to sell a product or service
which the advertiser in truth does not. .. want to sell." Id. § 238.0 (emphasis added).
192 Id. § 310.2(u) (emphasis added).
193 U.C.C. § 1-201(32) (2002).
194 Id. § 2A-103(I)(m) (emphasis added).
195 16 C.F.R. § 310.2(r).
196 See NAT'L CONSUMER L. CTR., UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES § 5.8 (5th ed.
2001).
197 U.C.L.A. § 106 legis. n. 2 (2002).
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Another example would be state "lemon laws" that provide specific
consumer remedies for buyers of defective goods, usually limited to motor
vehicles. Almost every state has such a law."" The lemon laws typically
provide that the warrantor of the goods must either replace them or refund
the purchase price if the warranty defects cannot be timely repaired, or the
goods are out of service for an extended period. 99 Some of these laws
expressly apply to leased vehicles,0o but many do not. In theory and pol-
icy, there seems no reason why state law should give less protection
against "lemons" to consumer lessees than to buyers. The U.C.L.A. draft-
ers did not undertake to write a lemon-law provision into the U.C.L.A., but
did include a "Legislative Note" urging an enacting state to "consider
amending its Lemon Law to afford the same protection to consumer lessees
as well as buyers." ''
A third example of complementary, existing state law comprises the
various state consumer fraud acts. These "little FTC Acts," like the federal
model, typically prohibit "unfair or deceptive acts or practices, '"202 some-
times enumerate examples of bad practices, and usually provide for private
recoveries as well as governmental enforcement by the Attorney General or
comparable state official.2"3 The U.D.A.P. statutes are not uniform in
scope of coverage, specificity of the substantive standards, or sanctions for
violations, but together provide a basis for challenging merchant conduct
that is factually offensive even if it is not forbidden by specific statutory or
regulatory rules.2 Not surprisingly, these laws have frequently been in-
voked to challenge consumer leasing practices2. 5 (for example, failure to
credit the consumer with the agreed value of a trade-in). The U.C.L.A.
clearly intends these general consumer fraud statutes to remain in place
with respect to consumer leases. The U.C.L.A. specifically provides that it
is "supplemented by other applicable statutory provisions,"2" and a Legis-
198See NAT'L CONSUMER L. CTR., CONSUMER WARRANTY LAW ch. 13 (2001).
199
200 E.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 198-a(aX2) (McKinney Supp. 2002).
201 U.C.L.A. § 310 legis. n. 2.
202 Hence the acronym "U.D.A.P." statutes.
203 See generally NAT'L CONSUMER L. CTR., UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES (5th
ed. 2001) (surveying U.D.A.P statutes and their application).
204 Id.
205 For a collection of cases involving U.D.A.P. allegations in automobile leases, see id. § 5.4.8.
Examples include:
* misrepresentation that the transaction is a sale when it is a lease;
* mis-stating the amount of the down-payment;
* failure to disclose a marked-up cash price;
* misrepresenting that there is a purchase option;
Id. § 5.418.2.
206 U.C.L.A. § 106.
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lative Note reminds any enacting state to "review its statutory treatment of
unfair and deceptive acts and practices to assure that it covers consumer
lease transactions. 2 7
There is another category of existing state consumer protection laws
where the relationship to the U.C.L.A. will be less clear. These are state
laws, usually statutory but including judicial precedent, that are of more
general applicability than just to consumer leases, but that are potentially
overlapping or inconsistent with the U.C.L.A. As just noted, the U.C.L.A.
expressly states that it is supplemented by other statutory law and "general
principles of law and equity. ' 20 But those other laws and principles are
not applicable if they "are displaced by or inconsistent with" the
U.C.L.A.2°' Several examples may sharpen the issue:
I. If a state (like Connecticut) has a "plain language" law re-
quiring all consumer contracts to be written in simple Eng-
lish,2"' or if a state requires non-English translations, 21
nothing in the U.C.L.A. should affect the continuing appli-
cability of those laws to consumer leases.21 2
2. Some states follow a "single document" rule, requiring
that all the essential terms of a consumer contract be con-
tained in a single paper document." 3 The U.C.L.A. does
not explicitly require such a single document." 4 Does the
single-document rule continue to apply, or is it displaced
for U.C.L.A. transactions?
3. A number of states have adopted rules or case law hold-
ings on the handling of security deposits, some requiring
that such deposits be kept in segregated accounts or that
interest accrue in the customer's favor on such deposits.2"5
207 Id. § 106 legis. n. I.
208 Id. § 106.
209 Id.
2 10 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-152 (2001).
211 E.g., 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 505/2N (West Supp. 2002); CAL. CIv. CODE § 1632
(West Supp. 2002).
212 Section 42-156(a) of the Connecticut act provides that the "plain language" requirement does
not affect any disclosures or notices specified by law. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-156(a).
213 E.g., California Motor Vehicle Leasing Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 2985.8(a).
214 Section 203 of the U.C.L.A. adopts by reference the disclosure content and format rules of the
federal C.L.A. and Regulation M. Regulation M allows the disclosures to be made on a separate sheet.
12 C.F.R. § 213.3(a)(1) (2002). The U.C.L.A. allows at least some information "in a separate record
accompanying the lease." U.C.L.A. § 203(c)(5) (addressing itemization of capitalized cost); see also id.
§ 301b) (addressing spot delivery notice).
See Summary of Lease Security Deposit Cases, 51 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 284-88 (1997).
The recurring argument in the cases is that, under pre-2001 U.C.C. section 9-207, the lessor held the
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The U.C.L.A. specifically says that the holder is not re-
quired to pay interest on a security deposit,216 and the Offi-
cial Comments say that security deposits need not be "seg-
regated or maintained in separate accounts. ''217 How
much, if any, of the other state law on security deposits
remains applicable to consumer leases after U.C.L.A.?
This issue of the integration (or exclusion) of other law in consumer
lease transactions is discussed further in connection with U.C.L.A. section
106, which is discussed below in Part 1V.B.5.
F. Contrasting Legal Environments for Leases and Credit Sales
To summarize this section: Consumer leases and credit sales compete
for the consumer's market choice. Both involve the consumer's acquisi-
tion and use of goods for personal, family or household purposes, with
payments deferred over a period of time. Each form of consumer goods
financing draws on the Uniform Commercial Code for its basic legal struc-
ture, including default rules on contract formation, warranties, perform-
ance, priorities, and remedies. Both leases and credit sales are subject to
advertising and disclosure rules set by federal law. At this point, however,
the legal environment for the two transaction forms begins to diverge.
As discussed in Parts II.B and II.E.1, there are a number of federal
laws and regulations designed to protect consumers as debtors, i.e., as buy-
ers on credit. But the extension of these laws and regulations to consumer
lease transactions is often uncertain. At the state level, every jurisdiction
has a range of protective laws for credit buyers, such as usury (interest rate)
regulations and installment sales acts, which typically prescribe additional
disclosures beyond those required by federal law, impose restraints on con-
tract terms and remedies, limit repossession and foreclosure procedures,
regulate insurance and other products sold as part of the credit sale, and
usually provide for private enforcement and public administration. In addi-
tion, on the sale side are specialty laws such as the lemon laws for defec-
tive cars and cooling-off laws for door-to-door and similar sales settings.
And there are almost everywhere special laws addressing rent-to-own
transactions as a form of marketing that is effectively sui generis.
Except for the smattering of existing state laws on consumer leases,
mostly affecting only motor vehicle leases, there has been no compara-
ble--certainly no uniform-body of law for consumer leases equivalent to
that described for credit sales in the prior paragraph. It is the general ob-
security deposit as collateral and so must segregate it and use reasonable care with respect to it, includ-
ing investing it at interest and accounting for those earnings. This argument usually loses. Cf Turner
v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 180 F.3d 451 (2d Cir. 1999).
216 U.C.L.A. § 303(d).
217 Id. § 303 cmt. 3.
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jective of the U.C.L.A. to fill that role.
III. DRAFTING HISTORY OF THE U.C.L.A.
A. Study Committee Report
The deep background of the U.C.L.A. was touched on earlier."' Since
the early 1980s, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws and the American Law Institute have been working on a sub-
stantial overhaul of the Uniform Commercial Code. The first piece of that
overhaul was the drafting of a new Article 2A (Leases). 9 In the drafting
process for that article, as for U.C.C. Article 9 (Secured Transactions) and
Article 2 (Sales), there was recurring debate over the need to include con-
sumer protection provisions in those articles of the commercial code, and if
so, which and how many of them. Before and even after promulgation of
Article 2A, N.C.C.U.S.L. apparently believed it would help spur adoption
if that Article were left primarily commercial in scope, with consumer pro-
tections in leases to be dealt with in a separate uniform law. If this ap-
proach were successful for Article 2A, perhaps something similar could be
done with Articles 2 or 9. Even outside of N.C.C.U.S.L. there were sug-
gestions for a "model" Consumer-Lessee Protection Act.
220
N.C.C.U.S.L. commissioned a Study Committee in early 1995, chaired
by Commissioner Gerald Bepko, Chancellor of Indiana University (Indian-
apolis). That Study Committee canvassed knowledgeable people across
the country and collected both scholarly and popular literature on leasing
practices. The Committee's Report in July 1995 recommended the ap-
pointment of a drafting committee, and sketched the scope of what should
be addressed in the drafting process:
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws ("N.C.C.U.S.L.") should establish a drafting
committee to prepare a proposed Uniform Consumer Leasing
Act. The drafting committee should be instructed to give first
attention to substantive issues in an effort to provide a bal-
ance of interests between lessors and lessees of consumer
218 See discussion supra Part II.
219 Actually, what is now U.C.C. Article 2A began as the free-standing Uniform Personal Prop-
erty Leasing Act. Foreword to U.C.C. Article 2A, SELECTED COMMERCIAL STATUTES 193 (West
Group 1993).
220 See John J. A. Burke & John M. Cannel, Leases of Personal Property: A Project for Con-
sumer Protection, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 115 (1991). This proposal was an outgrowth of New Jersey's
consideration and enactment of U.C.C. Article 2A. N.J. LAW REVISION COMM'N, REPORT AND REC.
OMMENDATIONS ON CONSUMER LEASES (1989), at http://www.lawrev.state.nj.us/rpts/clpa94.pdf (last
visited Nov. 23, 2002) (on file with the Connecticut Law Review). An even earlier exhortation to the
California legislature appears in Joseph G. Gorman, Jr., Comment, Automobile Leasing: A Subject for
Legislative Consideration, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 138 (1965).
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goods. In particular, the drafting committee should review
issues addressed by states that have enacted or are consider-
ing enacting laws on this subject. During the drafting proc-
ess, the committee should monitor the developments under
the federal Consumer Leasing Act and Federal Reserve
Board Regulation M, and the currently pending revision pro-
cess for Regulation M. Before completing its work, the
drafting committee should review Regulation M, determine
whether any supplementary state law is desirable, and incor-
porate the results of their deliberations in the proposed Uni-
form Consumer Leasing Act.
In its charge to the Study Committee on Consumer Leas-
ing, the N.C.C.U.S.L. Executive Committee chose to exclude
"rent-to-own" arrangements from consideration. While the
Study Committee honored this instruction, it feels compelled
to suggest as part of its recommendation that any drafting
committee appointed be given the authority to explore the
points of comparability that may exist between the kinds of
consumer leases to be covered and rent-to-own transac-
tions....
The drafting committee should be instructed to include in
the proposed Uniform Consumer Leasing Act the lease to
consumers of all types of tangible personal property....
The drafting committee should exclude short-term leases.
How to define the excluded transactions should be left to the
drafting committee. A common provision in present state
laws excludes leases of less than four months.22I
The Executive Committee of N.C.C.U.S.L. in late 1995 designated a
Reporter for the project, appointed members of the Drafting Committee,222
and designated Commissioners Robert Cornell of California and Justin
Vigdor of New York as co-chairs.
B. Methodology and Schedule
The Drafting Committee first met in the spring of 1996, and met semi-
annually thereafter until final approval of the U.C.L.A. at the N.C.C.U.S.L.
221 NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, REPORT OF THE STUDY COMMIT-
TEE ON A PROPOSED UNIFORM CONSUMER LEASING ACT 1-2 (July 1995).
222 It was probably no accident that two of the original Drafting Committee members were Com-
missioners from Connecticut, which had been reluctant to act on U.C.C. Article 2A without assurance
of adequate consumer protections being included.
2003]
CONNECTICUT LA W REVIEW
annual meeting in August 2001. Announcements of the Drafting Commit-
tee meetings were distributed to a broad mailing list, and interested persons
were invited to attend committee meetings as "observers." Over the full
drafting period, scores of observers attended various meetings, but there
was a core group of about ten who attended virtually every drafting ses-
sion. These observers represented industry, consumer, academic, and regu-
latory perspectives, and far from being passive observers were welcomed
as full-fledged participants in the discussions. And participate they did,
both as critics of current draft language and as resources of information
about current leasing practices and problems, and the rationales or cures for
them.
Having been the Reporter and thus an "insider," it is difficult for this
author objectively to appraise the drafting process. All involved worked
hard. The co-chairs were patient but persistent in moving the project for-
ward during each two-and-a-half day drafting session, while keeping the
process open and collegial. There is a certain inefficiency in a process that
is so open, and in which almost any issue can be re-opened at any time.
There was also some turnover in Drafting Committee membership during
the six-year drafting process; replacement members understandably were
on a learning curve and wanted to be sure to understand, and free to re-
visit, issues previously thought to be resolved. As is too often the case,
consumer representatives had difficulty getting financing for regular atten-
dance at semi-annual meetings scattered over the country.223
The drafting methodology was straight-forward. The earliest drafts
prepared by the Reporter were conglomerations of provisions taken from or
patterned on the U.C.C. and the U.C.C.C., from the recently enacted state
motor vehicle leasing laws, and from a "model" act derived from a New
York law but refined by industry sponsors.224 There was a certain "every-
thing including the kitchen sink" character to those early drafts.225 Within
three or four meetings, however, the basic shape of the Act emerged, and it
then became a process of debating and resolving issues and refining the
statutory language. In addition to the on-site input from the observers, the
Committee also received numerous written comments from a spectrum of
interested parties. For each Drafting Committee meeting a new "clean"
draft was prepared and circulated, reflecting changes from the prior meet-
ing and highlighting issues and options for the upcoming session.
Explanatory "Reporter's Notes" evolved during this process and became
the basis for the Official Comments that accompany the Act.
223 This is a recurring problem. See Gail Hillebrand, What's Wrong with the Uniform Law Proc-
ess?, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 640-41 (2001).
224 Venable, Baetjer, Howard & Civiletti, LLP, Motor Vehicle Consumer Lessee Protection Act.
Commentary and Policy Discussion, in CARLAw SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT (1995).
225 For non-insider perceptions of the process, see Joseph W. Gelb & Peter N. Cubita, Toward a
Uniform Consumer Leases Act, 53 Bus. LAW. 1041 (1998).
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C. Official Approval, Finally
Strategically, the early thinking was that the U.C.L.A. project could tag
along behind the U.C.C. Articles 2 and 2A rewrites then under way, and
borrow, adapt, or adjust to decisions made in connection with the "com-
mercial" code. The U.C.L.A., in other words, could build on the best in the
revised U.C.C. articles, and add other consumer protection provisions
where the "commercial" code came up short. But as events occurred, the
U.C.L.A. became its own engine, rather than a caboose on the Article 2 and
2A train. The U.C.L.A. was scheduled for its "first reading" in the summer
of 1999, at the same N.C.C.U.S.L. meeting where it was hoped the aggres-
sively revised U.C.C. Articles 2 and 2A would get final approval. But as
the Article 2 and 2A projects slowed, and then imploded literally on the
eve of N.C.C.U.S.L. discussion of them,226 the U.C.L.A. passed its first
reading and the Drafting Committee anticipated final approval the follow-
ing summer.
For various reasons, the scheduled second reading of the U.C.L.A. was
deferred until the summer of 2001. In part this was to see if the log jam on
U.C.C. Articles 2 and 2A would be breached so that, as originally planned,
the U.C.L.A. could be fine-tuned for optimum mesh with those U.C.C.
articles. In fact it was probably a good thing that the Drafting Committee
had an extra year, because it met three more times in that interval and made
some important adjustments in what became the final version of the Act.
Then, as the clock wound down to and through the final drafting ses-
sion in May 2001, political reality surfaced. A number of industry
groups.27 advised that the member organizations would not accept the
U.C.L.A. because of strong objections to many of its provisions as then
drafted. "Enactability" has always been a N.C.C.U.S.L. principle of uni-
form laws drafting, and the question for the Drafting Committee and the
Conference was how to proceed. Should they leave the Act as drafted and
hope for the best in terms of Conference approval and state enactment, or
begin a new round of negotiated compromises in hopes of garnering indus-
try neutrality if not support? The Committee chose the latter path. By
conference call and face-to-face meetings the Committee, with the industry
226 Revised Articles 2 and 2A had been approved by the American Law Institute ("A.L.l.") in
May 1999. The day before they were to come to the N.C.C.U.S.L. floor in August that year, the leader-
ship removed them from the agenda out of concern for their enactability, especially on the issue of
scope of coverage as to software. The Reporters resigned, a new Drafting Committee undertook to do a
scaled-back version of the revisions, and in August 2002 N.C.C.U.S.L. approved scope language that, it
is hoped, will draw A.L.I. agreement and conclude the lengthy revision process. The saga, from the
A.L.I. perspective, is told in Final Attempt to Achieve U.C.C. Article 2 Amendments Underway, A.L.I.
REP., at I (Fall 2002).
227 Almost all were motor vehicle lessors and financers.
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groups and consumer representatives, 228 worked out adjustments on a num-
ber of issues, to a point where the Committee co-chairs believed they had
gotten general acceptance, or at least industry neutrality.229 By conference
call on May 24, the Drafting Committee approved certain changes, and
hoped that the decks were cleared for approval.
Not quite. Several weeks before the Conference gathered for its An-
nual Meeting at the Greenbrier in White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, in
August 2001, the industry coalition served notice that they still would be
unable to support the Act without further revision on four specified
points.3' An industry delegation appeared at the Greenbrier prepared to
negotiate. Would the Committee engage them, or not? It would. The
Committee co-chairs led the group through an almost non-stop three day
exchange of drafts, revisions, proposals and counter-proposals that culmi-
nated in a number of revisions of the draft Act and a signed commitment
from the industry coalition members that they would not oppose the Act in
its final iteration either in the Conference or in the states.23" ' The U.C.L.A.
passed its second reading without dissent and was approved for promulga-
tion to the states.232 Whether the eleventh-hour modifications will influ-
ence the "enactability" of the Act remains to be seen.2"'
228 Key Observers from the consumer side participated in most of these exchanges and were kept
apprised of each step in the process.
229 A memo from Drafting Committee Co-Chair Justin Vigdor to N.C.C.U.S.L. officers
McLaugherty, Burnett, and Miller reviews this activity, concluding that "it seems we have reached
some sort of a meeting of the minds," although "we have no ironclad commitments" from either side.
(Mar. 22, 2001) (on file with Connecticut Law Review).
230 Letter from the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, the Association of International
Automobile Manufacturers, the Association of Consumer Vehicle Lessors, and the American Financial
Services Association ("AFSA"), to Comm'r Justin L. Vigdor (July 13, 2001) (on file with the Con-
necticut Law Review). Separate letters of opposition were circulated to the Commissioners by the
National Automobile Dealers Association, the National Vehicle Leasing Association, and the AFSA.
The four specific points of objection were: (1) class action exposure; (2) over-broad availability of
statutory damages; (3) excessively long statute of limitations; and (4) lack of a safe harbor for early
termination liability.
231 Letter from representatives of the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, the Association of
International Automobile Manufacturers, and the Association of Consumer Vehicle Lessors (Aug. 14,
200 1) (on file with the Connecticut Law Review).
232 At this point in the N.C.C.U.S.L. meeting the Reporter (this author) went home, believing the
U.C.L.A. was finally finished. There was, however, one last flurry of objections, leading Conference
officers to consider suspending approval of the U.C.L.A. This came not from the auto leasing compa-
nies but from the computer software industry, insisting that the U.C.L.A. not take or infer a position on
its coverage of computer software and "smart goods" unless and until that coverage issue was resolved
for U.C.C. Articles 2 and 2A. Since that issue is the one that had brought the Articles 2 and 2A revi-
sions to a stand-still, failure of the U.C.L.A. loomed one more time. Happily, the issue was brokered to
apparent agreement by including an additional Comment 8 to U.C.L.A. section 104, professing neutral-
ity on coverage of software.
233 In Connecticut, where the U.C.L.A. was adopted in the spring of 2002, some of the industry
coalition members actively supported the U.C.L.A.; none, apparently, opposed it openly. Leasing
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D. Intervening "Changed Circumstances"
During the six years from the appointment of the original Study Com-
mittee to final approval of the U.C.L.A., there were several changes in the
environment for consumer leases that can affect one's outlook on the need
for--or adequacy of-a new consumer protection law.
One of these changes was the modernization of the federal Regulation
M disclosure rules. The revision of that regulation conformed the disclo-
sure compliance rules to current market practices, emphasized a more intel-
ligible format, and resolved several disclosure issues that had been prob-
lematic in the case law. The leasing industry by and large took the position
that with improved and streamlined disclosures in place, there simply was
no compelling need for additional regulation of consumer leases through a
uniform state law. Let the market work, they said, and let the federal dis-
closure rules provide sufficient "transparency" to prevent consumer abuse.
At very least, the argument went, the Conference should hold off imposing
an additional regimen of legal controls until we see how the new Regula-
tion M works and whether there are real problems left to be addressed.
The counterpoint, the Drafting Committee also heard, is that the federal
C.L.A. only provides disclosure and so cannot deal with the array of lease
terms and practices that need more substantive controls; a uniform state
law can reach to problems or abuses not related to disclosure. The fact is
that we have a significantly different disclosure regime in place now, com-
pared to the pre-1998 period. No one yet knows how the current disclo-
sures will obviate old problems, create new ones, or simply miss the mark
of real leasing abuses.
The other sea change since the mid-1990s is economic, especially with
respect to market forces affecting motor vehicle leases. Auto leasing was
booming in the early part of the decade, with predictions that forty or even
fifty percent of retail auto deliveries would be through leases. In retro-
spect, this sentiment was not only supported by market data, but consistent
with the psychology and consumer expectations of the time: the economy
is surging, let's upgrade our transportation, and why not get the best we
can for our cash flow!
Now, as of mid-2002, to say that auto leasing is flat is an understate-
ment, though "tanked '234 may exaggerate the decline.235 A number of les-
industry support included insistence on repeal of an existing Connecticut law that would have (as of
July 2002) required disclosure of a "lease rate," anathema to the industry.
234 This term was used by a knowledgeable leasing lawyer in a recent conversation with the au-
thor. A trade association study puts the point equally colorfully concerning auto finance originations:
"The 2002 ... study validates last year's emergent story, namely, lending was the origination prince




sors and financial institutions have left the auto lease markets.236 The
manufacturers are vigorously promoting sales of new cars with subsidized
("0% APR") financing. Perhaps some folklore is developing that leases are
not all that advantageous after all.237
Part of the economic problem in the auto leasing business is self-
inflicted, or at least indigenous to that market. Most vehicle leases are
"closed-end"; that is, the lease projects an estimated residual value of the
car at the end of the lease term, and monthly rent payments are set by ref-
erence to that residual value. Essentially, the higher the expected residual
value, the less depreciation needs to be accounted for in the monthly pay-
ment stream, and the smaller-and more attractive-are the monthly pay-
ments. When the lease expires the consumer lessee may simply return the
car with no further obligation, and the lessor (or current "holder" of the
lease)23 bears the risk that the car's actual residual (resale) value will
match the estimated value. If the actual residual value exceeds the esti-
mated, the lessor gets a bit of a windfall on resale of the car. Or the lessee
may exercise an option to buy the goods at, or close to, the estimated resid-
ual-which is a bargain purchase for the customer.
But if the car depreciates more than expected, or if the residual value
was set artificially high, so that the estimated residual value overstates the
car's actual value at lease end, the lessor or holder faces a dead loss. The
customer has no further obligation under the lease,239 and will not want to
purchase the car at an inflated residual or purchase-option price. Nor will
the lessor or holder, typically selling the returned vehicle in a wholesale
market, recover the full estimated residual. Some leasing industry mem-
bers carry insurance against these residual losses, but substantial claims
experience may make that coverage very expensive or unavailable. The
glut of vehicles coming off-lease has also skewed the used-car markets
with over-supply, and in circular fashion this undercuts the new car mar-
235 Vehicle leases declined in dollar value during 2001 by almost 5%, while credit sales grew by
more than 8%; this is by contrast to the prior year when leasing grew 11.5% and credit sales by only
7.2%. Id. at 1.4, fig. 1.3 (on file with the Connecticut Law Review).
236 CONSUMER BANKERS ASs'N, AUTOMOBILE FINANCE STUDY, at V. 1(2002). From i roster of
the major institutional leasing companies, respondents to the leasing portion of the study declined from
thirty-five in 2000, to twenty-four in 2001, and to fifteen in 2002. Id. The response shrinkage is attrib-
uted to companies leaving the leasing business. Id.
237 See It's the Lease You Can Do, CONSUMER REP., Jan. 2001, at 12-17 (containing "7 keys to
unlocking thousands of dollars in savings on your next auto lease"); see also Should You Lease Your
Next Car?, CONSUMER REP., Dec. 1997, at 30-35 (containing "[a] five-minute leasing self-defense
course").
238 The term "holder" is adopted in the U.C.L.A. to include both the original lessor and a subse-
quent assignee of that lessor. U.C.L.A. § 102(a)(7) (2002).
239 Of course the consumer may incur extra liability under the lease for excess wear and tear on
the goods. Id. § 407. Even when that liability (costs of repair) is imposed, it merely returns the goods
to their market-value condition which, we are assuming, is depressed.
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kets as many consumers choose to buy used-previously leased-vehicles
in good condition and at good prices. 0
Just as the long term effect of the new Regulation M disclosures is un-
certain, so too the cycles of strength and weakness of the consumer econ-
omy as a whole and the consumer lease markets in particular are unpredict-
able. No one knows whether or when motor vehicle leasing, or the leasing
of other consumer goods, will rebound to greater market share. Are con-
sumer protection laws more needed (or more enactable) when the market
for a particular product is flat or constricting, as the lease markets are now?
Or when the markets are booming? In both contexts there may be intense
competitive pressures on lessors to push their product vigorously and in the
process to push the boundaries of its legal envelope. In a perverse way it is
unfortunate that there was no casus belli with respect to consumer leasing
during the drafting of the U.C.L.A., a case law or regulatory disaster that
cried out for legislative compromise and cure, or a marketing innovation so
dramatic it required statutory guidance. Instead, the drafting committee
saw an active if quiescent market segment for which a gap-filler consumer
protection law was appropriate but could be achieved only with a careful
balancing of industry and consumer interests.
E. Policy Themes of the U.C.L.A.
There is not a single theme or policy objective that dominates the
U.C.L.A., unlike, for example, the federal C.L.A. whose focus is on disclo-
sure. Nor does the U.C.L.A. contemplate a comprehensive restructuring of
industry practices, as perhaps the U.C.C.C. attempted.24 But there are
discernable policies operative in the U.C.L.A.
1. Alignment With Other Law
As discussed at length above,4 2 the U.C.L.A. is designed to fit between
240 One by-product of the weakened market for vehicle leases, and the residual-value shortfalls
that result, is an incentive for lease holders to get their customers to terminate their leases early, pref-
erably by leasing or buying a new car before the original lease expires. Many of the "early termina-
tion" formulas require the customer who wants out of an existing lease to pay the entire unpaid-for
value of the car (less its realized value on resale). The early termination charge equates to the "unamor-
tized adjusted capitalized cost," or the "adjusted lease balance," less the then-value of the car. This
effectively shifts the depreciation risk to the consumer lessee, and explains why Regulation M requires
a "health warning" disclosure about "a substantial charge if you end this lease early," possibly "several
thousand dollars." Cf Miller v. Nissan Motor Acceptance Corp., No. CIV.A. 99-4953, 2000 WL
1599244, at *2-*5 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 27, 2000) (finding that because a consumer terminated a lease one
month before its scheduled expiration, the early termination formula in the lease would have required a
payoff of $5,337.00, but the lessor settled for the one remaining monthly payment of $267.00.). Early
termination charges are addressed in U.C.L.A. section 405.
241 See U.C.C.C. prefatory note (1974) (emphasizing the need for law reform with respect to the
price of credit, freedom of entry, and creditor remedies).
242 See supra Part 11.C.8.
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the federal C.L.A. and Article 2A of the U.C.C. and to complement and
dovetail with each of them and other applicable law.
2. Transparency
The U.C.L.A. stresses the need for consumer lessees to have ample and
clear information about the lease transaction before, during, and after lease
signing. In part, this is done by incorporating the C.L.A. disclosures into
the U.C.L.A., but the U.C.L.A. fills in additional information requirements
throughout the life cycle of the lease. 43
3. Restraints on Unconscionable Terms and Practices
This policy might be re-stated as conscious parallelism with retail in-
stallment sales acts on the credit side. In addition to a general "uncon-
scionability" provision,'" the U.C.L.A. forbids lease terms traditionally
found to be oppressive, and restrains the lessor's contractual and opera-
tional remedies within bounds of what might be called industry best prac-
tices.
4. Non-Interference with Pricing
Unlike much state law for credit transactions, the U.C.L.A. does not di-
rectly interfere with the industry's range of options for determining the
price and payment structure of consumer leases. To be sure, some of the
limitations in the U.C.L.A. will inhibit certain revenue sources for les-
sors, 245 and affect certain risk allocations in the consumer's favor.2 46 But
on the basic formulas for calculating capitalized cost, internal rates of re-
turn, payment flows, and liquidated damages, the industry retains its free-
dom of contract.
5. Protecting the Lessee's Investment in the Lease
This might also be rephrased as protecting consumer lessees from sur-
prise losses or liabilities. Although a lessee does not build "equity" or
ownership rights in the leased goods, lessees ought not be exposed unduly
to risks of financial exposure or loss of bargain that are difficult to antici-
pate or calculate. Examples of this policy can be seen in the rules on spot
delivery," preservation of claims and defenses,24 cure of default,249 and
243 See U.C.L.A. § 202 (pre-lease availability of forms); id. § 204 (insurance disclosures); id. §
206 (information during period of lease).
244Id. § 110.
245 E.g., id. § 401 (banning imposition of "gap" liability on consumer leases).
246 E.g., id. § 405(b) (capping early termination liability).
247 See id. § 301(b).
248 See id. § 305(b).
249 See id. § 402.
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liability for excess wear and us25°
6. Balanced Private and Public Enforcement
The U.C.L.A. permits individual consumers to vindicate their rights
under the Act through private actions for actual and statutory damages,25" '
and in some circumstances through class actions." 2 The Act also vests
public enforcement authority in the state attorney general or equivalent
consumer protection official. 3'
F. Current Status of the UC.L.A.
At this writing, the U.C.L.A. has been adopted in Connecticut, with an
effective date of July 1, 2003.254 Connecticut did make about half a dozen
non-uniform amendments to the official Act; these are noted in context in
the discussion below.
The Act has neither been adopted nor introduced in any other state leg-
islature to date.
IV. SCOPE OF U.C.L.A. COVERAGE
One cannot appreciate the U.C.L.A.'s contents without understanding
when it applies, and to what. It applies, simply, to a "consumer lease."' 55
A. What Constitutes a Consumer Lease?
The U.C.L.A. definition of "consumer lease" draws on the comparable
definitions in the federal C.L.A. 56 and U.C.C. Article 2A 57 and is meant to




" for a term of more than four months;
" for a contractual obligation of no more than $150,000;
" to a lessee who is an individual; and
* the lessee is acquiring the goods for personal, family, or
household purposes.
The components are cumulative; all must exist together for the lease to be
250 See id. § 407.
251 Id. § 501
252 For actual damages only. Id. § 501(d).
253 Id. § 507.
254 CONN. U.C.L.A., 2002 Conn. Pub. Acts 02-81 (Reg. Sess.).
255 U.C.L.A. § 104(a) (2002). "Consumer lease" is defined in U.C.L.A. section 102(aX2).
256 Regulation M, 12 C.F.R. § 213.2(e) (2002).
257 U.C.C. § 2A-103(1)(j) (2002).
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covered, and each is fraught with some complexity.
1. A "Lease"
The U.C.L.A. adopts the substance-over-form approach of the U.C.C.
by specifying that a lease is a "right to possession and use"-not title or
any semblance of it--"for a term in return for consideration.""2 8  It ex-
pressly excludes transactions that are sales or security interests;259 thus in-
voking indirectly the U.C.C. definitions for each of those terms. A "sale"
is defined as "the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price"26 ;
courts should have no greater difficulty separating sales from leases under
the U.C.L.A. than under the commercial code or its antecedents. A trans-
action is also not a lease if it is a "security interest" as defined in the
U.C.C.26' This triggers the same economic and fact-based analysis that the
U.C.C. has required for years: Will the transaction likely produce a not-
insignificant residual value for the lessor?262 Purported leases that exhaust
the useful life of the goods, or that permit the lessee to become owner of
the goods or renew the lease for the remaining life of the goods for no or
nominal consideration will fall into the definition of security interest.263
These "dirty leases" are not leases for purposes of the U.C.L.A.; they will
be treated as credit sales under other consumer protection laws.26
2. Goods
The U.C.L.A. applies to leases of "goods," that is "all things that are
movable." '265 This refers to tangible chattels of all sorts, most obviously
excluding all forms of real property leases or rentals.266 The definition also'
excludes personal property assets that are intangibles or obligations.2 67
This may seem an obvious set of exclusions, for what consumer "leases"
258 U.C.L.A. § 102(a)(8).
259 ld.
260 U.C.C § 2-106(1).
261 Id. § 1-201(37) (revised U.C.C. Article 1, § 1-201(b)(35)).
262 Id. In revised U.C.C. Article 1, the analytic factors are spelled out in section 1-203.
263 Id. § 1-203(b).
264 Cf 12 C.F.R. § 213.2(e)(2) (2002) (noting that leases defined as credit sales are not consumer
leases 5
U.C.L.A. § 102(a)(5).
266 See id. The U.C.L.A. definition of goods does include "fixtures," i.e., chattels affixed tempo-
rarily to real property, such as a household furnace, stove, or built-in entertainment system.
267 See id. (goods "does not include money, documents, letters of credit, letter-of-credit rights, in-
vestment property, accounts, chattel paper, deposit accounts, general intangibles .... ).
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mutual funds or bills of lading? This definitional language, however, does
not expressly resolve the continuing debate over the proper treatment of
computer software--"computer information"268-particularly when it is
embedded in other goods as part of their operational systems, like the chips
that control a motor vehicle's ignition, brakes, and satellite navigation sys-
tem. This debate stymied the revision process for U.C.C. Articles 2 and
2A for several years, and the U.C.L.A. does not resolve it.269
Examples at the extremes may sharpen the issue. The automobile with
computer-assisted ignition and brakes seems clearly to remain entirely
"goods," and a lease of that vehicle falls under the U.C.L.A. (and probably
U.C.C. Article 2A as well). By contrast, a computer program that the con-
sumer downloads into a home computer is likely to be treated as "soft-
ware" and not goods,27 even though the software is embedded in a tangible
plastic disk. A "lease" arrangement for such software would probably not
be covered by the U.C.L.A.
3. Term More Than Four Months
A consumer lease must entitle the lessee to use the goods for more than
four months. 7  It is the period of possession and use that is critical, not the
payment period. This has the effect of excluding short-term leases and
rent-to-own transactions."' But it does not exclude a longer term lease
merely because the lease acknowledges that the lessee may terminate early
on payment of an early termination charge. 3 Such a lease is still a con-
tractual commitment, and the early termination charge is considered a form
of liquidated damages for breach. Most motor vehicle leases contain such
268 See UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS AT (U.C.I.T.A.) § 102(a)(10), 7 U.L.A. 205
(2002) (defining computer information, which is the critical term for coverage under the U.C.I.T.A.);
id. § 103(a) (stating that the U.C.I.T.A. "applies to computer information transactions").
269 In fact, the U.C.L.A. seems to duck the issue. See U.C.L.A. § 104 cmt. 8 (stating that "this
Act does not expressly address the extent to which it applies to information contained in or part of
leased goods").
A U.C.C. § 9-102(aX44) (2002). In the context of security interests, U.C.C. Article 9 tries to
draw a line between "goods" and "software":
["Goods"] also includes a computer program embedded in goods and any supporting
information provided in connection with a transaction relating to the program if (i)
the program is associated with the goods in such a manner that it customarily is con-
sidered part of the goods, or (ii) by becoming the owner of the goods, a person ac-
quires a right to use the program in connection with the goods. The term does not
include a computer program embedded in goods that consist solely of the medium in
which the program is embedded.
ld; see also id. cmt. 4.a (explaining that "goods" and "software" are mutually exclusive).
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provisions, and it would be an unintended irony if mainstream auto leases
were accidentally excluded by the more-than-four-months rule.
4. Contractual Obligation of $150,000 or Less
The lessee must be obligated "for a total contractual obligation of
$150,000 or less. 2 74 The intention here is to exclude from U.C.L.A. cov-
erage very upscale leases that are either "non-consumer in purpose, or
likely to be carefully negotiated between parties of sophistication, probably
with professional advice. 2 7' The phraseology tracks the Regulation M
Commentary to make clear that the cap measures actual cash outlays by the
lessee; it ignores the residual value or any renewal or purchase option
price, presumably because these are not payment obligations of the les-
see.2 76 It also excludes charges paid through the lessor to third parties, such
as taxes or registration fees.277
There is an important interface with the C.L.A. and Regulation M here.
The federal law caps its coverage at $25,000.278 Virtually any lease cov-
ered by C.L.A. will be covered by the U.C.L.A. But the U.C.L.A. expands
its scope to the higher dollar figure, and then imposes certain C.L.A.-
derived obligations (particularly disclosure) on all leases, including those
from $25,000 up to $150,000. The disclosure obligations will be the same,
but only leases up to $25,000 are subject to C.L.A.'s penalties. 79
Industry observers and commentators complained that the $150,000
figure is too high, and will sweep into the U.C.L.A. very expensive leases
that do not need its protections. The Drafting Committee had considered
setting no cap at all, so in a sense the $150,000 figure is a compromise.
More importantly, the $25,000 boundary figure in the federal C.L.A. was
actually set in 1968 as a part of the Truth in Lending Act to which the
C.L.A. was later added.28 The Consumer Price Index in 2002 is more than
500% of the CPI of the late 1960s, which would raise the C.L.A. figure to
about $130,000 if adjusted for inflation.28' It is not impossible for an auto
274 Id. § 102(aX2XA).
275 Id. § 102(a)(2) cmt. 2.c.
276 12 C.F.R. § 213.2 cmt. 2(e)3 (2002).
277 ld.
278 C.L.A. § 181(I), 15 U.S.C. § 1667(l)(2000).
279 Another consequence is that, while there is federal court subject matter jurisdiction for actions
brought under the federal C.L.A., there is no comparable federal court jurisdiction for actions involving
U.C.L.A. leases over the $25,000 federal cap.
280 Auto leases can easily exceed $25,000 in "total contractual obligation," and so fall outside the
C.L.A. See Kondo v. Marietta Toyota, Inc., 480 S.E.2d 851, 853 (Ga. App. 1997) (noting a total obli-
gation of $27,246.40); Sanders v. Gold Key Lease, Inc., 906 F.Supp 197, 199 (S.D.N.Y., 1995) (noting
a total obligation of $25,601.06).
281 Based on the Consumer Price Index, $25,000 in 1968 would equate to almost $130,000
($129,533.68) as of November 2002. See Columbia Journalism Review Dollar Conversion Calculator,
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lease to exceed even the $150,000 figure. In Addison v. Burnett,282 a
dealer's sale and lease-back arrangement for a twenty-two-year old Ferrari
330 GTC Roadster called for thirty-six monthly payments of $4,213.23, or
a total obligation of $151,676.28.
5. To an Individual
A consumer lease requires a "lessee," who must be an "individual,"
that is, a natural person.211 So a lease to a corporation or other business
entity, or to any other kind of organization, falls outside U.C.L.A. cover-
age. The rule needs to be applied with some common sense; for example, a
married couple, or a household, are not organizations. At the same time,
an entity acting for an individual as trustee or other fiduciary is considered
a lessee for U.C.L.A. purposes.284 Historically, creditors sometimes re-
quired individual debtors to incorporate to avoid application of usury laws.
Courts would often disregard such sham incorporations, 285 and could do the
same under the U.C.L.A. if a lessor artificially required the lessee to incor-
porate before entering into a lease.28 6
6. Personal, Family, Household Purposes
To be a consumer lease the goods must be "intended by the lessee pri-
marily for personal, family, or household purposes. ' '27 This is the conven-
tional rubric for distinguishing consumer transactions from those intended
for business, investment, agricultural, or other purpose. It is the lessee's
intent that controls, as of the consummation of the lease.288  Lessors may
understandably want to record an indication from the consumer as to the
intended purpose of the leased goods, and this is quite appropriate. The
lessor cannot simply hide behind a check-box indication of business or
other non-consumer purpose; the use of sham "business purpose" represen-
tations has been a problem in'credit transactions in the past. A lessor may
be immunized from liability for violating this Act, but only if the lessor
at http://www.cjr.org/resources/inflater.asp (last visited Nov. 6, 2002) (on file with the Connecticut
Law Review).
282 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 132 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
283 U.C.L.A. § 102(a)(9) (2002) (defining a lessee as "an individual who acquires, applies for, or
is offered the right to possession and use of goods under a consumer lease").
284 Id. § 102(a)(9) cmt. 9.b.
285 See, e.g., Allan v. M & S Mortgage Co., 359 N.W.2d 238, 244-45 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (not-
ing that Michigan's consumer protection act could apply to these plaintiffs because they sought relief as
individuals who had incorporated only to obtain a loan); In re Seisay, 49 B.R. 354, 360 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that the debtors could assert a defense of usury because the lender made the
loan to an individual for personal purposes, through a corporate borrower that served as a "paper con-
duit").
286 U.C.L.A. § 102(a)(9) cmt. 9.b.
287 Id. § 102(a)(2)(B).
288 Id. § 102 cmt. 2.e.
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reasonably relies on a lessee's representation as to non-consumer pur-
poses.289
7. A "Lessor"
Though not technically part of the definition of consumer lease, there
must be a "lessor" as a party to a lease transaction. The U.C.L.A. defini-
tion of "lessor" is based on that in U.C.C. Article 2A, and means "a person
that transfers the right to possession and use of goods under a consumer
lease."2'9 Two aspects of this definition are notable. First, unlike the defi-
nition of lessor in the federal C.L.A., the U.C.L.A. does not include per-
sons who merely "offer" or "arrange" consumer leageg. 291 Thig broader
definition was used in the federal law to parallel the then-equally broad
definition of "creditor" in the T.I.L.A.292 The T.I.L.A. definition has since
been narrowed to include only the designated payee of the obligation,2 93 but
no comparable adjustment was made to the C.L.A. The significance of this
in the federal law is primarily that there may be multiple "lessors" in a sin-
gle transaction, each responsible for the C.L.A. disclosures and liable for
violations. In part to avoid ambiguity about who "offers" or "arranges" a
lease,294 the U.C.L.A. focuses instead on the single entity that actually
transfers the leasehold interest. That person must comply with the Act, not
agents, brokers, or other intermediaries.
Another distinction from the C.L.A. is that the U.C.L.A. definition of
lessor is not, by its terms, limited to professional lessors, i.e., merchants
who regularly lease consumer goods. This qualification is picked up in the
U.C.L.A. exclusions, discussed below.295 Nor does the U.C.L.A. exempt
lessors that are public utilities;2 96 the phone or gas company that leases
goods to customers may be covered (unless the transactions are excludable
for other reasons).297
289 Id. § 502. It is actually a two-step test: The holder must have a "reasonable belief' that it is
not a consumer lease based on "reasonable reliance" on the lessee's representation. Id.290 Id. § 102(a)(10).
291 C.L.A. § 181(3), 15 U.S.C. § 1667(3) (2000).
292 See T.I.L.A., Pub. L. No. 90-321,82 Stat. 146, 177, § 103(0 (1968).
293 T.I.L.A., 15 U.S.C. § 1602(f)(2).
294 This can be a difficult factual issue. See Dwyer v. Barco Auto Leasing Corp., 903 F. Supp.
205, 207 (D. Mass. 1995) (noting that the plaintiffs and the defendants "entertained radically different
perceptions of the essential nature of the transactions into which they had entered").
295 See discussion infra Part IV.B. 1-2.
296 The federal C.L.A. likewise has no exemption for public utility lessors. The T.I.L.A., on the
other hand, exempts public utility credit for services, but not for the financing of durable goods or
home improvements. 12 C.F.R. § 226.3(c) (2002).
297 For example, if the lease is terminable at the end of any weekly or monthly payment period, it
is not an obligation for more than four months (or the equipment rental may be considered incidental to
the sale of services).
[Vol. 35:647
LEASING CONSUMER GOODS
If all of the above elements are present, the transaction is a consumer
lease under the U.C.L.A. But that is not the end of questions about
U.C.L.A. coverage.
B. The Edges of Coverage
Even with the detailed definition of "consumer lease" just described,
transactions do not always fall neatly within or outside it. The Act envi-
sions some circumstances where its scope is narrowed a bit, and others
where coverage may expand beyond the literal boundaries.
1. More than Five Leases in a Year
Like the federal C.L.A., the U.C.L.A. is meant to apply to leases only
where the lessor is a merchant, an entity that regularly conducts a leasing
business in the marketplace. In the C.L.A. this limitation is handled within
the definition of lessor, by limiting that term to a person who is "regularly"
engaged in consumer leasing.298 Regulation M refines this to a bright-line
test: A person leases regularly if it made more than five leases in the prior
calendar year, or after the fifth lease in the current year.299 If I rent my
neighbor's lawn mower for the summer, U.C.C. Article 2A will apply to
the transaction, but neither the federal C.L.A. nor the U.C.L.A. will cover
it.
The U.C.L.A. treats this as an explicit limitation on coverage; the Act
does not apply to what otherwise would be a consumer lease unless the
lessor has made the requisite five leases in the prior or current year." In
other words, a leasing dealer who has been in business for some time is
always covered because it will have made more than five leases in the pre-
ceding year. A start-up leasing company has five "free" transactions in the
start-up year but then is covered for the rest of that year and all of the next.
This "five-transactions" rule may also exclude truly occasional leases even
when made by a merchant who primarily sells or services goods.3 '
298 C.L.A. § 181(3), 15 U.S.C. § 1667(3).
299 12 C.F.R. § 213.2(h).
300U.C.L.A. § 104(b) (2002).
301 See id. For example, a piano dealer may sell almost all of its piano inventory, but occasion-
ally arrange a lease for a customer under special circumstances. Until the dealer makes its sixth lease in
a calendar year, the U.C.L.A. does not apply. See id. § 104 cmt. 2. The U.C.L.A. differs from U.C.C.
Article 2A in this regard. See U.C.C. § 2A-103(l)(e) (2002) (explaining that a consumer lease is one
involving a lessor who is "regularly engaged in the business of leasing or selling ....") (emphasis
added). Under this U.C.C. definition, the piano dealer's first lease would be treated as a consumer
lease for purposes of Article 2A.
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2. Other Explicit Exclusions
The U.C.L.A. also excludes from its coverage several other types of
transactions, including safe-deposit box rentals," 2 and home furnishings
incidental to a lease of real property (the furnished home or apartment
situation).3 ' Both of these track exclusions in Regulation M or its Com-
mentary.3" So also does an exclusion for a lease of "goods incidental to a
contract for the sale of goods or services." ' 5 This recognizes the possibil-
ity of hybrid transactions that combine elements of lease and sale, an issue
that courts have addressed under U.C.C. Article 2 usually by applying a
"predominance" or "gravamen" test to gauge whether the transaction as a
whole should be considered a sale of goods within Article 2, or a lease (or
a sale of services) governed by other law.3" The Comments to U.C.L.A. §
104 give examples and elaborate on how the these tests should be ap-
plied.30 7
The U.C.L.A. also addresses directly several "hybrid" issues that
courts (or enforcement agencies) might otherwise have to test in a vacuum.
One is the transaction that is clearly a consumer lease, but in which the
lessee buys certain goods or services as an incident to that lease. A service
contract or a trailer hitch purchased as part of a car lease are given as ex-
amples.3 ' If a consumer purchased the trailer hitch separately on credit,
that would be a credit sale subject to disclosure or other regulation under a
retail installment sales act. Or the separate purchase of insurance might be
subject to rules on insurance premium financing.3 Under the Act3 " these
items may be swept into the lease, usually as part of the capitalized cost or
302 U.C.L.A. § 104(c)(1).
303 See id. § 104(cX2).
304 12 C.F.R. § 213.2(2Xe) cmt. 8 (exempting safe deposit boxes from consumer leases); id. §
213.2(e)(3) (excluding, with certain restrictions, personal property that "is incident to the lease of real
prope3rty").
U.C.L.A. § 104(cX3). See 12 C.F.R. § 213.2.(2)(e) cmt. 7 (listing "incidental leases of per-
sonal property").
06 See, e.g., Tivoli Enter., Inc. v. Brunswick Bowling & Billiards Corp., 646 N.E.2d 943, 947-48
(111. 1995) (applying the predominant purpose test); Anthony Pools v. Sheehan, 455 A.2d 434, 440-41
(Md. 1983) (holding that the mechanical predominant purpose test is prohibited by the state statute and
applying the gravamen test instead); In re Trailer & Plumbing Supplies, 578 A.2d 343, 345 (N.H. 1990)
(considering both the predominant purpose test and the gravamen test, and determining that "the
gravamen of the action analysis is inappropriate"); Pass v. Shelby Aviation, Inc., No. W1999-00018-
COA-R9-CV, 2000 LEXIS 247, at *9 (Tenn. App. Apr. 13, 2000) (recounting the choice between the
"gravamen" and the "predominant factor" tests and noting that Tennessee adopted the predominant
factor approach).
U.C.L.A. § 104 cmt. 5 & cmt. 7.
308
1d. § 104 cmt. 6.
309 Id. A state enacting the U.C.L.A. should insert into section 104(d) references to the specific
other state laws being preempted or displaced.
310 Id. § 104(d).
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periodic payment amount, and are no longer subject to other state laws that
would apply to the incidental items if sold or financed separately. The
objective of the U.C.L.A. rule is to permit what is in fact a single transac-
tion to be written and disclosed as such, without redundant paper work for
its component parts.
Similarly, when a consumer enters a lease, the consumer may owe
sums for governmental fees or taxes related to the lease, or may carry over
a debit balance from a prior transaction, as by making an "under water" or
"upside down" trade-in.3" Technically, the lessor may be viewed as mak-
ing a loan to the consumer for those amounts. Again, the Act allows those
obligations to be swept into the lease without being subject to otherwise
applicable small loan or consumer lending laws.3"2
The intention of these "merger" provisions (in which certain non-lease
charges merge in the lease) is to avoid redundant paper work and disclo-
sure. It is not meant to deprive consumers of the substantive protections
they would get if the hitch or insurance were sold separately, or if a lender
made a direct loan to the consumer to pay off the prior credit balance. So
sales warranties should continue to apply to the hitch, and insurance cover-
age and premium limitations to the insurance.3"' In identifying which state
laws are to be displaced under U.C.L.A. section 104(d) and (e), a state may
find it necessary to refer to parts of certain acts, but not all of them. For
instance, if the state has a comprehensive credit code (like the U.C.C.C.), it
might displace the provisions on disclosure and collection rights, but leave
provisions on insurance pricing in place.
3. Re-characterization
The consumer protections of the U.C.L.A. would be lost if the parties
could contract out of its coverage, and, not surprisingly, the Act bars an
agreement that a consumer lease "is governed by other law in lieu of this
Act." '1 4 On the other hand, the Act invites parties to a lease that is not a
consumer lease to contract for coverage by the U.C.L.A.3 " As the Corn-
311 That is, the consumer owes more on the car than it is worth. Either the consumer must pay off
that prior loan balance separately, or the unpaid balance may be rolled into the lease as part of the
capitalized cost.
312 U.C.L.A. § 104(e). Again, an enacting state is to insert references to the specific credit laws
being displaced.
313 Id. § 104 cmt. 6.
314 Id. § 105(c). A particular concern in the drafting process was that lessors of computers and re-
lated software, or lessors of other "smart goods," might contract for coverage by "computer law," such
as the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act.
315See id. § 105(b).
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ment notes, this "permits lessors to establish a safe-harbor legal framework
for leases at the margins of [U.C.L.A.] coverage. "3"6
Further, the Act engages in some wishful thinking, or perhaps just
states the obvious, by providing that a consumer lease "may not be deemed
a credit sale, loan, or security interest to make the transaction subject to
coverage by other law in lieu of this Act., 317 The intent is to discourage
courts or enforcement agencies from taking a hind-sight view of a con-
sumer lease transaction and deciding that it more resembles a sale or secu-
rity interest than a true lease."' 8 Of course, whether the transaction was
properly characterized as a lease in the first place is always subject to chal-
lenge.
4. Choice of Law
The applicability of the U.C.L.A. to a given lease transaction can be af-
fected by the parties' contractual choice of governing law. There is a risk
that the pre-printed lease contract may specify coverage by the law of a
jurisdiction distant from the consumer's home territory, having little rela-
tionship to the transaction and affording little consumer protection. To
prevent that kind of manipulation, the Act invalidates a choice of law pro-
vision unless it is the law of a jurisdiction that suits the transaction in one
of several ways. a"9 Thus a stipulation for the law of the consumer's actual
or anticipated principal residence is permissible. 2 So too is the selection
of the law of the jurisdiction where the leased goods will be used;2' the
drafters give as examples a snowmobile or boat used at a vacation home. 22
To this point, the U.C.L.A. rule on choice of law for consumer leases is
316 Id. § 105 cmt 3. Literally this would seem to permit rent-to-own transactions to be brought
under the U.C.L.A. if the contract so provides. But it seems doubtful a rent-to-own merchant would
prefer the U.C.L.A. to existing law on that product.
317Id. § 105(a).
318See, e.g., Granite Auto Leasing v. Jeff-Mar Bus Leasing Corp., 353 N.Y.S.2d 217, 220 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1974) (noting different factors that indicate the contract at issue was for the sale of a boat,
despite the labels of lessee and lessor). In several more recent cases courts have re-characterized rent-
to-own transactions as credit sales. See Miller v. Colortyme, Inc., 504 N.W.2d 258 (Minn. App. 1993)
(noting that the rent-to own contracts "clearly constitute a 'sale of goods' but in the instant case were
not considered consumer credit sales because the customers prepaid); Rent-A-Center v. Hall, 510
N.W.2d 789, 795 (Wis. App. 1994) (concluding that an agreement for the rental of appliances was a
"consumer credit sale").
319U.C.L.A. § 108.
320 Id. § 108(a)(1)-(2). The latter subsection deals with a situation where the consumer plans to
relocate to a new residence within thirty days after entering into the lease. The Comments indicate that
while a consumer may have more than one residence, only one of them can be the "principal" resi-
dence. Id. cmt. 2.
321 Id. § 108(aX3).
322 Id. cmt. I. The emphasis is on where the goods are used, not stored. Thus the law of the ski-
cottage state could be chosen even though the snowmobile is kept in the consumer's garage at home for
eight months of the year.
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identical to that in U.C.C. Article 2A.323 But the U.C.L.A. goes on to bless
another limited option-the lease contract may choose the law of the juris-
diction where the consumer receives the goods.3" This deals with the
common situation where a consumer living in a multi-state metropolitan
area shops across state lines-a Maryland resident leases from a dealer in
Washington, D.C., for example. The transaction is negotiated at the deal-
ership in Washington, the paperwork is executed there, and the consumer
takes delivery of the goods there. Subject to a limitation to be mentioned, a
contractual provision applying Washington, D.C. law to the lease is valid.
The justification is two-fold. First, as a practical matter, it may be difficult
for the D.C. dealer to maintain forms (and software) that satisfy the laws of
all the jurisdictions in which its customers may reside; nor is it feasible to
customize each lease contract depending on where the customer lives.325
Second, a consumer who has chosen to shop and take delivery of leased
goods in D.C. is not likely to be surprised by the choice of D.C. law for a
lease consummated there; there is no inherent unfairness or manipulation in
applying the law of the lessor's location.
The limitation on this fourth choice-of-law option has to do with en-
forcement and collection activities. In the example above, assume Mary-
land has enacted the U.C.L.A. but Washington, D.C. has not. If the Mary-
land lessee defaults and the D.C. lessor wants to enforce the lease in Mary-
land, the lessor must comply with Maryland law (the U.C.L.A.) with re-
spect to that enforcement action.326 For instance, the lessor must provide a
right to cure, is subject to limitations on repossession, early termination
liability, excess wear and use limitations, and cannot enforce lease provi-
sions prohibited in the U.C.L.A. (such as a confession of judgment
clause).327 In enforcing the lease in Maryland, the D.C. lessor is not subject
to retrospective challenge to disclosures or other lease provisions that were
valid in D.C. at the time the lease was consummated there. For example,
the lease document might not satisfy the U.C.L.A. disclosure rules, or
might impose gap liability on the lessee. These aspects of the transaction
cannot be undone at the collection stage, and are judged under D.C. law,
where the consumer "received" the leased goods.
Lastly on choice of law, note that the U.C.L.A. does not attempt to
state its "territorial applicability," nor does it require or dictate a choice of
law provision in the lease. Thus, absent a valid choice of law clause in the
lease, a forum court in a U.C.L.A. state will have to determine applicable
323 See U.C.C. § 2A-106(l) (2002).
324 U.C.L.A. § 108(a)(4).
325 Neither of these problems arises, of course, if the U.C.L.A. is enacted uniformly! Choice of
law becomes a non-issue, except to the extent there may be non-uniform amendments in some states.
326 U.C.L.A. § 108(b).
327 Id. § 108(bX1) (referencing the prohibitions in section 302).
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law under the common law of conflict of laws, typically the law of the ju-
risdiction where the contract was made or was to be performed, or the ju-
risdiction with the most significant relationship to the transaction.328
5. "Supplemental Provisions and Principles"
A final aspect of the scope of the U.C.L.A. is its relationship to other
law in the enacting state, an issue touched on above. 29 The Act makes
clear that it is not comprehensive treatment of consumer leases, but "is
supplemented by other applicable statutory provisions and by general prin-
ciples of law and equity .... 10 This is a familiar notion from the U.C.C.;
it confirms that courts may look to other law of the state, both statutory and
case law, to augment the black letter of the U.C.L.A. The policy is one of
supplementation, however, and not override. Thus the same U.C.L.A. pro-
vision goes on to say that other statutory provisions or common law princi-
ples do not apply to consumer leases if "displaced by or inconsistent with
the provisions of this Act., 33' The question is how does this preemptive
mechanism work? How do you know when other law is "displaced by" or
"inconsistent with" the U.C.L.A.?
The U.C.L.A. Comments give some guidance, 332 but perhaps not
enough, and the courts will eventually have to fashion answers case by
case. There is little difficulty when the U.C.L.A. is merely adding con-
sumer protection rules to transactions that would otherwise be unregu-
lated-for example when the U.C.L.A. prohibits "gap" liability, or pre-
serves the lessee's claims and defenses, or requires additional disclosures.
And the "displaced or inconsistent" standard seems to work adequately
when the U.C.L.A. explicitly changes what would otherwise be the con-
trolling law.333 But the U.C.L.A. also establishes a number of protective, or
"safe harbor," rules for lessors: "if you do it this way, it is legal. '334 What
328 See generally RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS ch. 7 (4th
ed. 2001).
329 See supra Part IV.B.3-4; see also U.C.C. § 2A-106 (2002); U.C.L.A. § 108a.
330 U.C.L.A. § 106.
331 Id.
332 Id. cmts. 1-2.
333Id. cmt 2. This Comment explains:
For example, Section 305(b) (Preservation of Lessee's Claims and Defenses] would
displace any common law or statutory right of a holder to invoke a waiver of de-
fense clause, such as under U.C.C. § 9-404(a). By contrast, the statutory limits on
late charges under Section 304 of this Act may have no direct counterpart in other
law of this state (other than the general law of contracts). In a given case this may
lead to Inconsistent answers on permissible late charges. If so, the answer dictated
by this Act controls.
Id. (emphasis in original).
34 See, e.g., U.C.L.A. § 303(d) (stating that a lessor need not credit the lessee with interest earn-
ings on a security deposit); id. §301(b)(2) (explaining that a lessor may impose a mileage charge for a
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happens if terms or practices authorized by the U.C.L.A. are arguably chal-
lengeable under other law in the state? Does the U.C.L.A. in a sense "pre-
empt" that other state law?
For comparison, consider the preemption rule in the federal C.L.A.
with respect to that act's relationship to state law. State laws are not pre-
empted "except to the extent that those laws are inconsistent with any pro-
vision of [the C.L.A.], and then only to the extent of the inconsistency.""33
Moreover, the Federal Reserve Board "may not determine that any State
law is inconsistent with any provision of [the C.L.A.] if the Board deter-
mines that such state law gives greater protection and benefit to the con-
sumer." '336 This is clearly a policy of limited preemption and deference to
more protective state law. There is no comparably explicit statement in the
U.C.L.A. concerning its effect on other state laws that may be more protec-
tive. Should such a policy of deference be inferred? Should "inconsistent"
be interpreted to retain other state laws that are more stringent than the
U.C.L.A.?
Frankly, it seems inconsistent with the U.C.L.A. drafting history to in-
fer that more protective laws remain applicable to consumer leases in the
face of explicit authorizations in the U.C.L.A. In other words, terms or
practices specifically permitted by the U.C.L.A. ought not be subject to
challenge under other state laws of general applicability.337 A contrary
interpretation ignores the efforts of the drafters to maintain a balance be-
tween consumer and industry interests, and to supply fairly bright-line
guidance to lessors. Under such an interpretation, the Act would become a
consumer protection floor, but there would be no ceiling on potential com-
pliance requirements and exposure for lessors.3 '
Connecticut has made a non-uniform amendment to the U.C.L.A.
"supplemental law" provision that seems to take something of the latter
approach. It adds to U.C.L.A. section 106 the following sentence:
"Nothing in this Act shall be construed to limit or restrict in any way any
rights or remedies which may be available to a lessee or person under any
other statutory provisions or under general principles of law and equity." '339
spot-delivered car if the lessee's application is not approved); id. § 108(aX4) (stating that a lease may
choose to be governed by the law of the jurisdiction where the goods are delivered to the lessee).
335 C.L.A. § 186(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1667e(a) (2000).
336 Id.
337 This reading also seems compelled by basic canons of statutory interpretation that make more
recently enacted and more specific statutes controlling over earlier and more general ones.
33LThe issue here is whether terms or practices blessed in the U.C.L.A. can be outlawed or quali-
fied by other state law. See U.C.L.A. § 506(b) (permitting lessor misconduct to be challenged as a
violation of other (non-U.C.L.A.) law as well). And the U.C.L.A. in no way precludes a consumer
lessee from separately proving fraud, misrepresentation or unconscionability despite the lessor's tech-
nical compliance with the Act, such as where a sales person orally misstates critical facts or covers up
disclosures.
339 CoNN. U.C.L.A. § 6,2002 Conn. Pub. Acts 02-81 (Reg. Sess.).
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Neither the legislative notes accompanying the Connecticut bill, nor
the sponsoring Representative's remarks on the Connecticut House floor,
elaborate on this amendment, 40 so there may be some uncertainty as to
exactly what the language intends. Literally it seems to say to lessees, "get
what protection you can from this Act, but if you can find a different and
more favorable rule or a stronger remedy elsewhere in state statutory or
common law you can invoke that law instead. '341 If this is the legislative
choice in Connecticut, or elsewhere, so be it. But it seems to give lessees
the best of both worlds, and to deprive the uniform Act of some of its sta-
bility and balance.34 2 A better interpretation might be that this non-uniform
addition to the Connecticut act merely confirms that violations of the
U.C.L.A. remain subject to other law as well.
V. INFORMATION FLOW; DISCLOSURES
The U.C.L.A. accepts the premise that consumers can often protect
themselves from bad bargains or over-reaching, and that much potential
marketplace mischief can be avoided, if consumers have adequate, accurate
information about the transactions they consider. This philosophy is par-
ticularly relevant to leases, where consumers have less experience, there is
less reliable folk-lore, the terminology is opaque, and the lease terms are
often intricate. As counterpoint, disclosure can be ineffective if it is over-
done-the "information overload" phenomenon. 3 And, when auto leases
are approaching two feet in length, fully printed front and back, there are
practical limits on how much information can be shoe-homed into lease
documentation.
The U.C.L.A. primarily relies on the federal C.L.A. and Regulation M
for lease advertising and transactional disclosure rules, but adds some dis-
closure, or "information," requirements of its own.
340 OFFICE OF LEGIS. RES., BILL ANALYSIS ON HB 5248, An Act Concerning the Uniform Con-
sumer Leases Act, at http://www.cga.state.ct.us./2002/olrdata/gl/ba/2002HB-5248-ROO0083-BA.htm
(last visited Nov. 6, 2002) (on file with the Connecticut Law Review); Remarks of Representative John
W. Fox, Connecticut House of Representatives (April 26, 2002), at
http://prdbasis.cga.state.ct.us/BASIS/TSAMDHP /LINI/AMD/MSDF (last visited Nov. 6, 2002) (on
file with the Connecticut Law Review).
341 E.g., U.C.L.A. § 304(a) (permitting a late charge up to $10 after a 10-day delinquency). If a
state law generally requires a 15-day grace period, or limits a late charge to $5, can the consumer lessee
claim that a $10/ten-day late charge is unlawful despite U.C.L.A. approval of it? It seems neither
logical nor appropriate to undermine the U.C.L.A. in this fashion. If the state wants to restrict late
charges, or any other aspect of a consumer lease, in the face of U.C.L.A. authorizations, the right tech-
nique would be to amend the U.C.L.A. itself.
342 A version of this issue has been fought out under the federal T.I.L.A., with several courts
holding that if the credit cost disclosures satisfy T.I.L.A., they cannot simultaneously violate a state
consumer fraud law. See Jackson v. S. Holland Dodge, 755 N.E.2d 462,470 (III. 2001).




A. Advertising and Pre-Lease Availability of Information
For lease advertising, the U.C.L.A. starts3" by adopting by reference
the C.L.A. requirements.345 Since the U.C.L.A. covers leases up to
$150,000, this means that advertisements for even the most upscale leases
are covered, and must meet the federal standards.346 Lest leases not be
adequately covered by a general consumer fraud or false advertising law in
the enacting state, the U.C.L.A. then adds a broad prohibition against any
"false, deceptive, or misleading advertisement,, 347 suggesting this should
be interpreted consistently with the law on advertising practices developed
by the Federal Trade Commission and comparable state law. 34' As in the
C.L.A., these advertising rules do not apply to the advertising media-
newspapers, radio-TV stations-that merely carry leasing ads.349
In section 202 the U.C.L.A. introduces a "disclosure" requirement that
is somewhat novel and experimental.35° It requires that a lessor furnish a
prospective customer, on request, a blank copy of the lease. This is to oc-
cur pre-consummation, that is, while the customer is still shopping, or per-
haps is simply curious. The thought is that consumers may benefit if they
have a chance, at their leisure, to read through the often lengthy lease form,
appreciate the standard pre-printed terms, and perhaps ask questions about
those terms or the transactional details that would be filled in later.35' The
challenge to the drafters was to make this kind of industry "best practice" a
legal obligation without transforming it into a compliance nightmare. So
the provision is very carefully hedged. The merchant must supply the form
3" U.C.L.A. § 201(b).
345 12 C.F.R. § 213.7 (2002). This fairly lengthy provision bans bait-and-switch advertising, sets
"prominence" standards for key terms (amount due at lease signing, lease rate), and then provides that
certain terms, if advertised, trigger the obligation to include other specified terms in the ad. There are
also special format rules to accommodate the limitations of merchandise-tag and TV-radio advertising.
These rules are analyzed in NAT'L CONSUMER L. CTR., TRUTH iN LENDING § 9.4 (4th ed. 1999 & Supp.
2001).
346 Unlike its sibling T.I.L.A., the C.L.A. permits private remedies for violations of the advertis-
ing rules if the claimant proves actual damages. 15 U.S.C. § 1667d(b) (2000). U.C.L.A. section 501(b)
permits recovery of actual damages for any violation of the Act, which would include the advertising
rules borrowed from the C. L.A..
347 U.C.L.A. § 201(c).
348 Id. § 201 cmt. 2. Here, too, a consumer might recover provable actual damages under
U.C.L.A. section 501.
349Id. § 201 (d). The Comment to this section points out that this would not protect "a lessor that
maintains an advertising web site or otherwise posts advertising messages over the Internet system."
Id. § 201 cmt. 3.
350 Similar provisions are enacted in New York, N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 333 (2002), and Wis-
consin, WiS. STAT. § 429.201 (1998).
351 Under the C.L.A. (and U.C.L.A.) rules for transactional disclosures, the disclosures must be
given before "consummation" of the lease. 12 C.F.R. § 213.3(a)(3). Since lessor and lessee must have
by then negotiated the goods to be leased and the essential lease terms, the disclosures made at closing
do not really enable comparative shopping, or even careful reading.
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only on request at the lessor's place of business, or "electronically"-by
fax, e-mail, or web page-but only if the lessor consummates lease con-
tracts electronically." 2 The form may be a "copy or reproduction," includ-
ing a computer print-out. 53 Where a lessor uses multiple forms, it need
only provide one that "is pertinent to the type of lease about which the in-
dividual has inquired.""'  The first such form is free, but the lessor may
charge for additional copies. The Drafting Committee was optimistic that
this technique will prove to be a fruitful way of enhancing consumer un-
derstanding of lease transactions.
B. Information at Lease Closing
1. Transactional Disclosures
For basic transactional disclosures, the U.C.L.A. 55 adopts the federal
disclosure rules from the C.L.A. and Regulation M for all leases covered
by the U.C.L.A., i.e., up to $150,000 even though the federal law is capped
at $25,000. The disclosures also must follow the timing and format re-
quirements of the federal law. That is, the disclosures must be made
"clearly and conspicuously," "in a form the customer may keep," and be
given "prior to the consummation of a consumer lease." '56 The contents of
the disclosures are summarized above.3" The disclosures may be made in
a separate statement, or within the lease itself;358 certain key disclosures
must be segregated from other information. 59
352 If a lessor actually closes lease deals electronically, as through an interactive web page, it
must be prepared to furnish electronic copies of the lease form on that web page, or it may respond to a
web-page request by mailing the prospective customer a hard copy.
353 For example, a dealer might provide on-site computer access to a web page that permits dis-
play of various lease forms. So long as the consumer can scan the forms, and print and retain a copy,
that should be sufficient.
354 U.C.L.A. § 202(c).
355 Id. § 203(a)-(c) (including renegotiations and extensions).
356 12 C.F.R. § 213.3(a). These latter two phrases mimic language in T.I.L.A. that has spawned a
raft of litigation and a Commentary clarification on the question whether the merchant may present the
disclosures in the credit contract itself, allow the customer to see and read it, but then take the contract
back for processing and furnish the customer a copy later. The leading cases are seemingly contradic-
tory holdings from the same federal circuit. Polk v. Crown Auto, Inc., 221 F.3rd 691 (4th Cir. 2000)
(holding that the seller must provide the buyer with a separate, retainable written disclosure, in the
proper form before consummation of the transaction); Gavin v. Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc., No.
01-1436, 2002 WL 46759, at *3 (4th Cir. Jan. 14, 2002) (upholding summary judgment for the dealer
where buyer was presented with written disclosures in the proper form in the credit contract, prior to
the finalization of the contract). This prompted a clarification in the Regulation Z Commentary. 67
Fed. Reg. 16,980, 16,981-82 (Apr. 9, 2002), adding new Comment 226.17(b)(3) (clarifying that
"creditors satisfy T.I.L.A. by giving a copy of the document containing the disclosures to the customer
to read and sign" prior to consummation). Hopefully, this T.I.L.A. guidance is transferable to leases.
357 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
358 12 C.F.R. § 213.3(a)(1).
359 Id. § 213.3(a)(2).
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In the federal law, when "consummation" occurs is left to state law,3"
and the U.C.L.A. explains that it occurs "when the lessee signs a record
evidencing the lessee's contractual obligation under the lease."36' "Prior to
consummation" therefore means any measure of time--even a nano-
second-before the consumer signs. Since the disclosures must be made
"prior to consummation," it might seem that a lessor would not violate the
Act by failing to give the correct disclosures if a lease was never consum-
mated.362 This result does not follow under the U.C.L.A., which goes on to
note that "a lessee may consummate a consumer lease even if it is subject
to subsequent credit or other approval by the lessor or an assignee of the
lessor." '363 This deals with the "spot delivery" situation where a consumer
signs the lease papers (and takes delivery of the goods) but the terms of the
deal must be approved later by the lessor or financer. The consumer is
committed when he signs, and is entitled to the disclosures at that point,
even though there is a "condition subsequent" on the lessor's side.
At the cost of lengthening even further what are already lengthy lease
forms, the U.C.L.A. adds some additional disclosure ingredients to those
required by the C.L.A.: a statement and warning notice that the document
is a lease,3" identification of the lessor's place of business and the lessee's
residence,365 identification of any trade-in,3" and an itemization of the
gross capitalized cost.367 The recording of these extra items in the lease can
be important when disputes arise down the road, especially as to compo-
nents of the capitalized cost. Comparable disclosures are called for under
most retail installment sales acts. Further, except perhaps for the "idiot
warning" that the document is a lease, this information is often included in
the lease anyhow, and hopefully will not require unduly expensive redesign
of forms.368
360 Id. §213, Supp. 1$ 3(a)(3)-I.
361 U.C.L.A. § 103(a).
362 The theory is that, without consummation, there was never a time before which the disclosures
were due. T.I.L.A. interpretations are generally to this effect. See RALPH J. ROHNER & FRED H.
MILLER, TRUTH IN LENDING 261-62 (Amer. Bar Ass'n 2000). But see Dauti v. Hartford Auto Plaza,
Ltd., No. CIVA3-99-CV-994 (D. Conn. Feb. 16, 2001) (holding that disclosures given at the point of
sale, if inaccurate, would violate the federal CLA even though no binding lease was ever created.) The
court later determined that the defendants' disclosures in fact complied with the federal law. Dauti v.
Hartford Auto Plaza, Ltd., 213 F. Supp. 2d 116 (D. Conn. 2002).
363U.C.L.A. § 103(a).
364 Id. § 203 (c)(2).
365 Id. § 203 (c)(3).
366Id. § 203 (cX4).
367 Id. § 203 (c)(5).
368 In the 1996 revision of Regulation M, the Federal Reserve Board compromised on itemization
of the capitalized cost. The regulation requires the itemization only on the customer's request. Instead
of disclosing that option and then preparing itemizations separately when requested, most lessors have
preferred to put the itemization in the lease in the first place. See 12 C.F.R. 213, Supp. 11 4(0I()-2
(2002). For these lessors, the U.C.L.A. adds no new burden.
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There is also the traditional prohibition against having the customer
sign forms with blank spaces to be filled in later.369 This otherwise could
be an obvious invitation to fraud.
2. Copies of Transaction Records
The U.C.L.A. requires that the lessee be given a "written" copy of the
lease and a copy of "all other records that the lessee has signed in connec-
tion with the transaction."37 This has two implications. First, this is one
of only two places in the Act where a writing is required; otherwise the
U.C.L.A. uses the medium-neutral term "record" to accommodate elec-
tronic documentation. The effect here, by virtue of the recent federal E-
SIGN law, is that the lessor will need to get the consumer's affirmative
permission to substitute an electronic record for a traditional paper writ-
ing. 7 ' Secondly, and contrary to some current practice, this provision will
assure that the consumer has copies of all signed documents that may re-
flect some part of the deal or the consumer's commitment to it. This would
include applications, work-sheets, purchase orders, spot-delivery agree-
ments, and the like-if signed by the consumer. To recognize the practi-
calities of gathering and copying these documents there is some flex in
how "promptly" they must be provided.372
Failure to give any of these point-of-closing disclosures is a violation
of the U.C.L.A., and may give the consumer a remedy under Part 5 of the
Act, but it does not vitiate the contract or give rise to a right of rescission.
Whether the lease represents a binding contract is determined under the
usual law of contracts, including U.C.C. Article 2A.a"3
3. Insurance Disclosures
The federal C.L.A. and Regulation M already require a "brief identifi-
cation" of any insurance included in the lease (and its cost if provided by or
through the lessor), and the U.C.L.A. amplifies a bit on what information
the lessor must give to the lessee:374
For required casualty or liability insurance, the consumer
must be told he can acquire it from an insurer of the les-
see's choice;
375
369 U.C.L.A. § 203(d). An exception is made for future delivery situations where certain data are
not known until after the lessee has signed. Id.
370 Id. § 203(e).
371 See discussion of E-SIGN infra Part VI.E.
372 U.C.L.A. § 203 cmt. 5.
373 Id. § 203 cmt. 4.
374 Id. § 204. Each of these insurance disclosures must be in a record, but not necessarily in the
lease itself. d. § 204(b).
375 Id. § 204(a).
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* If casualty insurance is neither provided nor required-i.e.,
if the goods are being leased "naked"-the lessee must be
told that fact;376
" The lessee may not be required to purchase credit insur-
ance-insurance that pays off the obligation if the con-
sumer dies, is disabled, or loses employment-and credit
insurance may be sold to the consumer only if the lessor
discloses that it is optional and the consumer signs an elec-
tion to purchase it."7
" The lessor must furnish a copy of any policy or certificate
of insurance bought through the lessor."'
4. Notice to Guarantor
A common problem in the history of consumer credit has been the
plight of a co-signer or guarantor who agreed, or was coaxed, to sign onto a
credit obligation to help out an un-creditworthy spouse, friend, or relative,
without appreciating the nature of the potential liability being incurred.
The U.C.C.C. and other state credit laws have required explicit co-signer
notices for decades,379 and such a notice is a central part of the Federal
Trade Commission's "Credit Practices Rule., 380 That a comparable rule
would appear in the U.C.L.A. is hardly surprising.
The mechanics of the U.C.L.A. provision 381' are straightforward. Be-
fore a person signs to guarantee a lease, the lessor must give that individual
a specified notice spelling out the obligation and risks the guarantor under-
takes. Absent that notice (and a copy of the guaranty obligation itself), the
guarantor's obligation is not enforceable. The tricky question is who is a
"guarantor" affected by this provision. The U.C.L.A. tries to draw the
definition382 fairly narrowly, or at least tries to avoid ambiguity that would
leave lessors guessing whether one of every set of co-customers was acting
as guarantor for the other. Only an "individual" can be a guarantor for this
purpose, and only when she "becomes obligated to perform as an addi-
tional obligor on a consumer lease" for one of two reasons: either (i) the
original lessee does not meet the lessor's credit standards, or (ii) the origi-
376 Id. § 204(b). This would rarely if ever be the case with a motor vehicle lease where insurance
is always required, but the notice might alert the consumer lessee to add the newly leased computer or
piano to her homeowner's insurance policy.
377 Id. § 204(c).
378 Id. § 204(d).
379 See, e.g., U.C.C.C. § 3.208 (2002).
380 FTC Trade Regulation Rule on Credit Practices, 16 C.F.R. § 444.3(aX2) (2002).
381 U.C.L.A. § 205.
382 Id. § 102(a)(6).
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nal lessee is already in default under the lease.383 In both these situations,
the lessor is likely to be quite aware that it is demanding, or being offered,
a guaranty obligation. Indeed, it may be hoped, at that point all the parties
(including the guarantor) understand that special circumstances require the
addition of the guarantor to the lease contract, and the required Notice con-
firms that fact. Where spouses, relatives, or friends shop, negotiate, and
sign a lease together, the lessor may consider them co-lessees, and need not
inquire about any understandings between them as to payment responsibil-
ity."' Nor is the leasing dealer a "guarantor" when it assigns the lease with
recourse.
385
This is a setting where we can wish it were clearer whether the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act applies to leases.38 6 Under that act it is considered
discriminatory, and unlawful, for a creditor to require a co-signatory "if the
applicant qualifies under the creditor's standards of creditworthiness."3 7
Prudent lessors will hew to the Regulation B limitation on co-signers, as
well as to the U.C.L.A. notice requirement.
C. Post-Closing Disclosures/Notifications
In the U.C.L.A. there are a number of situations after the consumma-
tion of a consumer lease where the lessor or current holder must give no-
tices or information to the lessee. Generally these are not complex theo-
retically or operationally, and may be summarized here. Some are dis-
cussed further in the context of other U.C.L.A. provisions. Together they
reinforce the "transparency" principle noted above.
1. A lessee must get a written receipt for payments made in
cash;38
2. The holder must provide statements, on request, of-
. Payments made and balances owing;
" A payoff figure (or estimate) if the lease is terminated
383Id.
384 As co-lessees, in theory both have received or have access to all the basic disclosures for the
transaction. A true "guarantor" can get a full copy of the lease on request. Id. § 205(a)(2).
385 Id. § 102(a)(6)(B).
386 See supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
387 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d)(I) (2002). The concern is about creditors who routinely require spousal
co-signers, but the provision equally bars the creditor from insisting on a co-signature from any "other
person." Id.




0 A purchase option price, if available.3"9
3. After a lease is fully paid off, the holder must give the les-
see a "paid-in-full" copy or other "record of satisfac-
tion., , 9
4. A lessor must give a notice of "spot-delivery" rights,39' and
the lessee must separately sign a notice obligating him for
mileage charges in that situation.392
5. A lease may "provide for" a security deposit and certain
incidental security interests, 393 and for default charges and
attorney's fees, 94 i.e. those interests or charges must ap-
pear in the lease.
6. A holder must "account to the lessee" for the application
of a security deposit.39
7. A consumer lessee may safely send payments to a prior
holder of the lease until the lessee is notified that the lease
has been assigned.3 6
8. Any limitation on a lessee's right to sublease the goods
must be in a "specific and conspicuous provision" in the
lease.397
9. A holder must notify the lessee of the purchase of substi-
tute insurance before the premium can be folded into the
lease and subjected to a rent charge.39
10. Before repossession or collection, the holder must give the
.389 Id. § 206(a)(2)(A)-(C), (3).
390 Id. § 206(b).
391 Id. § 301(b).
392 Id. § 301(b)(2).
393 Id. § 303(b).
394 Id. § 304(c)-(d).
395 Id. § 303(d).
3% Id. § 305(a). Where the U.C.L.A. states simply that, after notice, the lessee's obligation is
discharged only by paying the assignee, Connecticut adds a non-uniform amendment requiring the
assignor who receives a misdirected payment to return it to the lessee or forward it to the assignee.
CONN. U.C.L.A. § 22(a)(2), 2002 Conn. Pub. Acts 02-81 (Reg. Sess.).
397U.C.L.A. § 306(b). The adjectives are borrowed from section 2A-303(7) of the U.C.C.
398 Id. § 308(d)(I).
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lessee formal notice of the lessee's right to cure a de-
fault.
399
11. A lease may contain a formula for early termination liabil-
ity, i.e., it must be explicit in the lease. °0
12. A lease may provide for excess wear and use, and excess
mileage, charges, 4 ' and:
" For non-vehicle leases, the holder must send prompt
notice of imposition of excess wear and use charges;
42
" For vehicle leases, the holder cannot collect excess
wear and use charges unless:
" it sends a pre-expiration inspection notice;
" within 60 days after the vehicle is returned it sends
notice of latent or uninspected wear and tear.40 3
If all of these disclosure and notice provisions function as designed,
they should bring to consumer leases a healthy degree of transparency as to
how leases work and what are the lessee's risks and obligations in the pro-
cess. In conjunction with the transactional disclosures under the C.L.A.,
this Act should produce a considerable degree of standardization of termi-
nology and format, which can only be helpful for consumers who want to
understand the lease and avoid surprises over its term.
D. Obituary for "Lease Rate" Disclosure
Of all the disclosure matters considered by the U.C.L.A. Drafting
Committee, none took more time and energy than the quest for a "lease
rate" formula that had computational integrity and informational value to
consumers. In the end, the Committee despaired that it could be done, and
removed any mention of a lease rate disclosure from the Act.
As noted earlier, in its mid-1990s revision of Regulation M, the Fed-
eral Reserve Board seriously considered either requiring or authorizing the
use of lease rate figures in consumer leases, but concluded that there were
too many variables in the pricing of leases to make any lease rate formula
reliable as a truly comparable expression of the cost of leasing or a basis
399 Id. § 402(c).
400 Id. § 405(a).
401 Id. § 407(a)(3) & (f).
402 Id. § 407(c)(1).
403 Id. § 407(e)(1 )-(3).
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for comparing a lease to a credit sale. 4" The primary problem is that the
residual values used, especially in auto leases, are estimates of future value,
and are so subject to variation from car to car, dealer to dealer, and time to
time, that a rate iteration based on a disclosed residual value number is
largely meaningless and impossible to compare across transactions.' 5
Interestingly, in a private paper shared with the Drafting Committee's
Lease Rate Task Force, an industry lawyer developed the thesis that there
were sufficient legal, economic, and competitive restraints on lessors to
dissuade them from setting artificially low residual values."' To the extent
this thoughtful paper gave limited support to the feasibility of a lease rate
disclosure, it drew no broader industry support among the U.C.L.A. Ob-
servers.0 7 The Drafting Committee reprised the Federal Reserve Board's
examination of the topic, and commissioned a Task Force of Committee
members and Observers to examine it further. Up through the U.C.L.A.
first reading at the N.C.C.U.S.L. meeting in 1999, the working drafts in-
cluded a tentative lease rate provision, authorizing (but not requiring) dis-
closure of a lease rate, and including the algorithm and other specifications
for computing that rate from components of the lease pricing."0 8 The prem-
ise was to devise a lease rate that was calculated similarly to the APR in
credit transactions; no serious attention was given to inventing a new, dis-
tinctive kind of rate figure for leases.
Eventually, by a close vote, the Committee determined to drop the
lease rate matter from the Act. This was not before one state, Connecticut,
had taken the U.C.L.A.'s draft lease rate provisions (which were noted to
be tentative and incomplete), and enacted them into law, 09 originally to
become effective in 2001 but then deferred until 2002. There were ex-
tended discussions between industry representatives and Connecticut offi-
cials to see whether the enacted law could be refined to a workable compu-
404 See supra notes 59-66 and accompanying text.
405 Thus, by lowering the estimated residual value (and thus increasing the amount of the monthly
payments applied to depreciation), a lessor could substantially lower the "lease rate" based on that
residual. The Federal Reserve Board considered using the purchase-option price as the future-value
figure in a rate calculation, on the theory that this was likely to be a more realistic valuation than the
stated residual value. 61 Fed. Reg. 52,246, 52,255 (Oct. 7, 1996). What the Drafting Committee came
to appreciate was that probably the only way to hope to assure computational integrity and comparabil-
ity in a lease rate was to standardize the setting of residual values, such as by applying some universal
depreciation curve. This was not only impractical as an operational matter, and would probably pro-
duce less reliable residual value numbers, but it was a political non-starter both for the Committee and
the observers. See id.
406 Memorandum from Randall McCathren, Bank Lease Consultants, Inc., to Richard Mossburg,
Ford Motor Credit Co. (Mar. 4, 1997) (on file with author).
407 Id.
408 See NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, U.C.L.A. Draft No. 7 §§
203(c), 207 (Mar. 1999), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bllulc/consleas/cla399.pdf (last vis-
ited Nov. 9,2002) (on file with the Connecticut Law Review).
409 CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 42-158a-g (2001).
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tation and meaningful disclosure, but these were inconclusive and the ef-
fective date loomed closer and closer. The vehicle leasing industry was
adamantly opposed to the lease rate legislation, for the same reasons they
opposed it at the Federal Reserve Board and in the U.C.L.A. drafting proc-
ess-the disclosed lease rate would be unreliable as a measure of the cost
of leasing and would be subject to manipulation by unscrupulous lessors.
The industry's willingness to support enactment of the U.C.L.A. in
Connecticut therefore has an easy explanation: In exchange for adoption
of the U.C.L.A., Connecticut would repeal its lease rate law. That is what
has happened."' The U.C.L.A. was perceived by the industry as the lesser
of evils if lease rate is one of them.
E. Electronic Documentation and Disclosure
With the enactment of the federal Electronic Signatures in Global and
National Commerce Act (E-SIGN)4"1 in 2000, and the promulgation of the
parallel Uniform Electronic Transactions Act in 1999, the commercial and
consumer markets have officially entered the world of "e-commerce," and
the impact of those laws on the U.C.L.A. should be noted, however briefly.
Except in two places, the U.C.L.A. does not require that documentation
and disclosures be in a conventional writing."2 Instead, the term "record"
is used throughout the Act 3 to authorize documentation in electronic for-
mat. Additionally, the term "sign" is defined (consistently with the U.C.C.,
U.E.T.A., and E-SIGN) to include various forms of electronic authoriza-
tion. 4  U.C.L.A. § 111 generally exercises a state's right to opt out of cov-
erage by E-SIGN to avoid technical preemption by the federal law. With
U.E.T.A. now adopted in most states for the same purpose, it provides a
basis for opt-out from the federal law. Thus it is possible for there to be an
entirely paperless consumer lease under the U.C.L.A."3
410 CoNN. U.C.L.A. §§ 49-50, 2002 Conn. Pub. Acts 02-81 (Reg. Sess.).
411 15 U.S.C. §§ 7000-7021 (2000).
412 U.C.L.A. requires a writing for a copy of the lease and related documents given to the con-
sumer at lease consummation, and receipts for cash payments. U.C.L.A. § 203(e) (2002); id. §
206(a)( I).
413 "Record" is defined in the U.C.L.A. to mean "information that is inscribed on a tangible me-
dium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form."
U.C.L.A. § 102(aXl4). This is intended to be consistent with the same term in the E-SIGN Act, 15
U.S.C. § 7006(9), in the U.E.T.A., U.E.T.A. § 2(13) (2002), and in the U.C.C., U.C.C. § 1-201(31)
(200241, U.C.L.A. § 102(a)(1 5). According to these sections "sign" means:
(A) to execute or adopt a tangible symbol with the present intent to authenticate a re-
cord; or
(B) to attach or logically associate an electronic symbol, sound, or process to or with
a recotrd with the present intent to authenticate a record.
Id.
415 See Kenneth J. Rojc & Gregory Eidukas, The Electronic Approach to Motor Vehicle Financ-
ing: An Emerging Road Map, 57 Bus. LAW. 1175 (2002).
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To this simple conclusion there is the qualification that, under E-SIGN,
consumer disclosures otherwise required by law to be in writing may be
given in electronic form only if the consumer has consented to disclosure
in that manner.416 E-SIGN sets out a rather elaborate consent mechanism,
to assure not only that the consumer agrees to electronic disclosure, but
also has the ability to access the information electronically through a com-
puter terminal.417 Issues involving consumer consent and electronic docu-
mentation will inevitably arise, and consumer lawyers are already
anticipating problematic marketing practices that may emerge4"'
VI. LIMITATIONS ON LEASE PRACTICES AND PROVISIONS
A core component of the U.C.L.A. are provisions restricting certain
lease provisions or practices that otherwise could be abusive of consumers.
A. "Classic" Restraints
Some U.C.L.A. provisions follow long-standing prescriptions applica-
ble to credit transactions, and were never very controversial in the
U.C.L.A. drafting process.
1. "Good Faith"
Like the U.C.C., the U.C.L.A. imposes a universal obligation of good
faith on all parties to a consumer lease." 9 The phrase "good faith" is de-
fined expansively to include not just subjective honesty but also "obser-
vance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.' 420 Since a lack
of good faith would violate this Act, presumably an aggrieved consumer
could recover provable actual damages caused by the bad faith conduct.
2. Unconscionability
Like U.C.C. Article 2A,42 the Act proscribes unconscionable lease
provisions, and also unconscionable conduct in the inducement of a con-
sumer lease or the collection of a lease claim.422 Thus, a court may fashion
416 15 U.S.C. § 7001(c)(1).
417 Id. § 7001(c); see R. Cook & N. Munro, Giving Consumer Disclosures on-Line: Is ESIGN the
Path to the Paperless Loan, 57 BUS. LAW. 1187, 1188-91 (2002) (explaining the consumer consent
procedures and the disclosure of hardware and software requirements mandated by E-SIGN); James A.
Huizinga et al., Electronic Disclosures Under the Federal Reserve Board's Consumer Protection
Regulations, 57 Bus. LAW. 1197, 1200-02 (2002) (delineating the general application of the E-SIGN
consent requirement and the exceptions thereto).
418 NAT'L CONSUMER L. CTR., TRUTH IN LENDING § 9.3.2.4.2 (4th ed. 1999 & Supp. 200 1).
419 U.C.L.A. § 109.
420 Id. § 102(a)(4).
421 U.C.C. § 2A-108 (2002).
422 U.C.L.A. § I I0(a)-(b).
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any appropriate remedy if unconscionability is proved.423  While uncon-
scionability is "a matter of law,"424 rather than a jury issue, the court must
afford the parties an opportunity to put on evidence "as to the setting, pur-
pose, and effect" of the lease and related conduct.
45
Also comparably to U.C.C. Article 2A, the U.C.L.A. mandates that a
lessee who successfully asserts unconscionability be awarded attorney's
fees, and the size of the attorney's fee award is not controlled by the
amount of the lessee's recovery in the case.426 For instance, the court
might refuse to enforce an oppressive lease provision but without any
monetary award to the consumer lessee; the lessee would still be entitled to
"reasonable" attorney's fees, measured by time spent, degree of difficulty
of the issue, and similar factors traditionally used to set attorney's fee
awards. There is a flip side to this attorney's fee matter. If the court finds
that the lessee knew the unconscionability claim to be groundless, it "shall"
award attorney's fees to the holder or other party against which the uncon-
scionability claim was asserted.427 Whether this prospect will chill uncon-
scionability claims remains to be seen. 28 Perhaps to avoid that prospect,
the Connecticut U.C.L.A. omits all reference to groundless claims and con-
sumer liability for the lessor's attorney's fees.
429
3. Waivers of Rights
A consumer cannot waive rights and protections afforded by the
U.C.L.A. except in the course of settling a dispute or collection claim, and
even then a court may invalidate the settlement if it is unconscionable.43 °
423 See id. (explaining the appropriate remedies for unconscionability).
424 ld.
425 Id. § 1I0(c).
426 Id. § I I0(d)(l), (3).
427 Id. § 110(d)(2).
428 At N.C.C.U.S.L.'s second reading of the U.C.L.A. in August 2001, a motion passed to change
"shall" to "may" in subsection I 10(dX2). The thought was that courts should have discretion to deter-
mine whether a consumer should be required to pay the holder's attorney's fees. The industry delega-
tion that was meeting regularly with the Drafting Committee during the Conference sessions insisted
that the statutory language in subsection I 10(d)(2) revert to "shall" to maintain symmetry with subsec-
tion I 10(dl )-if the unconscionable merchant must pay the other side's attorney's fees, so should the
groundless accuser. The Conference reconsidered and returned to "shall" in subsection I 10(d)(2). The
industry's victory on this point may have been mainly symbolic, for a court reluctant to award attor-
ney's fees against a consumer lessee need only find that the consumer did not "know" the unconscion-
ability claim to be groundless, or that the unsuccessful unconscionability claim was not quite "ground-
less." Id.
429 CONN. U.C.L.A. § 10(d), 2002 Conn. Pub. Acts 02-81 (Reg. Sess.). Specifically, the Con-
necticut version omits subsection (d)(2) of the U.C.L.A. Id.
430 Id. § 107.
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In this connection the U.C.L.A. ducks what has been a steaming debate
over the enforceability of mandatory arbitration clauses in consumer con-
tracts.43' Do such clauses constitute impermissible waivers of remedial
rights and procedures that the consumer lessee might avail in litigation,
including discovery, class actions, and jury trial? The drafters say only that
a mandatory arbitration clause "does not per se constitute a waiver of rights
or remedies under this Act, ' 432 leaving the courts to grapple with the issue
on their own.
4. Prohibited Lease Provisions
U.C.L.A. section 302 bans several types of contract provisions that
have long been disfavored in consumer credit transactions:
* Insecurity clauses;433
" Confession of judgment or assignment of wages; 434
" Repossession involving trespass or breach of the peace.435
Any such clause or provision is unenforceable, but does not invalidate the
whole lease. 6
5. "Referral" Inducements
Once upon a time there was evidence that some merchants would in-
duce customers into credit transactions by promising that the customer
would earn credits or rebates against his own obligation by providing the
merchant with leads to additional customers. "Referral" inducements of
431 See Alan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, Consumer Financial Services Arbitration, 56 BUS.
LAW. 1219 (2001) (reviewing recent Supreme Court and U.S. Court of Appeals opinions, which pro-
vide guidelines for the use of mandatory consumer arbitration clauses in the financial services arena);
Julia B. Strickland et al., Recent Developments in Consumer Financial Services Arbitration, 118 BANK-
ING L.J. 933 (2001) (discussing recent developments concerning the use of mandatory arbitration
clauses in consumer credit agreements); Richard E. Speidel, Consumer Arbitration of Statutory Claims:
Has Pre-Dispute [Mandatory] Arbitration Outlived Its Welcome, 40 ARIz. L. REV. 1069 (1998) (con-
cluding that mandatory arbitration clauses in consumer contracts are no longer useful where statutory
claims are involved).
432 U.C.L.A. § 107 cmt. 3.
433 Id. § 302(a)(1) (banning clauses that permit acceleration or repossession whenever the holder
feels insecure); cf U.C.C. § 1-208 (2002) (permitting clause if exercised in good faith).
434 U.C.L.A. § 302(a)(2); cf FTC Credit Practices Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 444.2(a)(1)-(3) (2002) (es-
tablishing that an obligation to confess judgment or assign wages is an unfair credit practice); U.C.C.C.
§§ 3.305, 3.306 (2002) (banning a creditor from taking an assignment of earnings or confession of
judgm~ent).
U35u.C.L.A. § 302(a)(3); cf, U.C.C.C. § 5.112 (prohibiting creditor from taking possession of
collateral by entering a dwelling and using force or breaching the peace).
436 U.C.L.A. § 302(b), cmt. 2.
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this sort have long been frowned on by courts437 and legislatures438 because
of the likely misrepresentation they contain. Vulnerable consumers will
assume that the referral earnings will be significant, when in reality few of
the consumers friends, neighbors, or relatives will respond to the mer-
chant's solicitation (if the merchant makes any).439  To be successful
through several rounds of referral sales, the promised referral earnings
would require so many customers as to make the scheme unworkable and
the projected earnings illusory."0
Whether such practices will continue in the new century is question-
able. Nonetheless, the U.C.L.A. ""' continues the U.C.C.C.'s animosity
toward referral inducements. The drafters make clear that "what is prohib-
ited is an inducement offered prior to lease consummation that depends on
events occurring after lease consummation." ' Thus, referral earnings ar-
rangements are permissible only when a lessor pays or credits the referring
customer before the lease is signed, or when the lessor offers the customer
referral earnings after the lease is signed.
B. More Innovative Restraints or Requirements
In a number of areas the U.C.L.A. echoes existing limitations from the
world of credit transactions, but the new provisions are crafted specifically
with leases in mind.
1. Limitations on Security Interests; Security Deposits
Since a lease by definition leaves ownership of the goods with the les-
sor, the lease cannot simultaneously take a security interest in those
goods-a lease and security interest are mutually exclusive.443 Further, a
lease may not "cross-collateralize" the lease obligation by taking a security
interest in other property of the lessee-a residence, a second car, or
household goods, for example.4" But a consumer lease may include a se-
437 See Norman v. World Wide Distributors, Inc., 195 A.2d 115, 117 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1963) (hold-
ing that referral sales are "a fraudulent scheme ... similar to the recurrent chain letter racket"); Brad-
dock v. Family Finance Corp., 506 P.2d 824, 826, 829 (Idaho 1973) (holding, over strong dissent, that a
pre-U.C.C.C. referral scheme was not an illegal lottery).
438 U.C.C.C. § 3.309 (2002). This is one of the 1974 U.C.C.C. provisions that specifically ap-
plies to leases.
439 Norman, 195 A.2d at 116.
"0°Id. at 117.
441 U.C.L.A. § 309.
442 Id. cmt. 2.
413 U.C.C. § 2A-103(1)(j) (2002) ("[Rietention or creation of a security interest is not a lease.").
The U.C.L.A. implicitly recognizes this by acknowledging that a holder may make a precautionary
filing under U.C.C. Article 9 against the eventuality that the "lease" of goods is determined in fact to be
a security interest in those goods. U.C.L.A. § 303(c), cmt. 2. Precautionary security interest language
in the lease itself should not be considered to violate the U.C.L.A. Id. § 303(b).
444U.C.L.A. § 303(a).
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curity interest in various payments or coverages contemplated as part of the
lease transaction-rebates of unearned insurance or service contract
charges if the lease is terminated early, or the benefits of insurance or ser-
vice contracts.44 These sums or coverages may be payable to the holder in
the first instance, or may be payable to the lessee under a separate policy or
contract; allowing the holder a security interest in them helps assure the
lease holder a priority claim to those funds or benefits as against third par-
ties and the right to apply them on the consumer's lease obligation. The
U.C.L.A. also allows the lessor to take a security interest in an "accession"
to the leased goods"06-an upgraded sound or satellite navigation system,
for example-but leaving priority rights to be determined under the
U.C.C.4 7
As to security deposits, the U.C.L.A. takes a very permissive posture,
permitting such deposits or other prepayments in any amount, with no re-
quirements as to segregating or accruing interest on those funds, and sub-
ject only to an accounting for the security deposit when it is applied."8
This approach accepts the economic premise that any front-loaded pay-
ments, from a simple security deposit to full payment of the lease obliga-
tion (as in a single-payment lease), reduces the lessor's risk and thus the
consumer's overall cost for the lease." 9
2. Insurance Charges
The U.C.L.A. addresses several issues relating to insurance sold in
connection with a consumer lease. For one, a lessor cannot "upcharge" for
casualty, liability, or credit insurance, when sold in connection with a con-
sumer lease.45 Compensation for the lessor is built into the premium as
commissions, experience rebates, or the like, and there is no need to allow
lessors to fatten their yield even further. Historically, the problem with
insurance as a "tied" product in credit transactions is the reverse-
competition effect it can produce: The more expensive the insurance of-
fered to customers, the greater the dealer's yield. Limiting insurance
charges in the lease to the insurer's premium prevents at least the most
blatant overcharges.
The U.C.L.A. also clarifies the treatment of insurance premium re-
bates. Insurance on the leased goods, or credit insurance protecting against
the lessee's ability to pay, are usually written for a term, either the full du-
ration of the lease, or one year (or other period) at a time. If the lease is
445 Id. § 303(b)(1)-(2), crnt. 3.
446 Id. § 303(b)(4).
447Id. cmt. 6 (referencing U.C.C. sections 2A-310 and 9-335).
448 Id. § 303(d).
449U.C.L.A. § 303 cmt. 3.
450 Id. § 308(a).
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terminated or the insurance is cancelled for some other reason, there may
be a refund due for that portion of the premium not yet earned. Who gets
to keep that rebate? If the rebate is payable directly to the lessee, there is
little doubt she can keep it-she paid the premium, or continues to be obli-
gated to pay for it. But if the rebate comes to the holder of the lease, how
is it to be applied? The U.C.L.A. answer is simple: Fairly. The rebate
must be either refunded to the lessee, or explicitly credited to obligations
the lessor owes under the lease. 5
Then there is the matter of substitute, or "force-placed," insurance.
Where a lease requires certain insurance coverage, most likely casualty or
liability insurance, and the lessee fails to maintain that insurance, the
holder may purchase substitute insurance, so long as it covers substantially
the same risks affecting the interests of either party.45 ' That is, the holder
can buy true replacement insurance, but cannot buy more extravagant cov-
erages, at extravagant costs, and pass that expense on to the consumer les-
see.453 The cost of true substitute insurance can be added to the lessee's
obligation under the lease, may incur rent (i.e., interest) charges, and is
subject to the repayment and default provisions of the lease.454 The ad-
justments to rent charges and capitalized cost resulting from replacement
insurance may marginally change the consumer's obligation and payment
schedule, but this does not amount to a refinancing that would require a
whole new set of disclosures. 55
3. Unwinding the Failed Transaction: "Spot Delivery"
Visualize a sales cubicle at an auto dealership, 7:30 in the evening. A
consumer has selected a car to lease, has signed and submitted an applica-
tion for credit approval, has gotten all appropriate disclosures, has written a
check for the initial payment under the lease, and has handed over the keys
to the trade-in vehicle. The dealership does not have on-line credit ap-
proval (from third-party financers) at that time of day, so everyone under-
stands that the "deal" is subject to credit approval in the morning. The
consumer may agree to come back at that time to take delivery of the car.
451 Id. § 308(b). It may be credited to the next monthly payment, the final payment under the
lease, or other obligation the lessee will owe on termination of the lease. Id. § 308(b)(2). If the holder
retains the money for application to any of these obligations, it must also credit the lessee with the
"unearned portion of the rent charge applicable to the refunded premium." Id. For example, if credit
insurance for the duration of the lease is packaged into the capitalized cost, and subsequently cancelled,
the credited refund of insurance premium must include the marginal interest charge attributable to that
part of the adjusted capitalized cost.
452 Id. § 308(c).
453 Nor, for that matter, could the holder buy-at lessee's expense-drastically less extensive
coverage than was required under the lease. That is not "substitute insurance ... against substantially
the same risks." Id.
454 Id. § 308(d).
455 Id. cmt. 3.
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Or, more likely, the dealer will "spot deliver" the car, and the consumer
drives it home.
From one perspective, spot delivery is a response to customer demand
("Since you've taken my old car in trade, I need the new one to drive my-
self home tonight") and convenience ("I'd rather not have to come back
tomorrow"). It also commits the customer to the deal even though the
credit approval is deferred. But what happens in the occasional case where
credit is not approved the next day, or the dealer finds some other reason
456
not to finalize the lease? The dealer will have already deposited the cus-
tomer's down payment check, may have disposed of the trade-in, and will
demand return of the new car unless the customer agrees to new terms that
satisfy the credit or other problem. The customer is reluctant to abandon
the deal, and certainly does not want the scruffy trade-in back. This pre-
sents an obvious temptation for the dealer to leverage the consumer into a
new, more expensive lease, or at least to confront the consumer with the
challenge of undoing the failed transaction, retrieving the trade-in and re-
covering the down payment.
The U.C.L.A. constrains possible abuse in this pattern by setting out
some flat "dos" and "don'ts." One boundary is that the lessor may not
dispose of the consumer's trade-in until the lessee's application is ap-
proved.4 57 Secondly, if the customer's application is disapproved, the les-
sor must promptly return the trade-in45 and any payment the consumer
may have made," 9 but if the lessor has spot-delivered the goods, the lessor
need not tender back the trade-in or payment until the customer tenders
back the goods.46
Specifically in a motor vehicle lease, if the lessor wants to spot-deliver
the goods and be able to take them back on disapproval of the customer's
application, the choreography gets more complex. On or before delivery of
the goods the lessor must give the consumer an explicit notice (call it a
"spot delivery notice") of the customer's right to a refund of the down
payment and return of the trade-in.' 6" Furthermore if the lessor wants to be
able to charge the customer for use of the vehicle in the interim, the notice
456 The reasons for disapproval are not always bad credit, but could include mistaken or errone-
ous entries in the application or the lease itself, such as use of the wrong residual value or miscalcula-
tion of monthly payments.
457 Id. § 301(c).
458 Id. § 301(aXI)(A). The lessor must "tender back" the trade-in "within one business day" after
disapproval of the customer's application. Id.
%9 Id. § 301(aX1XB). The payment must be refunded "promptly, but in no event more than five
business days after disapproval of the application." Id. While the trade-in is presumably sitting on the
dealer's lot and can be returned forthwith, it may take several days for the lessor to process and issue a
refund check for the down payment. Thus the longer time allowed for the refund.
460 Id. § 301(a)(2).
461 id. § 301(b).
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must specify the "fact and amount" of the charge, and be separately signed
by the customer at delivery. 2 The amount of the charge is capped at the
mileage rate set for deductions under state or federal tax laws. 46 3 To all this
is added the common-sense qualification that, whether or not the lessor has
given a spot-delivery notice, the lessee may still be liable for damage to the
vehicle that is the lessee's fault.'
These provisions should discourage the worst of sharp dealing by les-
sors in the context of spot-delivered motor vehicles. But at best the
U.C.L.A. can help customers understand the risks of taking delivery before
approval of their applications. The real dynamic is that the customer has
made the emotional commitment to "new wheels," and does not want to
rescind the deal" 5 and start shopping all over again. When the lessor then
advises the customer that the lease cannot be finalized without some
changes to its terms, it will be the uncommon case where the customer
walks away from the transaction. Ultimately, the policing of bad spot de-
livery practices may rest as much on claims under state U.D.A.P. statutes
as under this Act.
4. Assignee Liability
Section 305(b) of the Act generally abolishes holder-in-due-course
protections for financial entities that acquire a lease from the lessor by as-
signment or sale, thus making the law for consumer leases substantially
identical to that for credit sales.' For credit sales, federal and state laws
have outlawed third-party immunity from consumer claims and defenses
for nearly thirty years," 7 and in the U.C.L.A. drafting process it was a
given that the new act would do likewise. Where the dominant FTC Holder
Rule accomplishes its objective by requiring that every credit sale contract
contain a specified "Notice" that preserves claims and defenses, the
U.C.L.A. merely states dispositively that "a holder is subject to all claims
462 Id.
463 d. § 301(bX2). A legislative note following section 301(bX2) suggests a preference for a
mileage rate under state law, but Connecticut opted for the federal rate. CoNN. U.C.L.A. § 18(b)(2),
2002 Pub. Acts No. 02-81.
464 U.C.L.A. § 301(b)(3). This is to discourage joy-riding or other reckless driving at the lessor's
expense. It would include loss of the vehicle by government forfeiture or confiscation. Id. It is not
crystal clear whether these limitations must be mentioned in the "spot delivery notice," but prudent
practice would include them.
465 The provisions discussed here are not really "rescission." That assumes a contract has been
fully made, while here the lessor has temporarily withheld its commitment to the lease. There is noth-
ing in the U.C.L.A. that gives lessees a true "right of rescission" or "cooling-off period" as applies in
door-to-door sales or second mortgages. At one drafting session, the Reporter floated a mild, optional
24-hour "cooling oft" mechanism. No one in the room supported it.
466 U.C.L.A. § 305(b).
467 FTC Trade Regulation Rule on Preservation of Consumers' Claims and Defenses, 16 C.F.R.
§ §433.1-433.3 (2002). See discussion supra Part II E. .d.
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and defenses arising from the lease which the lessee could assert against a
previous holder." 68
This "preservation" rule applies to consumer claims and defenses aris-
ing from the lease. 69 The most common examples would likely be war-
ranty claims, late or non-delivery, failure to repair, or similar failures by
the lessor to honor its lease obligations. Lessor fraud would be another.
The consumer is clearly entitled to assert this kind of mis- or malfeasance
as a defense or counterclaim to collection efforts by a subsequent holder.
As under the FTC Rule, a consumer could also assert a separate affirmative
claim against the subsequent holder, such as for revocation of acceptance,
but the holder's liability is capped at the amounts the consumer has paid.47
Several aspects of this rule bear noting. One is its extension to leases
that approximate, but are not quite, finance leases under U.C.C. Article
2A.47" ' In finance leases the lessor is essentially the financer of the lease;
the lessor acquires the goods from a supplier specifically to be leased to a
consumer, and the supplier's warranties are passed through to the lessee.47 '
Article 2A recognizes that a consumer may assert claims and defenses
based on the supplier's warranties against the finance lessor, and the
U.C.L.A. affirms that result. But the U.C.L.A. language refers to any
situation in which "the original lessor does not select, manufacture, or sup-
ply the goods."473 This might be referred to as a quasi-finance lease; it
does not meet the definition of finance lease in Article 2A, most likely be-
cause the finance lessor has not specifically forwarded the supplier's war-
ranty information to the lessee. In any such quasi-finance lease, the con-
sumer may still assert against the nominal lessor and subsequent holders
any claims or defenses arising from supplier warranties.' 4
A second issue lurking in this assignee-liability provision is how it op-
erates when lease obligations are securitized. Frequently these days all
468 U.C.L.A. § 305(a).
469 Id.
470 Id. § 305 cmt. 3 (providing guidance on measuring this cap). Note that the U.C.L.A. rule, and
the FTC Holder Rule that it emulates, differ from the U.C.C. in permitting the consumer an affirmative
recovery from the holder. While U.C.C. section 3-305(aX3) permits an obligor to assert a "claim in
recoupment" against a non-holder in due course, this is limited to an offset against any amount still
owing on the instrument. U.C.C. § 3-305 cmt. 3 (2002).
471 U.C.L.A. § 305(b), cmt. 1.
472 U.C.C. § 2A-209.
473 U.C.L.A. § 305(b).
474Nothing in the U.C.L.A. provision, or in U.C.C. Article 2A, requires a supplier to make any
warranties, or prohibits disclaimers or remedy limitations, in the supply contract. Whether the con-
sumer has claims or defenses to assert against the finance lessor and subsequent holders therefore
depends altogether on what is in the supplier's sale contract to the lessor. Or, if the pending revisions
to U.C.C. Article 2 are adopted (specifically new sections 2-313A and 2-313B), the supplier may have
warranty responsibilities directly to the consumer lessee based either on the supplier's advertising or on
an explicit warranty packaged with the goods,
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forms of consumer receivables, from credit card account balances to mort-
gage loans, are transferred in bulk and packaged as securities to be sold in
the larger investment markets.475 The question is who then is the "holder"
subject to a consumer's claims and defenses? The U.C.L.A. Comments
offer some guidance by suggesting that in a securitization the "holder" is
"the special purpose vehicle, trustee, or other entity that holds title to the
leased goods" and not "a mere servicing agent, nor the securities investors
who have only beneficial or nominal ownership interests. 476 In any event
it seems clear that securitization should not operate to deprive consumers
of the right to assert claims and defenses against downstream holders.
There is a further significant limitation on the U.C.L.A. assignee-
liability rule as it applies to claims and defenses based on a lessor's viola-
tion of the U.C.L.A. itself (as opposed to a breach of the lease contract).
By inference in section 305(b) and by black letter in section 505(b), an
assignee or holder is generally subject to vicarious liability for violations of
the U.C.L.A., either actual damages or in some cases statutory damages.477
This means a consumer could not only set up a violation of the Act as a
defense or claim in recoupment to defeat a holder's collection action, but
could sue the holder directly for the sins of its assignor. 78 However, for
violations of specified U.C.L.A. disclosure provisions, an assignee is ex-
posed only if the violation is evident on the face of the lease documenta-
tion. This parallels a protective rule in the federal C.L.A.479 The effect is
that an assignee's due diligence as to transaction paperwork and disclosure
need not go beyond the face of that paperwork. Case law under the federal
T.I.L.A. consistently holds that this "apparent on the face" test will be ap-
plied literally: Unless the disclosure forms are facially irregular, an argu-
ment that the assignee knew or should have known of violations beneath
the surface will be unavailing.48 This is actually an odd juxtaposition of
rules. The assignee is liable for disclosure violations only when they are
475See Kurt Eggert, Held Up In Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization, and the Holder
In Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REv. 503, 545 (2002) (providing a detailed review and
analysis of the similar securitization processes involving subprime mortgage loans, and a strong rec-
ommendation that consumer rights be preserved throughout the securitization process). See generally
Stuart M. Litwin, Unlocking the Mysteries of Auto Lease Securitization, 3 THE FrNANCIER 22, 24-27
(1996).
476 U.C.L.A. § 102(a) cmt.
477 Id. §§ 305(b), 505(b); cf id. § 501.
478 Id. § 505 cmt. I.
479 T.I.L.A. § 131, 15 U.S.C. § 1641 (2000).
480 Four federal circuits agree. See Ramadan v. Chase Manhattan Corp., 229 F.3d 194 (3d Cir.
2000); Green v. Levis Motors, Inc., 179 F.3d 286 (5th Cir. 1999); Ellis v. Gen. Motors Acceptance
Corp., 160 F.3d 703 (1 Ith Cir. 1998); Taylor v. Quality Hyundai, Inc., 150 F.3d 689 (7th Cir. 1998).
These cases also confirm that an FTC "Holder" Notice in the contract does not "trump" the assignee's
protection under the T.I.L.A. § 131.
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self-evident in the paperwork, but is fully exposed to liability for any other
violations by the assignor that leave no paper trail at all.
5. Sublease
The U.C.L.A. allows a lessor to restrict the subleasing of consumer
goods, subject to a good faith standard for withholding its permission."'
This is a sore spot for the leasing industry and for consumerists as well.
From the lease holder's point of view, its property and payment rights are
in jeopardy if the original lessee can freely sublease or assign the lease to
another person." 2 Conversely, as the drafters note, "subleasing the goods
may be an efficient way for the consumer to adjust to changed circum-
stances, or to avoid a default."483 U.C.C. Article 2A allows a lessor to pro-
hibit unauthorized subleases and to treat such a sublease as an event of
default.484 The U.C.L.A. likewise allows the lessor to condition a sublease
on the holder's consent (and payment of a reasonable fee).485 This condi-
tion must be reflected in a "specific and conspicuous provision" in the
lease.86
For short-term leases (twelve months or less) putting that consent pro-
vision in the lease is the only restraint on subleasing. For longer term
leases the holder must consent to a sublease unless the holder "believes in
good faith that the sublease or assignment will jeopardize the holder's
rights or increase the holder's risk."47 This would probably become a mat-
ter of proof only after there has been an unauthorized sublease and the
holder seeks return of the goods from the sublessee. If a consumer lessee
dickers forthrightly with the holder for consent to a sublease or other relief
from the lease, it is likely the parties will work something out. In any case,
after a sublease, both the original lessee and the sublessee continue obli-
gated under the lease. 88
481 U.C.L.A. § 306.
482 There are sublease "brokers" offering consumer lessees the "service" of finding another party
to take over the leased goods and the payments. One can imagine a degree of unreliability among such
sublease intermediaries and the shoppers they attract. Several states regulate "sublease arrangers"
directly. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-106.2 (2001); NAT'L CONSUMER L. CTR., TRUTH [N LEND-
ING § 9.2.5, at 537-38 (4th ed. 1999) (concluding that such brokers are also "arrangers" covered by the
federal C.L.A.).
483 U.C.L.A. § 306 cmt. I. They might have added "... and to avoid substantial liability for an
early termination."
484 U.C.C. § 2A-303(2) (2002). But the provision preserves the lessee's power to alienate its in-
terest by making even a prohibited transfer or sublease "otherwise effective." Id.
485 U.C.L.A. § 306.
486 Id. § 306(b). The phrase was based on section 2A-303(7) of the U.C.C.
487 Id. §306(b). "Good faith" now includes "observance of reasonable commercial standards of
fair dealing," inviting proof of objective benchmarks for approving or disapproving a sublease. Id. §
102(a)(4).
41I ld. § 306(c).
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6. Ban on "Gap" Liability
In one of their more decisive policy choices, the U.C.L.A. drafters de-
cided early on to bar the imposition of so-called "gap liability" on con-
sumer lessees. This decision held firm into the final Act,489 in the face of
some strong industry opposition (which may have become resignation to-
ward the end).
"Gap liability" refers to the risk of physical loss of the leased goods, by
accident, theft, or otherwise. Leases, including consumer leases, customar-
ily impose that risk of loss on the lessee, and require the lessee to maintain
casualty insurance to cover it. This would be unobjectionable, except that
when a leased vehicle is destroyed midway through the lease, the lessee's
payoff liability on the forced early termination of the lease will often ex-
ceed the insured value of the car. This is because the car usually depreci-
ates faster than the payment stream covers that depreciation, especially in
the early months of the lease."" The result is that the lessee has lost the
goods (unless the holder is willing to replace them) but still owes a sub-
stantial sum representing the "gap" between the adjusted lease balance
(what the lessee owes) and the insurance coverage on the goods (the mar-
ket value of the car). 9 ' Some lessors internalize the gap risk, i.e., they self-
insure or buy insurance on their portfolio of leased goods. 92 Many other
lessors use this risk allocation as an opportunity to offer customers "gap
coverage" insurance or "gap waivers" that forgive the gap liability. 93 With
mark-ups, these gap products can be a significant revenue source for les-
sors.
Posed simply, the issue is this: Should the parties to a consumer lease
be free to allocate the risk of physical loss of the goods by contract, with
lessees then free to choose to buy gap coverage or not as their judgments
dictate? Or should the law make that risk allocation for the parties by
mandating that gap losses be absorbed (or insured) by the professional les-
sor? The U.C.L.A. opts for the latter approach,' 9' on the theory that it is
better to absorb these occasional losses in the overall system than to saddle
occasional lessees with substantial (and unexpected) expense if the leased
goods are destroyed or stolen.'95 It is a classic example of prohibiting a
consumer risk allocation universally, to protect the few who might be vic-
489 d. § 401.
490/d. § 401 cmt. 1.
491 See U.C.L.A. § 401(a) (definition "gap amount").
492/d. § 401 cmt. 1.
493 Id.
494Id. § 401(b) (providing that "a consumer lease may not provide that the lessee is responsible
for the gap amount").
4 Comments 2 and 3 to U.C.L.A. section 401 elaborate on this rationale.
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timized while marginally increasing costs for lessors and prices to consum-
ers.4"9 In this respect the U.C.L.A. is more solicitous for consumers than
most of the credit laws that permit charges for voluntary gap protection.
497
There are qualifications on the otherwise blanket prohibition on impos-
ing gap liability on the consumer lessee. First, the "gap amount" is calcu-
lated by treating the loss of the goods as an early termination, and subtract-
ing from the adjusted lease balance whatever cash value is received from
the lessee's insurance, or "from any other source" which could be a third-
party tortfeasor or that person's insurer.49 "Gap amount" also excludes the
deductible amount under the lessee's insurance coverage. 99  And it-
logically---excludes any sums otherwise due and payable under the lease at
the time of casualty to the goods, such as overdue periodic payments, late
charges, or accrued taxes.5"0 Finally, it excludes a reduction in insurance
proceeds attributable to (i) the consumer's delinquency in paying the insur-
ance premium, or (ii) the diminished value of the goods before the casu-
alty. °1 The latter would include situations where it is provable that the
goods had previously been damaged, were in poor repair, or had excess
mileage, all reducing the market value of the goods before the casualty
loss. In all of these circumstances, the consumer lessee would be responsi-
ble for the sums excluded from the "gap amount."
The second set of qualifications may collectively be called the "moral
hazard" limitations. The parties may contract for lessee liability for the
gap amount to the extent it is caused by:
" A lapse in required insurance;.. 2
* The lessee's own serious misconduct ("fraud, intentional
wrongful act or omission, or gross negligence");0 3 or
496 To the extent lessors can no longer sell marked-up gap-protection products, they lose that
revenue opportunity, and must replace it with pricing adjustments elsewhere in the lease, most likely in
the basic lease cost or "rent charge" in the lease.
497 The basic credit disclosure law, the T.I.L.A., assumes that gap protection products are legiti-
mate and merely specifies how they are to be disclosed in order to be excluded from the finance charge.
T.I.L.A. Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(dX3) (2002).




502 Id. § 401(c)(I). If substitute, i.e., force-placed, insurance is in place, it must be applied to re-
duce the gap amount. Id. cmt. 5.
503 Id. § 401 (c)(2). Comment 5 to that section explains that the holder's claim is in the nature of
subrogation against a lessee who "may not avoid gap... liability by purposely destroying or 'losing'
the goods, or intentionally or by gross negligence allowing their destruction or loss." Id. cmt. 5. Sim-
ple negligence by the lessee in driving the car, for example, would not fit this exclusion.
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* Government forfeiture or confiscation of the goods.5"
The bottom line on gap liability is that the U.C.L.A. will require that
the entire leasing industry conform to the practices of those lessors that
have retained the risk of gap losses rather than shift them to consumers-
The greater loss to some lessors is the discrete profits to be made from sell-
ing gap protection products.
7. Warranties of Quality
A consumer lessee's expectations as to the quality and performance of
leased goods are governed primarily by the warranty, disclaimer, and rem-
edy provisions of U.C.C. Article 2A. '0 That is, the U.C.L.A. does not re-
write, extend, or modify those U.C.C. rules at all. Nor does the U.C.L.A.
replicate state "lemon laws" applicable to leased goods.5°6
What the U.C.L.A. does do, withrespect to warranties, is import an as-
pect of the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (M.M.W.A.) °7 that pre-
serves a supplier's implied warranties whenever that supplier makes a
"written warranty" on the goods that are leased. 08 The operative language
in U.C.L.A. § 310, patterned on M.M.W.A., is:
A supplier may not disclaim or . . . modify an implied
warranty to a lessee with respect to leased goods if:
(1) the supplier makes a written warranty to the lessee
with respect to the leased goods; or
(2) at the time the lessee signs the lease, or within 90
days thereafter, the supplier enters into a service
504Id. § 401(cX3). Government seizure of the goods is possible if the goods are involved in un-
lawful activity such as drug trafficking.
S05 The relevant U.C.C. Article 2A provisions are section 2A-210 ("Express warranties"); section
2A-211 ("Warranties against interference and infringement"); section 2A-212 ("Implied warranty of
merchantability"); section 2A-213 ("Implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose"); section 2A-
214 ("Exclusion or modification of warranties"); and section 2A-503 ("Modification or impairment of
rights and remedies"). If the pending revisions of U.C.C. Articles 2 and 2A are finalized, consumer
lessees will benefit from provisions extending warranty responsibilities to remote suppliers and adver-
tisers, U.C.C. §§ 2-313A, 2-313B (2002), and more explicit disclaimer language in consumer leases in
amended U.C.C. § 2A-214.
506 The drafters include a legislative note that urges states to extend existing lemon laws to leased
goods if they do not already do so. U.C.L.A. § 310 legis. n.2.
507 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (2000); see supra notes 149-62 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of the M.M.W.A.
508As discussed earlier, there is significant case law to the effect that M.M.W.A. does not apply
to leases. See supra text accompanying notes 155-61. Perhaps Congress ought to rectify this limitation
on M.M.W.A. coverage. The Drafting Committee thought it unfeasible to attempt to rewrite the entire
federal M.M.W.A., including its disclosure, labeling and remedies rules, into this state-law uniform act




contract with the lessee with respect to the leased
goods.5"9
The principal effect of this inclusion in the U.C.L.A. will be on remote
suppliers, particularly manufacturers that include written warranties des-
tined for the consumer end-user of the product, and on retail dealers that
make written warranties51° or sell service contracts. Any of these suppli-
ers51 1 will also be bound by the implied warranty of merchantability and
perhaps by the implied warranty of fitness as well, regardless of any at-
tempted disclaimer of those warranties.512 But, as in M.M.W.A., a supplier
may limit the duration of the implied warranties to that of the written war-
ranty (except where the written warranty would be a "full" warranty under
M.M.W.A.).
1 3
Aside from M.M.W.A. and the U.C.L.A., some states have acted to
prohibit altogether, or substantially restrict, disclaimers of implied warran-
ties in sales of goods.' 14 The U.C.L.A. drafters alert those states to amend
their disclaimer prohibitions to make them applicable to leases as well as
sales.515 Connecticut is one of those states,"t 6 and in its enactment of the
U.C.L.A. it specifically adds language that nullifies all disclaimers of im-
plied warranties." 7 The inclusion of this non-uniform provision may create
some redundancy with the U.C.L.A., but no real clash. The U.C.L.A. pre-
serves implied warranties where a "supplier" makes a "written warranty,"
and this has particular impact on manufacturer warranties that run with the
goods." 8 The added Connecticut provision, on the other hand, outlaws "a
term in a consumer lease" that purports to disclaim implied warranties; this
509 U.C.L.A. § 310(b); cf M.M.W.A. § 108(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2308(a).
510 Retail dealers typically pass along the manufacturer's warranty and agree to perform warranty
work on the warrantor's behalf, but make no express warranties of their own. Nothing in M.M.W.A. or
in the U.C.L.A. requires any supplier or dealer to make any particular warranty. Cf M.M.W.A. §
102(b)(2), IS U.S.C. § 2302(b)(2); id. § 107, 15 U.S.C. § 2307 (stating that warrantor may designate
representatives to perform warranty work).
511 The term is defined broadly to include any upstream supplier, from manufacturer through dis-
tributor to the retail lessor. U.C.L.A. § 310(a)(3), cmt. 3.
512 Neither the U.C.L.A. nor M.M.W.A. necessarily extend the implied warranties to remote cus-
tomers such as consumer buyers or lessees if state law requires privity of contract between warrantor
and recipient. Compare Feinstein v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 535 F. Supp. 595, 605 (S.D.N.Y.
1982) (stating that "if state law requires vertical privity to enforce an implied warranty and there is
none, then, like the yeastless souffle, the warranty does not 'arise.'), with Szajna v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
503 N.E. 2d 760, 769-70 (111. 1986) (holding that M.M.W.A. not only preserves a supplier's implied
warranties but extends them to the consumer buyer without regard to vertical privity).
513 U.C.L.A. § 310(c).
514 This has sometimes been by non-uniform amendment of U.C.C. section 2-316 which would
otherwise permit such disclaimers.
515 U.C.L.A. § 310 legis. n.I.
516 CONN. GEN. StAT. § 42a-2-316(5) (2001).
517 CONN. U.C.L.A. § 27(e), 2002 Conn. Pub. Acts 02-81 (Reg. Sess.).
Si U.C.L.A. § 310(b)(l).
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appears applicable only to the retail lessor, who previously could pass
along the factory warranty but disclaim warranties of its own.' Now the
retail lessor will be on the hook for implied warranty breaches of its own.
While the manufacturer's warranty may be the realistic source of a con-
sumer's remedy, the dealer's implied warranties give the consumer extra
leverage, both in the repair shop and in court.520
The non-uniform Connecticut amendment to the U.C.L.A. also nulli-
fies any attempt, in the lease, to "exclude or modify a remedy for breach of
such warranties." '521 Thus lease language attempting to limit remedies to
repair-or-replacement, or to avoid consequential damages, is not enforce-
able.
8. Choice of Law and Forum
Historically, creditors could create strategic advantages for themselves
by specifying in the contract that the agreement was governed by the law
of a jurisdiction favorable to the creditor. The U.C.L.A.'s treatment of
choice of law clauses is discussed above522 and needs no restating, except
to say it prevents that abuse. But a related technique for creditors, and now
lessors or lease holders, to gain procedural and tactical advantage is to
specify in the lease a designated forum for suits against the lessee, or suits
by the lessee, or both.
A common practice was to provide that the consumer agreed to be sued
in the creditor's home state-often far from the consumer's residence. A
lease might assume that suit would be brought in the consumer's home
state, but permit it in any venue within that state, so that, for example, a
San Diego resident might have to defend a collection action 500 miles
away in San Francisco. 23 A parallel practice was to specify in the con-
sumer contract that the consumer could bring an action against the mer-
chant only in the jurisdiction of the merchant's headquarters-likely many
519 CONN. U.C.L.A. § 27(e), 2002 Conn. Pub. Acts 02-81 (Reg. Sess.).
520 Much of the litigation value of the dealer's implied warranties is that a breach of warranty is a
"claim or defense" that can be asserted against an assignee of the lease, either for affirmative recovery,
or as a setoff or defense to collection action. See supra text accompanying notes 466-80 for a discus-
sion of assignee liability. By contrast, a breach of the manufacturer's warranty is generally considered
actionable only against the manufacturer itself, and not against the dealer or dealer's assignee. But see
Mercedes-Benz Credit Corp. v. Lotito, 703 A.2d 288 (N.J. Super. 1997), rev'd in part on other
grounds, 746 A.2d 480 (N.J. Super 2000) (holding that after a Mercedes vehicle carrying a factory
warranty was leased to a consumer by an authorized Mercedes dealer and financed by the manufac-
turer's captive finance company the lessee could assert warranty claims based on the factory warranty
against the affiliated finance company). If, as the Mercedes-Benz court intimates but does not clarify,
this was a "finance lease," the result seems consistent with Comment 2 of section 2A-407 of the U.C.C.
521 CONN. U.C.L.A. § 27(e), 2002 Pub. Acts No. 02-81 (Reg. Sess.).
522 See discussion supra Part IV.B.4.




miles from the consumer's residence. Although the idea of a binding con-
tractual choice of forum has been found constitutional on due process
grounds,524 the use of that practice to force consumers to sue in distant ju-
risdictions remains objectionable on basic fairness grounds.
The U.C.L.A. deals forthrightly with each type of forum selection
clause. 5 Actions against a consumer lessee can be brought only in the
venue of the lessee's residence, and actions by a lessee against the lease
holder may be brought in "any judicial forum that otherwise has jurisdic-
tion over the holder." '26 Lease language to the contrary is unenforceable.
VII. THE CRITICAL JUNCTURE: DEFAULT AND LEASE
TERMINATION
The most difficult issues involving consumer leases, like credit
transactions, seem to swirl around default and termination. The U.C.L.A.
devotes considerable attention to this area.
A. Who Bears the Costs of Late Payments and Other Defaults?
A lessor will virtually always want the delinquent lessee to be respon-
sible for costs and charges related to delinquency. The U.C.L.A. generally
approves the contractual allocation of these costs to the lessee, but subject
to a number of restraints.
1. Late Charges
The Act permits the lease to set late charges for payments that are ten
or more days in arrears, in an amount up to the greater of ten dollars or five
percent of the tardy payment.527 The holder may not "pyramid" late
charges, i.e., impose a late charge on a subsequent payment that lacks only
the amount of an earlier-imposed late charge.52 In effect, the consumer
can be charged a late fee only once for a payment that is actually made but
late.529 If the late installment remains unpaid however, additional late
524 See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991) (upholding a Florida
forum-selection clause against residents of Washington); Nat'l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375
U.S. 311, 318 (1964) (holding that service of process on respondents' agent in New York, pursuant to
lease agreement, satisfied due process requirements, even though respondents were residents of Michi-
gan).
525U.C.L.A. § 108(c)-(d) (2002).
526 Id. § 108(d). Thus, merchants doing business nationwide or regionally are likely subject to
suit by the lessee in any state where they are doing business, including the state of the lessee's resi-
dence.
527 Id. § 304(a).
528 Id. § 304(b).
529 While this protects the consumer from multiple charges for the same delinquency, it also
makes it difficult for the holder to enforce payment of the late charge since subsequent timely payments
are credited first to the current payment due, then to delinquent scheduled payments, and only then to
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charges may be imposed in subsequent periods.
The U.C.L.A. provisions on late charges are meant as bright-line au-
thorizations, and inherently reasonable as such. While the federal regula-
tion says merely that late charges must be "reasonable,""53 the U.C.L.A. is
setting specific dollar limits which the drafters considered appropriate and
should be considered per se reasonable."'
2. Default and Collection Charges
Like the federal C.L.A., the U.C.L.A. permits imposition on the con-
sumer lessee of charges for any delinquency or default, "including collec-
tion, repossession, and court costs." '532 Like the federal act, these charges
are limited to an amount that is "reasonable" as a form of liquidated dam-
ages.533 Since these expenses are in the nature of incidental damages for
breach of the lease,534 a reasonable amount or formula for liquidating them
should approximate the out of pocket costs actually or likely to be incurred.
late or other charges. Id. § 304 cmt. 4. It is doubtful a holder would repossess and foreclose an other-
wise current lease on account of an unpaid $20 late charge. Id.
530 12 C.F.R. § 213.4(q) (2002).
531 One court has held that late charges are not subject to the explicit reasonableness test under
the C.L.A. Deusner v. Firstar Corp., 186 F. Supp. 2d 766, 769 (W.D. Ky. 2001). The statute lumps
together charges for "delinquency, default, or early termination," and says any such charge must be
"reasonable." 15 U.S.C. § 1667b(b) (2000). Separately it requires disclosure of any charge for "delin-
quency, default, late payment, or early termination." Id. § 1667a( 11) (emphasis added). Noting the
omission of late charges from the first phrase, the court concluded that late charges are excused from
the reasonableness standard. Deusner, 186 F. Supp. 2d at 767. But aren't late charges imposed for a
"delin uency" or "default"? Either the court is wrong, or the Federal Reserve Board is.
5T2 U.C.L.A. § 304(c).
533The U.C.L.A. tests reasonableness "in light of the anticipated or actual harm caused by the de-
linquency or default, the difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or infeasibility of otherwise
obtaining an adequate remedy." Id. This language is taken from 15 U.S.C. § 1667b(b), which in turn
was taken from U.C.C. § 2-718 (2002), the liquidated damages provision for sales of goods. Since
enactment of the federal C.L.A. in 1976, Article 2A has been added to the U.C.C., with its own, some-
what differently phrased, liquidated damages rule. (Had there been a U.C.C. Article 2A in 1976, Con-
gress would probably have used its liquidated damages language instead of Article 2.) The U.C.L.A.
drafters chose to follow the C.L.A. and U.C.C. Article 2 so that there would not be differing standards
of reasonableness under federal and state law. Moreover, the liquidated damages formula in Article 2A
omits the "difficulties of proof of loss" and "inconvenience or infeasibility" factors for assessing rea-
sonableness, intentionally making the test less restrictive than that in Article 2, to emphasize the free-
dom of contract policy for leases. U.C.C. § 2A-504. To the extent the Article 2A formula is less con-
sumer-friendly, it could be found inconsistent with and preempted by the federal C.L.A. On the other
hand, consumer lawyers have argued that the Article 2A standard may be more protective of consumers
because it omits reference to "actual harm" and does not allow a liquidated damages provision to be
justified by hindsight. NAT'L CONSUMER L. CTR., TRUTH IN LENDING § 9.5.2.1, at 573-74 (4th ed.
1999). In reality these distinctions may be moot, because the U.C.L.A. drafters indicate in Comment I
to section 304 that default charges that are impermissible under Article 2A "are not reasonable under
this Act either." U.C.L.A. § 304 cmt. I.
534 Cf U.C.C. § 2A-530 (detailing the types of incidental damages incurred by lessor).
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Formulas that set default charges as a percentage of the balance owed may
be suspect for that reason.535 Default charges must be provided for in the
lease,536 and disclosed pursuant to federal regulations.537
Default charges may include the holder's attorney's fee expense, but
only for work done by non-employee attorneys.3a If the lease provides for
the holder's recovery of attorney's fees, the Act automatically gives recip-
rocal attorney's fees to a consumer who successfully defends a collection
action.539
B. Default, Repossession, Disposition: When and How?
Eventually some lessees will default and the lease holder will want to
exercise its "ownership" rights to repossess the leased goods. The
U.C.L.A. boundaries at this stage are largely familiar ones from the credit
arena.
1. Events of Default
Regardless of default-clause language in the lease, the lease holder can
act on that clause only as permitted by the Act. One permitted circum-
stance is when the lessee fails to make a payment when due.5" Otherwise,
the holder must be prepared to establish that "the prospect of payment,
performance, or realization of the holder's interest in the goods is signifi-
cantly impaired."54' The U.C.L.A. language on these points is virtually
identical to that in the U.C.C.C., and the U.C.L.A. Comment fleshes out
examples of various kinds of non-payment defaults. 42 While the holder
has the burden to prove the necessary "significant impairment," the drafters
indicate543 that the holder need not get a judicial determination in advance,
and can act on such a breach immediately. The holder's burden of proof
will surface if and when the lessee challenges the holder's right to declare a
default.
2. Lessee's Right to Cure
Where the lessee's default is a failure to pay money, the holder may
not proceed with repossession or judicial collection without giving the les-
535 U.C.L.A. § 304 cmt. 2 (stating that "a collection fee of 25% of the adjusted lease balance may
not be reasonable if default occurs early in the lease and the charge would far exceed the actual costs of
collection").
536 Id. § 304 cmt. 1.
53712 C.F.R. § 213.4(q) (2002).
538 U.C.L.A. § 304(d).
539Id; see also id. § 304 cmt. 5.
540 Id. § 402(a)(1).
541 Id. § 402(a)(2).
542 Id. § 402 cmt. I.
543 Id. § 402 cmt. 1.
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see a chance to "cure"544 the default and restore the parties' rights, "as if
the default had not occurred. '5 45  Again, this mechanism is patterned
closely on the U.C.C.C.546 Before repossession or suit, the holder must
notify the lessee that the lessee has twenty or more days to cure the default
by bringing the account fully current5 47 (but without any additional security
deposit or prepayment). 48 Only if the lessee fails to cure may the holder
proceed with foreclosure or suit.549 A consumer has the right to cure only
once each twelve months,55° and so cannot use it as a routine response to
non-payment.
There may be less theoretical justification for a right to cure in the
lease setting because the lessee has no equity interest or ownership invest-
ment to protect-the goods are owned by the holder of the lease. Holders
can always work out alternative or modified payment arrangements with
their delinquent customers (including subleases), and will often find it in
their self-interest to do so. Still there is a fairness value in legislating a
mandatory cure notice and waiting period, to avoid premature, mistaken, or
"surprise" foreclosures that may invite a breach of the peace. It is doubtful
the formal cure mechanism is used very often,"' but its availability can
have a prophylactic effect against potentially nasty or precipitous foreclo-
sures.
3. Repossession
As owner of the leased goods, the holder is entitled to repossess them
on the lessee's default, or after the lessee has failed to cure. 52 Many repos-
sessions, we can assume, involve peaceful, voluntary surrender of the
goods by a lessee who realizes full well that he is in default and that there
is no particular advantage in resisting repossession. Absent such a volun-
tary surrender, the holder may proceed either "by judicial process or by
self-help without a breach of the peace." '  The latter phrase echoes the
traditional standard for self-help repossession in U.C.C. Article 9,554 and
more recently in U.C.C. Article 2A. 5" The U.C.L.A. drafters clearly in-
544Id. § 402(b)-(e).
545 Id. § 402(d).
546 Cf U.C.C.C. §§ 5.110-5.111 (2002) (notice requirements and the consumer's right to cure).
547U.C.L.A. § 402(c).
548 Id. § 402(d).
549 Id. § 402(b).
550 Id. § 402(e).
551 If there is any empirical evidence on consumer exercise of cure rights, this author has not seen
it.
552 U.C.L.A. § 403 cmt. 1.
553 Id. § 403(a).
354 U.C.C. § 9-609(b)(2) (2002).
555 Id. § 2A-525(3).
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tend the U.C.L.A. rule "to be interpreted consistently with" the U.C.C.5 6
Thus there is a ready-made body of case law guidance in every state for
determining the permissible bounds of self-help repossession," 7 and little
more need be said about it.
Some things must be said, however, about an issue that surfaced in the
U.C.L.A. draffing process, and drew an extensive non-uniform provision in
the Connecticut version of the U.C.L.A. (and also in the version of U.C.C.
Article 2A adopted in that state)-that is "electronic self-help," and it re-
fers primarily to emergent technological devices that may be programmed
to control the starter system of a motor vehicle. If the lessee or credit
buyer does not make payments when due, the device immobilizes the car.
Current examples of this technology are used mostly in subprime auto
markets. Each month when the customer makes the monthly payment, she
is given a code to be entered in the device installed in the car to allow it to
run for the next month. No pay, no code, no ride! One can imagine more
sophisticated versions where the holder can transmit authorizations or shut-
down messages remotely as through satellite navigation systems. Compa-
rable "electronic self-help" mechanisms exist with respect to purchased or
leased computers, where on default or breach the customer is denied access
to computer software and programming.' 8
The open policy question is whether electronic self-help is a good thing
or whether it is so fraught with risks and dangers that it ought not be per-
mitted. Industry supporters argue that the technique is an efficient, low
cost way to incent customers to pay on time and to help assure that the
vehicle can be located if the customer defaults. One might also think that
electronic self-help could reduce instances of midnight confrontations be-
tween angry consumers and the "repo man." Consumerists worry primar-
ily about the safety implications. Can the device malfunction, and shut off
the ignition while the car is on the highway? What if the customer makes a
timely payment but the new code does not work? What if the consumer's
payment is a bit overdue, but the consumer has to use the car in an emer-
gency, or needs it simply to get to the holder's place of business to make
the late payment? To which the industry responds that the "starter inter-
rupt" mechanism cannot shut off the ignition once started, and that custom-
ers are given special codes for one or several extra starts precisely for
emergency situations.
This is an issue that will obviously evolve with time. The U.C.L.A.
556 U.C.L.A. § 403 cmt. 1.
557See NAT'L CONSUMER L. CTR., REPOSSESSIONS AND FORECLOSURES §§ 6.1-6.6, at 191-209
(4th ed. 1999) (summarizing the doctrine of self-help repossession among the states); Cf. JAMES J.
WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 25-7 (5th ed. 2000)
558 Cf. U.C.I.T.A. § 816 (2002) (limitations on electronic self-help); Robbin Rahman, Comment,
Electronic Self-Help Repossession and You: A Computer Software Vendor's Guide to Staying Out of
Jail, 48 EMORY L.J. 1477 (1999) (advocating the use of electronic self-help by vendors).
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temporizes on it by setting out a bracketed provision (optional for the
states) that flatly prohibits electronic self-help.559 An accompanying Legis-
lative Note explains that electronic self-help is new, and "issues of propri-
ety, safety, and reliability can be identified but are not fully resolved."5"
The Note suggests that a state might either enact the prohibition for now
and revisit the matter in the future, or omit any mention of electronic self-
help and monitor practices as they develop.
Connecticut chose neither of these alternatives. Instead it addresses
electronic self-help head on.56' The provision raises many questions of
implementation and compliance, and will likely chill industry enthusiasm
for electronic repossession techniques. The fifteen-day notice requirement
may helpfully encourage lessees to pay up, or it may encourage them and
the goods to become hard to find.562 The subsection as a whole is patterned
closely on the 1999 version of section 816 of the Uniform Computer In-
formation Transactions Act ("U.C.I.T.A."), which may explain some of the
dire fears in paragraph (5) of the Connecticut provision563-that electronic
559 U.C.L.A. § 403(d).
560 Id. § 403 legis. note.
561 CONN. U.C.L.A. § 30(d), 2002 Pub. Acts No. 02-81 (Reg. Sess.). The statute provides for the
following:
(d)(I) In this subsection, "electronic self help" means the use of electronic means to
exercise a holder's rights pursuant to subsection (a) of this section and "electronic"
means relating to technology that has electrical, digital, magnetic or wireless optical
electromagnetic properties or similar capabilities. "Electronic self help" includes the
use of electronic means to locate the goods.
(2) Electronic self help is permitted only if the lessee separately agrees to a term of
the lease authorizing electronic self help that requires notice of exercise as provided
in subdivision (3) of this subsection.
(3) Before resorting to electronic self help authorized by a term of the lease, the
holder shall give notice to the lessee stating:
(A) That the holder intends to resort to electronic self help as a remedy on or after
fifteen days following communication of the notice to the lessee;
(B) The nature of the claimed breach that entitled the holder to resort to self help;
and
(C) The name, title, address and telephone number of a person representing the
holder with whom the lessee may communicate concerning the goods.
(4) A lessee may recover direct and incidental damages caused by wrongful use of
electronic self help. The lessee may also recover consequential damages for wrong-
ful use of electronic self help even if such damages are excluded by the terms of the
lease.
(5) Even if the holder complies with subdivisions (2) and (3) of this subsection, elec-
tronic self help may not be used if the holder has reason to know that its use will re-
sult in substantial injury or harm to the public health or safety or grave harm to the
public interest substantially affecting third parties not involved in the dispute.
Id.
562 May the electronic self-help notice be combined with the "cure" notice under U.C.L.A. sec-
tion 402? There seems no obvious reason why this could not be done. Otherwise the holder would
need to send the cure notice, wait at least twenty days, and, if the lessee has not cured by that time, then
send another fifteen-day notice for electronic self-help.
563 Compare CONN. U.C.LA. § 30(d)(5) (2002) ("Even if the licensor complies. ), with
U.C.I.T.A. § 816(0 (2002) ("Even if the holder complies...).
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shut-down of major computer systems or networks could affect public
health, safety or security. (It seems doubtful that shutting down an auto-
mobile's starter system could have such public impact.). The Connecticut
Act's parallelism to U.C.I.T.A. is interesting because it tracks that Act as
of its original promulgation in 1999. That version of U.C.I.T.A. would
permit a form of electronic self-help with respect to more commercial,
probably customized, software licenses, but flatly bans electronic self-help
in "mass market"-i.e., largely retail or consumer level-transactions.5"
U.C.I.T.A. was revised in 2002 to ban electronic self-help across the
board. 65
The U.C.L.A. (and U.C.I.T.A.) have fired the first shots across the bow
of electronic self help. We can expect more skirmishes in this area.
4. Disposition of Goods; Application of Proceeds
Once the leased goods are back in the holder's hands following default,
what becomes of them and the lessee's remaining obligations under the
lease? Sometimes the goods may go right back on the dealer's shelf, ready
to be .leased again to another customer. The high-school musician's tuba
may be of this sort. Far more generally in the case of consumer goods,
there is no re-lease market for used goods in various states of disrepair, and
the holder will look to dispose of them, usually by sale. The sale or other
disposition will determine a "realized value" for the goods, and that value
will be credited against the lessee's remaining obligations. Like U.C.C.
Article 9, the U.C.L.A. specifies the order in which those proceeds are ap-
plied.5 The lessee is liable for any deficiency.567
The challenge is to give the holder some practical leeway in determin-
ing realized value, while also assuring that the consumer gets fair credit for
the value of the leased goods being returned. The U.C.L.A. provides four
options for measuring realized value:568
I. The price received on sale of the goods;569
564 U.C.I.T.A. § 8 16(b) (2002).
565 Id.. The new subsection says simply: "On cancellation of a license, electronic self-help is not
permitted..." Id.
566U.C.L.A. § 403(b) (2002). The lease may specify the order of application, and that will con-
trol. Id. Absent such a provision in the lease, the realized value goes first to default and collection
charges, next to obligations that are due or past due under the lease, and then to any early-termination
liability of the lessee. Id.
567 Id. § 403(c). Unlike U.C.C. Article 9, the holder has no obligation to account for any surplus,
since the lessee has no ownership interest or equity in the goods. Any surplus is part of the residual
value that reverts to the holder. Id.
568 The sum includes any incidental rebates of insurance premiums or service contracts that the
holder receives. /d. § 404(aX I).
569 Id. § 404(aX2)(A).
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2. The present value of a re-lease of the goods;5 71
3. If the goods are not sold or re-leased, the higher of
the best offer for the goods or their "fair market
value";571 or
4. As an alternative to the above options, the parties
may simply agree on a realized value (subject to
safeguards against manipulation). 72
Where the holder disposes of the goods by sale, the Act imports the
familiar standards from U.C.C. Article 9 (not found in Article 2A) that the
sale may be public or private and that every aspect of it must be "commer-
cially reasonable. '"7  The Act also stipulates that sale "in a wholesale mar-
ket is not unreasonable,""14 hopefully mooting debate about whether the
lessee is entitled to a retail market valuation. Leased vehicles especially
are almost always liquidated at wholesale auctions, and it is unrealistic to
think that the repossessing holder, typically a financial institution, will
maintain a retail used car lot for disposition of vehicles coming off lease.
At the same time, the holder may have arrangements to sell the repossessed
goods back to the originating dealer, who may in fact resell them at retail
on its used car lot. In this kind of insider sale, the repurchase price paid to
the holder by the dealer may still be used to measure realized value so long
as it is "not less than the fair market value of the goods." 5 '
There is a final nugget in the U.C.L.A. to discourage holders from try-
ing to low-ball realized values. If the disposition is not commercially rea-
sonable, then realized value is set at retail market value. (For used cars
this would probably mean about a twenty to thirty percent up-tick in real-
ized value, as against wholesale.) This is acknowledged to be a "sanction"
for misbehavior, but also to serve as an alternative to application of an "ab-
570Id. § 404(aX2)(B). That is, "the total of periodic payments plus the residual value under the
new leased, reduced to present value." Id.
571Id. § 404(aX2XC).
572 Id. § 404(b). The agreement on realized value must be made at the time of lease termination,
not as boilerplate in the lease itself, but the lease may specify a method or formula for determining it.
Id. The agreed-upon amount may not be "unreasonable," and is not if it is determined by a mutually
agreeable appraiser or by reference to a standard valuation source, like used car "blue books." Id.; cf.
U.C.C. § 9-620 (2002) (requirements for acceptance of collateral in full or partial satisfaction of obliga-
tion); id. § 9-621 (notification of proposal to accept collateral). This is roughly comparable to "strict
foreclosure" under U.C.C. sections 9-620, 9-621.
573 U.C.L.A. § 404(c).
Id.
575 Id. § 404(d). This limitation applies when the disposition is "to a person related to the holder,
or a person obligated to the holder under an agreement for recourse, repurchase, or the like." Id. The
phrase "person related to" is used as defined in U.C.C. section 9-102(a)(63). U.C.L.A. § 404 cmt. 6.
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solute bar" rule that would forfeit the holder's entire deficiency recovery.576
C. Early Termination Liability
If there is a single aspect of consumer leasing that was the "heart of the
matter" for the U.C.L.A. drafters and observers, it was the issue of "rea-
sonable" early termination formulas. The background of the issue has been
discussed earlier in this article.577 In brief, the federal C.L.A. requires that
charges for early termination-like default charges generally-be "reason-
able" as a form of liquidated damages." 8 Reasonableness is measured in
"light of the anticipated or actual harm caused by the... early termination,
the difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or unfeasibility of
otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy.,1 79  Early termination liability
includes situations where the lessee has defaulted" ° and the holder has
repossessed and foreclosed. It also includes, especially for vehicle leases, a
voluntary termination by the lessee, i.e., a termination acceded to by the
holder on payment of the specified charge. 8'
The U.C.L.A. Drafting Committee early on decided to replicate in the
Act the general federal standard, in the interest of consistency of the rule
and to avoid a possible clash with the federal rule. The issue for the draft-
ers was whether they could refine the reasonableness standard so as to give
consumers more precise protection and to provide a safe-harbor rule for the
leasing industry. Despite strenuous effort, the Act does not advance the
ball very far toward this goal.
The issue may not be a critical one outside of motor vehicle leasing. 82
For the vehicle leasing industry, the formula for early termination liability
goes to the heart of lessors' pricing structures, as it determines how much
of the unpaid lease obligation will be recouped when a lease ends early.
From the consumer side, certain industry formulas for early termination
charges represent sometimes wildly lopsided recoveries when set against
the lessor's economic expectancy under the lease. If a typical closed-end
lease runs to full term, the consumer merely surrenders the goods and has
no further liability under the lease. If the goods at that point are worth less
than their projected residual value, the holder eats (or insures against) that
576 Id. § 404 cmt. 7; cf U.C.C. 9-626(b) (2002) (permitting courts to use their own established
rules for dealing with a consumer transaction in which the deficiency or surplus is in issue); id. § 404
cmt. 4.
577 See supra notes 77-82.
578 15 U.S.C. § 166Th(b) (2000).
579 Id.
5 80 Id.
581 Id. § 1667b(a).
582 All of the reported C.L.A. litigation on early termination charges involves vehicle leases. See
NAT'L CONSUMER L. CTR., TRUTH IN LENDING § 9.3.6.8, at 556-61 (4th ed. 1999) (discussing early
termination and default charges).
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loss. Prevailing practice usually includes in the lease an early termination
formula that, in one variation or another, allows the holder to recover the
entire remaining lease balance (including the estimated residual value),
with adjustments for unearned interest and similar time-related charges,
and with a deduction from that sum of the actual realized value of the
goods at the time of early termination. Since the goods typically depreciate
faster than the lessee's payments account for depreciation, a lessee may
find herself owing a substantial early termination charge in order to make
up the difference. Miller v. Nissan Motors Acceptance Corp.583 is the
poster-child case. One of the plaintiff lessees (Miller) terminated his lease
one month before its scheduled expiration, triggering the "ET" formula in
the lease.584 As ET provisions go, this is not bad. It is reasonably clear and
succinct; it "present values" the future obligations under the lease, includ-
ing the residual value, and it uses the mainstream "constant yield
method." '585 What it does not tell you is whether the residual value figure
set in the lease is realistic or not. Using the adjusted lease balance as the
base and subtracting the salvage value of the car would have required an
early termination payment of $5,336.95.586 Instead, the holder graciously
allowed the lessee to terminate on payment of the remaining single
monthly payment of $267."'7 The other plaintiffs (the Roses) terminated
their lease two months early; the contractual ET charge would have been
$2,282.28, but they were allowed to terminate for the price of the two re-
maining monthly payments, about $480."'8
Taking these numbers at face value, the holder of the Miller lease had
to absorb a residual loss of more than $5,000 on this transaction;589 i.e., it
583 No. CIV.A.99-4953, 2000 WL 1599244, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 27, 2000).
584 The Early Termination clause in the Miller case read as follows:
Early Termination Liability: At any time after 12 monthly payments have been paid,
I [the lessee] may terminate this lease on the due date of a monthly lease payment if
this lease is not in default .. and I have given you [NMAC] 30 days written notice..
•. [l]f I terminate early, ... I must pay you an Early Termination Charge which is
determined as follows: First, all monthly lease payments, which under the terms of
this lease are not yet due and the residual value of the Vehicle are discounted to pre-
sent value by the Constant Yield Method at the rate implicit in this lease (the "Ad-
justed Lease Balance"). This amount is then reduced by the Realized Value (and in-
surance loss proceeds) which you receive for the Vehicle. The balance due you is
the Early Termination Charge which I will pay to you immediately. If there is an
excess, however, you will not refund it to me.
Id.
585 Id.
586 Id. at *29. The court's opinion does not set out the precise mathematical derivation of this to-
tal, citing only to an affidavit in the record. Id. But as the court otherwise determines, the "residual
value" figure used in the lease was substantially inflated for marketing purposes, and we can guess that
the vehicle had a weak realized value. Id. at *29-*30. The gap between these two numbers is the basic
early termination charge.
587 Id. at *30.
588 Id. at *2.
589 Id. at *29.
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received $267, but needed $5,300 to recover its full unamortized invest-
ment in the vehicle. On the Roses' lease, the holder's residual loss was
about $1,800. Small wonder that lessors write ET formulas as they do.
For the thirty-or-so percent of leases that terminate early, the holder by
contract has shifted the whole residual value risk to the customer.5 O These
leases are "closed-end" (the consumer has no further liability on surrender
of the goods at lease expiration) only when the lease runs to term. At any
earlier point the leases are "open-end" in the sense that the lessee bears the
residual value risk on early termination.
The court in Miller assessed the reasonableness of the contractual ET
charges59' as follows:
[T]he letter of the statute [C.L.A.], as well as pertinent inter-
pretive materials, show that the early termination charge must
be a reasonable approximation of the harm--either the actual
harm or the harm anticipated at the time the agreement was
drafted-accruing to the lessor from the lessee's early termi-
nation. Putting aside for the moment the sheer dollar
amounts, we find that a charge of over $2,000 to the Roses
could not be reasonable where, had they held the car to term,
the further lease payments to NMAC would have totaled less
than $500 .... [T]here is nothing in the record that would re-
motely suggest that NMAC suffered anything near $2,000 in
damages from the early termination. Similarly, there is noth-
ing to show that the over $2,000 charge would have been rea-
sonable in light of any anticipated damages at the outset of
the lease. This logic also applies to the [contract ET] amount
calculated for Miller.592
So the amounts generated by the ET formula in this case were exces-
sive and unreasonable. 3 The court then continued, with a paragraph that
590 An industry-sponsored study captures the point:
In 2002, 69% of units coming off lease reached full term, which is relatively the
same year over year ['02 vs '01 ] ... A higher percentage of leases reaching full term
is not good for lessors since many of these leases are returned for lessor disposal. As
a result, the lessor is forced to bear the residual value risk and its potential impact to
financial performance since the market value of the vehicle oftentimes is lower than
the original residual value.
CONSUMER BANKERS ASS'N, 2002 AUTOMOBILE FINANCE STUDY, at V.14 (2002).
591 As noted, NMAC had a policy of charging the lesser of the contractual ET charge or the re-
maining monthly payments. Miller, 2000 WL 1599244, at *7. Although the holder did not actually
impose the contractual formula, the court found that its reasonableness was still in issue because it was
a component step in determining what the final ET charge would be. Id. at 024.
592 Id. at *29.
593 Id. at *30.
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might encapsulate the whole debate:
Beyond this, however, we also find that the [contract ET]
formula used to calculate these numbers is itself unreason-
able. What the formula serves to do is to impose upon an
early terminating lessee the risk that the contract residual
overstates the value of the car, a risk that neither is imposed
on lessees who carry their leases to term nor is related to any
harm that accrues to NMAC as a result of the early termina-
tion."'
"Quite so," the consumer plaintiffs would say. "My bargain was to
pay a set number of payments and then return the car. If I return the car
early, maybe I should have to make the remaining payments, but I certainly
should not owe any more than that. What's more, the lessor is getting the
car back with less mileage and depreciation than expected."
"Oh, no," the lessor might respond. "Our agreement is not as simple as
you make it seem. You agreed to lease the car for a specified term, and we
agreed to assume the residual-value risk as of the scheduled expiration
date. At any time before that, under the lease contract, you, the lessee,
assume that risk. That's why the early termination provision is in the lease
in the first place." "'
The Miller case is, at this writing, still on appeal, and until there is a
greater body of case law to provide guidance it is hard to draw conclusions
on reasonableness." On the theory the court articulates above, the ET
charge formulas in most auto leases would seem vulnerable to a reason-
ableness challenge. At the same time, the lessor practice of using inflated
residuals continues,597 and it is often the artificially inflated residual value
that creates the distorted early termination charges.
Nor is there any easy alternative to current early termination charge
practice that is manifestly more fair to consumers without significantly
594 Id. (footnotes omitted).
595 The lessor might add that the Comment to U.C.C. section 2A-504 identifies just this kind of
early termination clause as one that is "common in leasing practice." U.C.C. § 2A-504 cmt. (2002).
While it might become unreasonable as applied in a given case, it is not declared to be per se unreason-
able, unconscionable, or otherwise illegal. Id.
596 Relevant case law includes interpretations of the liquidated damages provision in U.C.C. Arti-
cle 2A as well as decisions interpreting the federal C.L.A. See, e.g., Sun v. Mercedes Benz Credit
Corp., 562 S.E.2d 714 (Ga. App. 2002) (finding that the lease obligation far exceeded the $25,000
ceiling for coverage by the federal C.L.A.; thus, UCC Article 2A controlled).
597 A 2002 trade association study reports that for the prior year, forty-nine percent of residuals
were set above guidebook (and none by more than eleven percent above). This was by contrast to 2000
when sixty-five percent of residuals were set above guidebook (including ten percent that were set more
than eleven percent above). CONSUMER BANKERS ASS'N, 2002 AUTOMOBILE FINANCE STUDY, at
V.13, fig. V.23 (2002).
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restricting lessor pricing options."' There is the "classic default formula"
that in effect allows the lessor to recoup all remaining payments under the
lease without reduction to present value."' Authors Burke and Cannel
suggest an alternative: The early termination charge should consist of the
present value of the remaining lease payments plus the present value of the
residual-value amount, less the value of the goods at default; the value at
default, however, is to be determined not by the actual disposition value of
the goods but by "interpolation" of a value along a hypothetical deprecia-
tion curve running throughout the lease.6o° Consumer lawyers currently
advocate for a version of this approach, the key to which is that the real-
ized value at early termination can never be less that the projected residual
value at lease expiration.6'o In theory, the U.C.C. default rule for measuring
lessor damages on lessee's default should be a useful reference point, as
the whole point of the liquidated damages clause is to approximate that
amount within a "reasonable" range. The statutory damages formula in
U.C.C. Article 2A is not very helpful. U.C.C. section 2A-528(l) would
award the lessor the difference between the present value of remaining
payments under the lease less the present value of the "market rent ... for
the same lease term" as of the date of repossession. o2 This may make
sense for real estate or certain equipment leases where there is a readily
ascertainable market rental rate for used property. In consumer goods
markets, particularly for automobiles, there is no such market rent. Used
cars coming off lease are not re-leased; they are sold. This lack of a help-
ful default formula in the U.C.C. only exacerbates the difficulty of deciding
whether a substituted liquidated damages in the lease is reasonable or not.
"As compared to what?" is the question left dangling.
Against this background, what does the U.C.L.A. add by way of clari-
fication, restriction, or safe harbor? A little of each, it seems.
First, the U.C.L.A. restates the reasonableness test for early termina-
tion liability in nearly the same language as is used in the federal C.L.A. o3
598 In addition to the "common" formula discussed here, the Comment to U.C.C. section 2A-504
describes several others:
Another common liquidated damages formula utilizes a periodic depreciation alloca-
tion as a credit to the aforesaid amount in mitigation of a lessor's damages. A third
formula provides for a fixed number of periodic payments as a means of liquidating
damages. Stipulated loss or stipulated damage schedules are also common.
U.C.C._§ 2A-504 cmt.
599See John J.A. Burke & John M. Cannel, Leases of Personal Property. A Project for Consumer
Protection, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 115, 121-25 (1991) (criticizing such an approach as inequitable).
60 d. at 143-47.
601NAT'L CONSUMER L. CTR., TRUTH IN LENDING § 9.5.4.7.2; § 9.5.4.7.2 (4th ed. 1999 & Supp.
2001).
602 U.C.C. § 2A-528(1).
603Compare U.C.L.A. § 405(a) (2002) ("A consumer lease may provide a measure or formula for
the lessee's liability on early termination, but only at an amount reasonable in light of the anticipated or
actual harm caused by the early termination, the difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or
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It then clarifies that certain amounts payable on early termination are out-
side the basic payoff figure, that is, the ET charge: (i) sums already due
under the lease, such as missed payments, or late or delinquency charges;
604
(ii) excess wear and tear and excess mileage charges;" 5 (iii) other amounts
the lessee owes, such as for traffic tickets or taxes;6°6 (iv) taxes and official
fees triggered by the early termination; 7 and (v) either a fixed disposition
fee or the actual costs of retaking and disposing of the goods.6°8 None of
these items are relevant to assessing the holder's lost expectancy.
Next, the U.C.L.A. imposes a substantive cap on the amount of any
early termination charge, regardless of how reasonable its calculation for-
mula might be."°9 That cap is the "total of the remaining periodic pay-
ments.610 (In a sense, though not intentionally, this U.C.L.A. cap requires
what the lessor in the Miller case did voluntarily-accept the remaining
payments under the lease instead of insisting on payment of an inflated,
questionable ET charge. 6t ) As the Comment explains, the U.C.L.A. "does
not reject, but does qualify"'61 2 the view that the lease contract can shift the
depreciation risk to the early-terminating consumer. "In effect this [cap]
allocates to the holder rather than to the consumer lessee a portion of the
risk of bad judgment about depreciation at the time of early termination." '613
Finally, what of the quest for a safe harbor? Of all the issues in the
U.C.L.A. drafting, more than anything else the industry hoped to get statu-
tory language that created a workable safe-harbor formula for early termi-
nation charges. Through the drafting process, a number of variants were
proposed, but none survived in the statutory text. At the N.C.C.U.S.L.
meeting in August 2001, as the industry delegation and the Drafting Com-
mittee worked feverishly to find adjustments and compromises that would
unfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy."), with 15 U.S.C. § 1667b(a) (2000) ("Penal-
ties or other charges for delinquency, default, or early termination may be specified in the lease but
only at an amount which is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual harm casused by the
delinquency, default, or early termination, the difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or
nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy.").
604 U.C.L.A. § 405(a)(1 ).
605 Id. § 405(a)(2). But these cannot be duplicative. For instance, the holder cannot collect ex-
cess wear and use charges if the goods have been resold in their unrepaired condition, lowering the
realized value.
606 Id. § 405(a)(3).
607Id. § 405(a)(4).
608 Id. § 405(a)(6).
609 Id. § 405(b).
610 Id. This cap does not apply to early termination of a true open-end lease, where the holder is
presumptively always entitled to at least three monthly payments. Id. § 405 cmt. 7; see id. § 307 (open-
end consumer lease).
611 Miller v. Nissan Motors Acceptance Corp., No. CIV.A.99-4953, 2000 WL 1599244, at *1, *2
(E.D. Pa. Oct. 27, 2000).




mute industry opposition to the Act, the safe harbor issue remained a focus
of concern. The upshot is the inclusion in the middle of Comment 6 to
U.C.L.A. section 405 of this single sentence:
Thus, an early termination charge that is less than or equal to
the unamortized capitalized cost, calculated in accordance
with the constant yield method or another generally accepted
actuarial method, plus a reasonable prepayment charge dis-
closed in the lease, minus the realized value of the goods,
may be" given a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness.614
Although qualified somewhat by the surrounding Comment language,
this is a powerful statement of approbation or tolerance for a mainstream
early termination formula. Reference to the "constant yield method"
'6 15
assures that the basic ET charge credits the consumer with unearned inter-
est on the remaining lease payments-similar to an "unpaid principal" bal-
ance for a loan. The blessing accorded to the constant yield method con-
spicuously omits other calculation methods that are less favorable to con-
sumers, such as the Rule of 78s or a straight-line amortization. The sen-
tence also acknowledges justification for a "reasonable prepayment
charge" to compensate for incidental losses such as foregone tax benefits,
overhead, or lost opportunity costs. 6 16 And it acknowledges that the appro-
priate deduction or offset is for the actual "realized value" of the goods,
and not some hypothetical or imputed valuation along a depreciation
curve. 6 1  Stated only as a "rebuttable presumption of reasonableness, '618
this sentence may not be quite the safe harbor the industry sought, but, if
the courts find it and give it weight, it is a more protective harbor than they
would otherwise have.
614 Id. § 405 cmt. 6.
615 This is a commonly used version of an actuarial method of calculating how much of each
monthly lease payment goes to interest (rent charge) and how much to principal (adjusted lease bal-
ance). E.g., CAL. CIVIL CODE § 2985.7(f)(1) (West Supp. 2002):
"Constant yield method" means the following:
(1) In the case of a periodic payment lease, the method of determining the rent
charge portion of each base payment in which the rent charge for each computational
period is earned in advance by multiplying the constant rate implicit in the lease con-
tract times the balance subject to rent charge as it declines during the scheduled lease
term. At any time during the scheduled term of a periodic payment lease, the bal-
ance subject to rent charge is the difference between the adjusted capitalized cost and
the sum of (A) all depreciation and other amortized amounts accrued during the pre-
ceding computational periods and (B) the first base periodic payment.
Id.
The following statutory paragraph recasts this definition for a single payment lease where the am-
ortization flow is reversed. Id. § 2985.7(f)(2).





One further note on early termination. Where a consumer's early ter-
mination of a lease is pursuant to authorization in the lease itself or is oth-
erwise agreed to by the lease holder, and the consumer pays whatever ET
charge is due, this termination should not be considered a "default" that
would mar the consumer's credit history. U.C.L.A. section 406 makes this
explicit.
619
D. Excess Wear and Use; Excess Mileage
Lessors understandably want their property returned at the end of a
lease in decent working condition, that is, within a predictable range of
ordinary wear and use, and without major physical damage, disrepair, and
lack of maintenance. To guard against such diminished value and repair
costs, most consumer leases set out standards for excess wear and use, and
impose charges on the lessee when damage or disrepair of the returned
goods exceed those tolerances. Likewise, for automobiles, the lease will
typically project estimated mileage and will impose a charge if the car is
driven more than that amount.62° Standards for general maintenance, ex-
cess wear and use, and excess mileage, are subject to disclosure under the
federal C.L.A.6 '
The imposition of these end-of-lease charges has apparently not been a
significant source of dispute, gauging from the dearth of case law. But the
context and dynamics of closing out a lease present possibilities for abuse,
or at least misunderstandings, about these charges, and the U.C.L.A. pro-
vides a framework for minimizing those problems. In the most common
case, the lessee returns the leased goods at the lease expiration date, either
to the lease holder (a finance company or bank), or to the originating dealer
acting for the lease holder, or to another dealer as part of the selection of a
new car for purchase or lease. Whoever receives the car may give it a cur-
sory inspection on the spot, and it may be examined more closely later,
perhaps in preparation for resale. If the dealer or holder then determines
that there has been excess wear and use, the lessee will be billed for the
charges. By the time the consumer receives that bill, the car will likely
have been sold and be effectively untraceable. As a practical matter it is
difficult for the consumer to question the legitimacy or amount of those
excess wear and use charges. The lessor or holder may be tempted to ex-
aggerate the damage or inflate the charges, especially if it will otherwise
619 Id. § 406.
620 Usually the customer may buy an extra-mileage rider, beyond what the lease would normally
expect.
621 12 C.F.R. § 213.4(h) (2002). A motor vehicle lease must flag the potential excess wear charge
with a special notice: "Excessive Wear and Use. You may be charged for excessive wear based on our
standards for normal use." Id. § 213.4(h)(3).
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take a big residual value loss. On the other hand, a dealer intent on making
a new sale or lease to the consumer will not want to nickel-and-dime that
potential customer with excess wear and use charges, especially trumped-
up ones. In any case, the holder has precious little leverage to collect ex-
cess wear charges if the consumer disputes or refuses to pay them---a
small-claims law suit, perhaps.
The U.C.L.A. sets the premise that excess wear and use standards and
charges must be "reasonable and reasonably applied," and may not exceed
the cost of repair or refurbishing.622 The standards cannot make the lessee
liable for "ordinary and expected wear, use, and depreciation," nor for
damage or repair that is covered by insurance, warranty or service contract
if the holder can collect under those coverages and the lessee cooperates in
helping the holder collect.623 Together, these restraints set limits on what
can be squeezed into the excess wear and use category, and they assume
that "ordinary" wear and tear is part of the lessor's business risk.
For non-motor vehicle leases, the Act seeks only to require some
minimum due process before a consumer can be charged for excess wear.
To impose the charge, the holder must notify the lessee of the "nature and
amount" of the charges within five days after the goods are returned.624
And the holder must give the lessee "reasonable time and access" for the
lessee to examine the goods.625 Notwithstanding some current Comment
language, the lessee's right to inspect the goods ends the matter as far as
the U.C.L.A. is concerned.626 If the lessee resists paying the excess wear
charges, the holder may pursue any normal collection methods.
Motor vehicle leases present a greater challenge, because the stakes are
higher. The amount of excess wear charges can be substantial for the les-
see. Simultaneously, there is greater pressure on the holder to dispose of
the goods quickly to minimize storage, insurance, and depreciation costs.
The approach in the U.C.L.A. is strongly to encourage, but not quite re-
quire, an inspection of the vehicle before the scheduled expiration of the
lease so that excess wear can be identified, charges set, and (if necessary)
disputes resolved before the vehicle is finally turned in on the expiration
622 U.C.L.A. § 407(a).
623 Id. at § 407(b)(t)-(2).
624 Id. at § 407(c). The holder must "send" the notice timely; thus the notice is presumably effec-
tive when dispatched even if the lessee never receives it.
625 Id. § 407. The time must be at least twelve business days, i.e., two and a half weeks, from the
sending of the notice. This effectively requires the holder to sequester the goods for at least that long
before they can be resold or re-leased.
626 Id. § 407, cmt. 4. The original version of this Comment says that the lessee has twelve busi-
ness days "to arrange a reinspection by a mutually agreeable inspector." Id. There is no support for
this reinspection notion in the statutory text. The author confesses blame for not correcting the Com-




To start the scenario, a holder of a vehicle lease that wants to be able to
impose excess wear and use charges at lease expiration must send the les-
see notice within a window of time between thirty and ninety days preced-
ing lease expiration.62 The notice explains the details of the process being
initiated:
I. The lessee is invited to bring the car in for an in-
spection for excess wear, at a "reasonably accessi-
ble site," at some point within 20 days of lease expi-
ration;
629
2. The lessee may use one of the holder's authorized
inspectors (identified in the notice), or an independ-
ent inspector agreeable to the holder;
630
3. The inspector's report on excess wear and use is
binding on the holder if the lessee either pays the
charge or has the necessary repairs made at his own
expense;
631
4. Despite this procedure, the holder may still recover
for latent damage ("not reasonably detectable by an
inspection"), damage incurred in the interval be-
tween the inspection and return of the vehicle, or
damage that is the result of shoddy repairs. To
claim such damages, the holder must notify the les-
see within 60 days after return of the vehicle.632
The lessee is not required to follow this procedure. If the lessee does
not get the pre-expiration date inspection, the only specific restraint on the
holder is that it must notify the lessee of claimed excess wear and use
627 Connecticut did not adopt the uniform version of U.C.L.A. section 407(e) dealing with excess
wear and use procedures for motor vehicle leases. See text infra at notes 635-41.
628 U.C.L.A. § 407(e)(l)-(3).
629 Id.
630 ld.
631 Id. To say that the inspector's report is "binding" means just what it says. The holder cannot
later claim additional (discoverable) damages or that the charges are understated. The U.C.L.A. does
not specify what happens if the lessee disputes the inspector's report. Presumably the parties work it
out or litigate, if necessary. But at least the lessee has had access to the goods, with a witness (and/or a
camera), and has a factual basis for any objections to the inspector's report.
632 Id. For these post hoc damages to be collectible, the holder need not retain the car nor provide
the lessee access to it or a new inspection. In fact the car will likely have been sold, and these later
damages may only turn up when the car is inspected closely by a subsequent purchaser. The sixty-day
limit may leave the holder exposed to warranty claims by subsequent transferees, without any recourse
against the original lessee.
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charges within sixty days after return of the car.633 Of course, the general
standard of reasonableness still applies.634
The drafters intent and hope is that this procedure will smoke out most
excess wear and tear problems in vehicle leases early enough to allow the
parties to deal with them, but without requiring the holder to keep and store
the vehicle for an extended period of time. It also struck the Drafting
Committee as impractical to interpose some kind of formal dispute resolu-
tion process in between return and disposition of the goods.
Connecticut has taken a somewhat different (non-uniform) approach
on excess wear and use in vehicle leases. It omits the U.C.L.A. provision
on that topic, and instead amends and re-enacts several sections of existing
law that set out Connecticut's established excess wear and use proce-
dure.635 Under these provisions, there is no required notice and opportunity
for a pre-expiration inspection of the vehicle.636 Instead, the key require-
ment is an "itemized estimate" of the charges, prepared by a licensed "mo-
tor vehicle physical damage appraiser . . . or repair shop."637 The Con-
necticut process unfolds as follows:
I. Within 45 days after return of the vehicle (or a
shorter time agreed by the parties), the holder must
send the lessee registered or certified mail notice of
the "wear and tear" charges, including the holder's
itemized estimate. The notice must alert the lessee
that he can contest the charges, and must identify at
least three independent appraisers or repair shops
from whom the lessee can get a second itemized es-
timate. 38
2. Within fourteen days after the holder's notice is
mailed or delivered, the lessee may contest the
charge by notifying the holder in writing and getting
(within that same fourteen days), at the lessee's own
expense, an itemized estimate from a licensed ap-
praiser or repair shop. If the new estimate comes
from one of the appraisers or shops identified in the
633 d. § 407(e)(4).
634 The rules described in this section apply only at scheduled expiration of the lease. If excess
wear and use charges are imposed at other times, such as on early termination of the lease, there are no
specified notices or other procedures to be followed, but the general reasonableness standard still ap-
plies. Id. at § 407, cmt. 5d.635 
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 42-270,42.271 (2001).
636 See id.
637 Id. § 42-271 (a). The "appraiser" and "repair shop" must be licensed respectively under CONN.
GEN. STAT. §§ 38a-790.
638 Id. § 42-271(b).
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holder's notice, the lower of the two estimates con-
trols. If the lessee uses a different licensed ap-
praiser or repair shop, the two estimates set a range
within which the actual charges must be set.639
3. If the lessee challenges the holder's estimate of ex-
cess wear and use charges, the holder must permit
the lessee's selected appraiser or repair shop "rea-
sonable access" to the vehicle during the fourteen
day challenge period. 64
4. If the holder fails to send the initial notice, or fails
to provide access to the vehicle, the holder may not
recover excess wear and tear charges. 4
Since this mechanism predates the U.C.L.A. in Connecticut, and has
apparently worked satisfactorily there, it is understandable that the state
should want to continue with it. It offers consumers an opportunity to chal-
lenge excess wear and tear charges if armed with a second itemized esti-
mate from a licensed appraiser or shop. This all must occur within fairly
tight time frames after the vehicle has been returned, i.e., after the lease has
expired. The U.C.L.A., by contrast, tries to get the wear-and-tear inspec-
tion (and any dispute about it) out of the way before return of the goods,
thereby allowing the holder to dispose of the goods quickly when they are
returned. Perhaps some empirical comparisons over time between the
Connecticut approach and the U.C.L.A.'s will show whether one has an
advantage over the other.
Back to the U.C.L.A. for one final point concerning lease expiration.
Most vehicle leases stipulate a maximum mileage limit over the term of the
lease, and impose a per-mile or similar charge for mileage over that limit.
Excess mileage is related to excess wear and use, yet is a distinctive aspect
of it. The car may be in top repair and unblemished, but if it has an extra
50,000 miles on the odometer, that mileage alone diminishes its resale
value. The U.C.L.A. permits "reasonable" excess mileage charges.61'
VIII. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT
Consumer protection laws need to be enforceable, either through
prosecutions by public officials, or by consumers vindicating their rights in
639 Id. § 42-271(c). An unstated inference may be that the parties will split the difference.
640 Id. § 42-271(d).
641 Id. § 42-271(e).
642 U.C.L.A. § 407(0 (2002).
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private civil suits, or by a combination of these approaches. The U.C.L.A.
includes both.
A. Public Enforcement and Administration of the Act
The U.C.L.A. assigns public enforcement to a designated state official,
but does not delineate that official's powers or remedies. Rather, it effects
a kind of hand-off, where the designated official "has the power and is enti-
tled to the remedies" under an existing consumer fraud act.6' In Connecti-
cut's adoption of the U.C.L.A., the Commissioner of Consumer Protection
is authorized to act under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act
("CUTPA").6" The U.C.L.A. drafters advise that the designated agency
should "have an array of investigative, injunctive, restitution and similar
powers," '645 so that public enforcement could be a real deterrent to scoff-
laws and an instrument for recovering monetary losses on behalf of con-
sumer victims of unlawful conduct.
The Act also provides that a designated state official or office will have
authority to administer the act, and to issue rules, interpretations or approv-
als that promote the goals of the Act.646 The designated "administrator"
could, but need not be, the same official as is assigned enforcement author-
ity. Connecticut names the Commissioner of Consumer Protection as ad-
ministrator as well as enforcer.64 7
Both of these functions--enforcement and administration-are critical
for the U.C.L.A. to be able to deliver the protections it promises. An ac-
tive, responsive enforcement official is the "cop on the beat" of the leasing
markets. Thoughtful administration of the Act can permit clarifications
and guidance on the application of the act to new or unsettled circum-
stances, and can perform a regulatory oversight role in gauging the Act's
effectiveness. 64 The administrative function is also important because,
643 Id. § 507.
644CONN. U.C.L.A. § 41, 2002 Pub. Acts No. 02-81 (Reg. Sess.). CUTPA is CONN. GEN. STAT.
§§ 42-110a to 42-1l0q.
645 U.C.L.A. § 507 cmt. 1.
646 Id. § 508. Administration of the Act should tend to "effectuate consumer protection" under
the Act, "prevent circumvention or evasion" of the Act, "facilitate compliance" with it, "avoid preemp-
tion" by the federal C. LA., and "assure consistent interpretations" with those of other states enacting
the U.C.L.A. Id. § 508(a). To help harmonize interpretations among enacting states, the Administrator
is instructed to "take into consideration" the interpretations made by administrators in other states. Id.
§ 508(b). The U.C.L.A. makes clear that while "uniformity of interpretation is a general objective,"
there is no "cession of any authority with respect to this Act to officials of other states." id. § 508, cmt.
3.
647 CONN. U.C.L.A. § 42, 2002 Pub. Acts No. 02-81 (Reg. Sess.).
648 For comparison, at the federal level, the Federal Reserve Board's Division of Consumer and
Community Affairs performs a significant administrative role for a variety of federal laws, including
the federal C.L.A. The Division drafts regulations and issues "Staff Commentary" interpreting those
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under the Act, lessors may be protected from liability where they act in
accordance with official regulations or interpretations, even if the regula-
tion or interpretation is later overturned in the courts.649
Sustaining the enforcement and administrative functions will require
some commitment of state resources, unless the state can absorb the incre-
mental costs within existing expense lines-that means new budget re-
quests and authorizations. The U.C.L.A. does not even attempt to project
what kinds of personnel or other resources might be needed, but they
should not be huge and may be offset in part by fines or civil penalties re-
covered by the agency.5 °
B. Private Civil Actions by Consumers
Empowering consumers to vindicate their own rights, and to serve as
private attorneys general in policing consumer markets, has been an impor-
tant component of most modern consumer protection laws, and the
U.C.L.A. is no exception. Violations of the U.C.L.A. may be the basis for
affirmative actions by consumers for actual and, in some cases, statutory
damages.65' Violations may also be asserted defensively against collection
actions, as claims in recoupment.652 A successful consumer litigant is gen-
erally entitled to court costs and attorney's fees.
65 3
Exposure to civil liability is perhaps the most sensitive aspect of the
U.C.L.A. for the leasing industry and for consumer representatives. For
the latter, it is critical that consumers be authorized to sue for violations of
consumer laws and that they have incentives to do so in the form of statu-
tory damages and litigation expenses. The industry objects in principle to
liability without proof of harm, which is what statutory damages provide.
But the industry's greatest concern is class actions, especially for statutory
damages based on allegations of "technical" violations across a whole port-
folio of lease transactions. 54 The U.C.L.A. drafting battles over the extent
regulations for all creditors and lessors subject to them. It also oversees enforcement of those laws and
regulations for state banks that are members of the federal reserve system.
649 U.C.L.A. § 504(d); see text infra at notes 566-75.
650 In an OFA Fiscal Note accompanying Connecticut's enactment of the U.C.L.A., it is ac-
knowledged that another complaint-examiner position could be needed for enforcement ($82,000), but
that administrative regulations would be adopted "within existing resources." Potential revenue gain
from civil penalties was also acknowledged, but not quantified. HB5248, File No. 593 (2002).
651 See discussion infra Part IX (discussing actions and damages available under the U.C.L.A.).
652 Id.
653 Id.
654 One industry-oriented observer characterized the penultimate draft of the U.C.L.A. as the
"Unlimited 'Class action' Liability Act." Thomas B. Hudson, Commentary, SPOT DELIVERY, Vol. 3,
Issue 11, at I (Consumer Credit Compliance Co., June 2001). Concern over class action suits, and the
enormous settlement leverage they provide consumers and their lawyers, is a major factor in the in-




of civil liability for violations continued into the frenetic three days of ne-
gotiations at the N.C.C.U.S.L. meeting in August 2001 and, as a result, the
Act contains a somewhat curious mix of liability rules and limitations on
their applicability.
1. Actual Damages; Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
Any violation of the U.C.L.A. subjects the guilty holder to liability for
"actual damages,"655 which includes "both direct and consequential dam-
ages."656 While liability attaches in the first instance to the "holder that
violates this Act," a subsequent assignee is generally also exposed to liabil-
ity for violations by the prior holder.657 This permits consumers to assert
violations by the original lessor defensively in collection actions by a cur-
rent holder that acquired the lease from that original lessor. For disclosure
violations, the Act specifies that the lessee must show "reliance on the
holder's conduct to the lessee's detriment" to recover actual damages.65'
Thus a consumer would usually have to show that he was conscious of the
mis-disclosed information, proceeded with the lease transaction nonethe-
less, but could have gotten more favorable terms elsewhere. The U.C.L.A.
does not enumerate which "disclosure" violations are subject to this "reli-
ance" limitation, but presumably it includes all the disclosure or informa-
tion requirements discussed in Part V of this Article.
Since the Act does not prohibit class actions for actual damages, class
action suits are permissible where they are allowed under the procedural
rules of the state. That is, the U.C.L.A. does not create a basis for class
certification where one does not otherwise exist. With the requirement for
individualized reliance on disclosure violations and the variable nature of
actual damages in other cases, class actions for actual damages under the
U.C.L.A. will probably be rare.
In an appropriate case, a consumer may also seek a declaratory judg-
ment or injunction.659 The statutory text makes clear that this can be a free-
standing claim and need not be ancillary to a claim for monetary damages.
2. Statutory Damages for Certain Violations
Statutory damages are recoverable for violations of specified sections
655 U.C.L.A. § 501o(b) (2002).
656 Id. cmt. 3. For example, a forcible middle-of-the-night repossession might give rise to dam-
ages for emotional distress as well as the conversion value of the retaken goods.
657 U.C.L.A. § 505.
658 Id. By stating this reliance test explicitly, the U.C.L.A. conforms to a consistent line of cases
construing the actual damages provision of the federal T.I.L.A. that applies to leases through the federal
C.L.A. See Turner v. Beneficial Corp., 242 F.3d 1023, 1026 (1 1th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (stating that
detrimental reliance is an element ofa T.I.L.A. claim for actual damages), and cases cited therein.
659 U.C.L.A. § 501(c).
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of the Act, most of which are disclosure rules in one form or another.'
The rationale is that these violations rarely produce provable actual dam-
ages, yet we want to give consumers an incentive to challenge bad prac-
tices and a modest reward if they are successful.
As for the amount of statutory damages, the U.C.L.A. parallels the fed-
eral C.L.A."6 ' The consumer who proves a violation of one of the listed
sections recovers twenty-five percent of the amount of payments scheduled
under the lease, 2 with a minimum of $500 and a maximum of $1,000. 66 '
While these statutory damages operate as a substitute for difficult-to-prove
actual damages in most cases, a consumer may recover both actual and
statutory damages.'
The most significant limitation on statutory damages under the
U.C.L.A. is that they cannot be pursued in a class action." The Drafting
Committee was persuaded that class action combinations of statutory dam-
ages across large classes of consumers, sometimes based on mechanical
violations and without proof of any actual harm, are enforcement over-
kill.' Individual actions still lie for statutory damages, but lessors and
660 Id. § 501(d). The specified provisions are:
§ 203(a),(b),(c)(l),(2),(4),(5),(d) (all disclosures due at consummation of a lease,
except the location of the lessor and lessee, (c)(3), and copies of transaction docu-
ments,(e));
* § 204 (insurance disclosures);
* § 206 (information during term of lease);
* § 301 (handling payments or trade-in pending lessor's approval of the lease);
* § 303(d) (accounting for application of security deposit);
* § 304(b) (pyramiding late charges);
* § 308(c) (application of refunded insurance premiums);
* § 309 (referral inducements);
* § 406 (reporting voluntary termination as a default); and
* § 407(c) (notice of excess wear and use charges in non-motor vehicle lease)
There may not be a completely coherent rationale for subjecting these violations to statutory damages
and not others. That is often the nature of provisions like this one, which are political compromises.
661 There is, in fact, a significant overlap between the federal C.L.A. and the U.C.L.A. regarding
statutory damages. For leases covered by both acts (i.e., up to $25,000), statutory damages for transac-
tional disclosure violations are recoverable under each act. But the U.C.L.A. § 506(b), permits only a
single recovery in such cases. Since the caps on statutory damages are the same under both acts
($1,000), the point is largely moot.
62 In the federal C.L.A., this twenty-five percent figure was used on the theory that that amount
would roughly approximate twice the amount of the finance charge in a credit transaction, which is the
baseline measure of statutory damages for violation of T.I.LA. disclosure rules. Ralph J. Rohner,
Consumer Credit Legislation in the Ninety-Fourth Congress - and a Look Ahead, 9 U.C.C.L.J. 307,
337 (1977). Cf T.I.L.A. § 130(a)(2)(A)(i), 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(A)(i) (2000).
663 9 U.C.C.L.J. 307, 337 (1977). The federal C.L.A. cap is also $1,000, but the minimum is only
$100.
664 U.C.L.A. § 501(d). The federal C.L.A. is to the same effect.
665 Id. § 501 (d) ("[e]xcept in a class action...').
666 This creates some divergence between the U.C.L.A. and the federal C.L.A. in cases where
they both apply. Nothing in the federal act prohibits class actions for statutory damages; indeed
T.I.L.A. recognizes their legitimacy by setting a cap on class action recovery and factors for a court to
apply in setting a maximum class action recovery. T.I.L.A. § 130(a)(2)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(B).
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holders will not be subject to the potentially vast liabilities, and resulting
settlement leverage, that class actions generate. It is better, the Committee
believed, that widespread violations without measurable harm be moni-
tored and policed by the state Attorney General or other consumer protec-
tion officials.
3. Court Costs and Attorney's Fees
Like most consumer laws, the U.C.L.A. entitles the successful con-
sumer litigant to recover court costs and "reasonable" attorney's fees.
667
The amount of damages recovered is not controlling on the amount of at-
torney's fees, which, to be reasonable, should reflect the time, energy, and
skill brought to the case.6 s When and how a consumer is "successful" in a
multi-claim or multi-count lawsuit is not specified in the Act, although the
drafters indicate by Comment that a consumer is "successful... whenever
a favorable court judgment or settlement is based on a violation of this
Act." ' 9 This suggests that even when litigation is settled, the consumer
may petition the court for attorney's fees (if they are not provided for in the
settlement agreement). Case law under other consumer protection laws can
be a source of guidance on these issues.670
As a result of the last-minute negotiations at the N.C.C.U.S.L. meeting
in August 2001, the Act contains a provision that limits the consumer's
right to attorney's fees where the consumer refuses a settlement offer and
recovers at trial no more than the amount of that settlement offer.67' While
this is justified in the Comments as "encouraging settlements in actions for
monetary damages, 672 it is also an obvious effort to chill or foreshorten
litigation whenever the lease holder offers to settle for a respectable
amount. 3 It also tends to place a wedge between the consumer lessee and
her lawyer, because after a settlement offer, the lawyer who pursues litiga-
tion, at the client's insistence or the lawyer's, risks going uncompensated
unless the court award is larger than the settlement offer.
The control on the lessee's right to attorney's fees operates only where
Many such T.I.L.A. class suits have been certified. Cf RALPH J. ROHNER & FRED H. MILLER, TRUTH
IN LENDING 12.08 (2000); NAT'L CONSUMER L. CTR., TRUTH IN LENDING § 8.8 (4th ed. 2001). To
this extent the industry's victory on class actions under the U.C.L.A. may be Pyrrhic.
667 U.C.L.A. § 501(e).
668 Id. cmt. 6.
669 Id.
670See generally RALPH J. ROHNER & FRED H. MILLER, TRUTH IN LENDING $ 12.0413] (2000);
NAT'L CONSUMER L. CTR., TRUTH IN LENDING § 8.9 (4th ed. 2001).
671 U.C.L.A. § 501(0.
672 Id.
673 For instance, if there are no actual damages and the holder offers to pay $1,000 (the maximum
statutory damages liability for a U.C.L.A. violation), neither the lessee nor her counsel have much
incentive to initiate or prolong litigation. The lessee will never get more than the proffered $1,000, and
the lawyer will not get paid for efforts beyond receipt of that settlement offer.
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the consumer lessee is the plaintiff in an action for money damages674 and
does not apply when the lessee seeks injunctive or declaratory relief, or
where the lessee is asserting a U.C.L.A. violation defensively or as a coun-
terclaim in a collection action.675 It contemplates the following scenario:
0 Before filing suit the plaintiff must send the holder
a demand letter stating the alleged violation and the
damages sought.676
• The holder then has twenty days to give the lessee a
settlement offer.6"
* If the lessee accepts the settlement offer, that should
end the matter. Whether included specifically in the
settlement offer or not, the lessee is entitled to at-
torneys' fees for work done before receipt of the
settlement offer.
0 If the lessee rejects the settlement offer, the litiga-
tion may proceed, but unless the court awards dam-
ages to the lessee in an amount greater than the set-
tlement offer amount, the lessee recovers no attor-
ney's fees incurred after the settlement offer.678
This procedure puts pressure on the lessee and lessee's counsel to cal-
culate their litigation strategy carefully lest they accrue unpayable attor-
ney's fees. It also forces lease holders to decide whether to pay off pesky
consumer litigants at the threshold of litigation, or to contest their allega-
tions of U.C.L.A. violations on the merits while the meter runs on the
plaintiff's attorney's fees.
4. Statutes of Limitations
The time limits for exposure to civil liability can sometimes be as im-
portant as the liability itself. The U.C.L.A. statute of limitations provisions
again reflect some political compromises.
674 U.C.L.A. § 501(f) (referring specifically to "a lessee as plaintiff in an action for monetary
damages").
P5 Id. cmt. 7.
6 76 Id. § 501(f)(1).
677 Id. § 501(f)(2). The lessee may file suit in the interim, while waiting for the holder's response
to the demand letter. In addition, the lessee's demand letter tolls the statute of limitations for sixty




The basic limitations period for an action asserting a violation of the
Act is one year after the "termination of the lease." '679 This is ostensibly the
same as the limitations period under the federal C.L.A.680 "Termination" is
not defined under the federal act, but it is under the U.C.L.A.6"' Termina-
tion occurs when the lessee no longer has the right to possession and use of
the goods through either (i) expiration of the lease; (ii) an election to ter-
minate by one of the parties as provided in the lease, such as by default or
other early termination; or (iii) agreement of the parties at any time.682 The
trigger for starting the statute of limitations running should not be difficult
to determine in most cases. Where the lessee is in default, it may not be
obvious when the holder elects to terminate and case law under the federal
C.L.A. may be helpful.6" 3
To this general statute of limitations there are several qualifications:
" A class action (which is permitted only for actual
damages or non-monetary relief) is time-barred after
a year from the occurrence of the alleged violation."
* For violations with respect to disclosures due at or
prior to closing of the lease deal, the statute of limita-
tions runs two years from the "execution of the
lease. 68 5
A note on the Connecticut version of the U.C.L.A. is in order here.
Connecticut has set each of the respective limitations periods just discussed
at three years from the triggering event. 86 Thus the general statute of limi-
tations is three years from termination of the lease; class actions may be
brought within three years after occurrence of the violation, and pre-
closing disclosure violations are actionable for three years from the con-
summation of the lease. These adjustments, one can assume, represent
679 Id. § 503(a).
680 15 U.S.C. § 1667d(c) (2000).
681 U.C.L.A. § 103(c).
682 Id.
683 See Carmichael v. Nissan Motor Acceptance Corp., 291 F.3d 1278, 1281 (11 th Cir. 2002)
(stating that a lease terminates when leased vehicle leaves the lessee's possession through voluntary
surrender or repossession).
684 U.C.L.A. § 503(b). This effectively shrinks not only the window of opportunity for filing a
class action, but also reduces the potential size of the class to those who suffered provable actual dam-
ages within the twelve month period between the violation and the filing of the action.
685 Id. § 503(c). One effect of this rule is to create different statutes of limitations for the transac-
tional disclosures that are subject both to the federal C.L.A. and to the U.C.L.A.; most notably the
disclosures required under U.C.L.A. section 203(a). Ifa lease (of no more than $25,000) has disclosure
violations, the statute of limitations under the federal C.L.A. is a year after the lease terminates, while
under the U.C.L.A. it is two years from lease signing. For any lease longer than one year, the U.C.L.A.
statute of limitations is shorter than the C.L.A.'s.
686 CONN. U.C.L.A. § 37(a)-(b), 2002 Pub. Acts No. 02-81 (Reg. Sess.).
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consumer victories or industry concessions in the Connecticut legislature.
Then, under the U.C.L.A., there is the recognition that, despite any
other applicable limitations period, a lessee may always raise a violation of
the Act "by way of recoupment" in a holder's collection action on the
lease. This too parallels the federal T.I.L.A. rule.687  To the extent
U.C.L.A. violations are asserted defensively in this manner, the effective
limitations period runs as long as the statute of limitations on the holder's
collection claim. Under U.C.C. Article 2A, a lessor or holder may com-
mence an action for default under the lease "within four years after the
cause of action accrued. '688 Assume a case where a lessee defaults on ob-
ligations due under a sixty-month lease at or close to expiration of the
lease. The lease holder has four full years thereafter to sue the lessee for
those obligations. Then the lessee may introduce as a "claim in recoup-
ment" a U.C.L.A. violation committed any time during the lease period,
including a disclosure violation at or before lease signing. For a lessee in
this posture, the effective statute of limitations approaches or even exceeds
nine years from the time of the violation.
While the example just used is an exaggerated case, it highlights the
battles over limitations periods. Violations of the U.C.L.A. will often not
be self-evident and consumer lessees ought not be deprived of appropriate
remedies in circumstances where they cannot know of, or act on, violations
immediately. 9 On the other hand, lessors and lease holders-including
downstream assignees and securitizers-should not have to carry contin-
gent liabilities and indemnification responsibilities for lengthy or indeter-
minate periods of time. The U.C.L.A. cuts down the limitations periods for
actions initiated by a consumer, but preserves the consumer's right to in-
terpose U.C.L.A. violations defensively for however long the holder has to
sue the lessee for breach of the lease itself. Time will tell whether this is
an appropriate balance.
5. Protective Rules for Lessors/Holders
In part to parallel certain protective rules for lessors under the federal
C.L.A., the U.C.L.A. also immunizes a lessor or holder from liability for
violating the U.C.L.A. under some circumstances. These provisions were
687 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (2000). Connecticut enacted the U.C.L.A. language for this subsection.
CoNN. U.C.L.A. § 37(d), 2002 Pub. Acts No. 02-81 (Reg. Sess.).
688 U.C.C. § 2A-506(l)(2002).
689 U.C.L.A. § 503 cmt. 3 (alluding to the doctrine of "equitable tolling," which may suspend the
statute of limitations if a party consciously conceals a violation or other misconduct. The drafters say,
however, that the Act "takes no position on when or whether" the doctrine is appropriate). The doctrine
has been applied in T.I.L.A. litigation, although several recent T.I.L.A. cases have refused to apply
"equitable tolling" when the consumers themselves failed to exercise due diligence to discover the
violations. Taylor v. The Money Store, No. 00-35930, 2002 WL 1769962, at *1 (9th Cir. Aug. 1,
2002); Ignash v. First Serv. Fed. Credit Union, No. 01AP-1326, 2002 WL 1938412, at "2, *3 (Ohio
App. 10th Dist. Aug. 22, 2002).
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never controversial in the U.C.L.A. drafting process and can be summa-
rized here.
a. Reliance on Lessee's Representation
A holder has no liability for violating the U.C.L.A. if the holder rea-
sonably believed, based on reasonable reliance on the lessee's representa-
tion, that the leased goods were not intended for consumer purposes.6"
This immunity, based on a comparable provision in U.C.C. section 9-
628(c), shields the holder against both private civil actions and governmen-
tal enforcement. The premise is that if a lessee has indicated in a record,
expressly and persuasively, that the leased goods are for business, agricul-
tural or other non-consumer use, the lessor may rely on that representation
and treat the lease as outside U.C.L.A. coverage.
b. Cure of Violation
A holder avoids liability for statutory damages (but not actual dam-
ages) if it discovers a violation on its own and (within sixty days) fixes it
before the lessee either files suit or gives the holder written notice of the
violation.69 To cure the error, the holder must refund or make other ad-
justments for any charges that were mis-disclosed or wrongly imposed.
c. Good Faith Error
A holder is not liable for statutory damages if it can prove that the vio-
lation was a good faith error or oversight that occurred despite procedures
reasonably designed to avoid such errors.692 Examples could include cleri-
cal or calculation errors or computer malfunction, but not errors in legal
judgment about what the U.C.L.A. requires.
d. Multiple Lessees
Where there is a U.C.L.A. violation in a lease that has co-lessees, only
one measure of statutory damages may be imposed.69
e. Reliance on Official Interpretations
A holder has no liability for actual or statutory damages or otherwise
under the U.C.L.A., provided that the holder acted in good faith in confor-
mance with official regulations or interpretations of the Act by the admin-
istrator (Attorney General, or other consumer protection official), even if
the interpretation is later reversed, rescinded or modified.694 The same
690 U.C.L.A. § 502 (2002).
691 Id. § 504(a), based on T.I.L.A. § 130(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1640(b).
692 Id. § 504(b), basedon T.I.L.A. § 130(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1640(c).
693 Id. § 504(c), basedon T.I.L.A. § 130(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1640(d).
694 Id. § 504(d)(1), based on T.I.L.A. § 130(f), 15 U.S.C. § 1640(f).
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protection is afforded with respect to interpretations of the federal C.L.A.
by the Federal Reserve Board or its staff with respect to the Regulation M
rules incorporated in the U.C.L.A. by reference.695
f. Multiple Violations
Where a lease contains multiple violations of the disclosure rules that
support recovery of statutory damages, only a single recovery of statutory
damages is allowed.696 A separate provision in the U.C.L.A. deals with the
situation where a violation of the U.C.L.A. also violates some other law,
which could be the federal C.L.A., or a state U.D.A.P. statute. 697 If there
are different measures of liability under the two laws, the consumer lessee
is entitled to the larger of the two recoveries, but not both.
Most of these protective provisions have track records, principally un-
der T.I.L.A. (which, for enforcement purposes, includes the C.L.A.). Judi-
cial interpretations and applications of those rules in T.I.L.A. should for the
most part be transferable to the U.C.L.A.698
IX. CONCLUSION
So there you have it. The National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, responding to felt concerns about the limited con-
sumer protection rules in U.C.C. Article 2A, has promulgated the Uniform
Consumer Leases Act to fill that gap and hopefully to bring greater consis-
tency and balance to the laws regulating leases of consumer goods. The
new Act borrows a number of baseline standards and protections from es-
tablished consumer credit laws to address issues that are common to trans-
actions in either credit sale or lease form. It also posits rules or frame-
works for evaluating terms and practices that are unique to leases. This is
supported by an enforcement structure that is rigorous but hopefully fair.
Is the U.C.L.A. a perfect regulatory response to leasing issues, a pana-
cea for all the ills of the consumer lease markets for our lifetimes? Almost
certainly not. The ingenuity of the marketplace always outruns the regula-
tory response, and practices will evolve that the U.C.L.A. fails to address at
all, or deals with inadequately. There may be questionable judgments or
695 Id. § 504(d)(2).
696 Id. § 504(e), based on T.I.L.A. § 130(g), 15 U.S.C. § 1640(g). This is justified in part because
often, if one number is miscalculated or misstated, a whole series of numbers derived from that one will
also be inaccurate.
697 Id. § 506(b).
698 See RALPH J. ROHNER & FRED H. MILLER, TRUTH IN LENDING 12.05 (2000); NAT'L CON-
SUMER L. CTR., TRUTH IN LENDING 7.3, 9.7.6 (4th ed. 2001). But note that the rules under T.I.L.A.
are not always precisely the same as those under the U.C.LA. The "good faith error" defense under
T.I.L.A., for example, protects a holder against both actual and statutory damages. The companion rule
in the U.C.L.A., however, protects only against statutory damages.
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drafting omissions or blunders in the U.C.L.A. as promulgated.6 99 But
there are also numerous provisions that are carefully considered and care-
fully crafted to bring greater order and integrity to the markets for con-
sumer leasing, a greater degree of bright-line guidance on permissible prac-
tices, and ample disclosure so that consumers can more often protect them-
selves and lessors can compete on a more level field.
It is frustrating, to some degree, that the U.C.L.A. could not resolve de-
finitively some of the important issues affecting consumer leases, such as:
" The precise bounds of "reasonableness" for early
termination charges:
" The appropriateness of electronic self-help;
" The proper treatment of "smart goods";
* Truly equivalent treatment of lessees under the Mag-
nuson-Moss Warranty Act; and
" The formulation of a workable "lease rate" disclo-
sure.
In the Drafting Committee's defense, some of these matters have gone
unsolved by able courts and other drafting bodies. Some are probably just
not politically ripe for resolution, and others may simply be intractable.
The effort to position the U.C.L.A. to complement, and be complemented
by, other law such as the federal C.L.A. and U.C.C. Article 2A, has
brought to light some uncertain regulatory boundaries between credit sales
and leases, some of which can only be clarified by law outside the
U.C.L.A. For example, only Congress (or perhaps the Federal Trade
Commission or the Federal Reserve Board) can confirm whether consumer
leases are covered by the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act or the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act. If nothing else, perhaps promulgation of the
U.C.L.A. will prompt legislators and regulators generally to be more con-
scious of leases as a marketplace option, and to state clearly their intentions
as to coverage of leases in any other consumer protection laws they draft.
No one, certainly not this author, can predict an enactment pattern for
the U.C.L.A. It is enacted in Connecticut partly to resolve a political
stand-off there over U.C.C. Article 2A. States that have no consumer leas-
ing laws on their books could readily adopt the U.C.L.A. as a companion to
their existing laws on credit sales. In states that have consumer leasing
699 Under N.C.C.U.S.L. practice, the original Drafting Committee becomes the Stand-By Com-
mittee to monitor the Act through its adoption and implementation in the states. In that role, the Com-
mittee has already caught and fixed several glitches in the U.C.L.A.'s Official Comments.
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laws in place, there can be a problem of inertia-it may be more difficult to
gain consensus to change existing law than to enact to fill a void. While
N.C.C.U.S.L. always hopes (and works) for widespread, even truly "uni-
form," adoption of their acts, that may simply not be realistic. Still, the Act
might be adopted in modified form, for example, applicable only to motor
vehicle leases. Or pieces of the U.C.L.A. might be added to existing laws,
for example in U.C.C.C. states that already address a number of consumer
lease issues. To whatever extent the U.C.L.A. is adopted, it should help
consumers and the marketplace generally.
